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56 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Mind Body Problem
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what it is to have a mind; what it is for someone or something to be in a mental state
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Materialism
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-AKA physicalism
-All physical things, no immaterial stuff (souls) -The mind is just the brain -In order to have a mind, you just need a type of “software” in a sort of brain -Neurons don’t fire w/o a stimulus -Conservation of energy neurons gained/lost this cannot happen -The need for life after death is a purely psychological desire -Thoughts, ideas and other non-physical things are merely movements of physical matter or chemical reactions. There is no reality beyond the physical. |
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Dualism
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Physical things (bodies, chairs, brains) and immaterial things (souls) both exist; Dualism is the philosophy that there are two kinds of reality: material and immaterial.
Physical thing "2" exist: can't perform tests on it Nonphysical soul More common a couple hundred years ago Aunt Helen is in my mind, she is NOT in my brain (proves mind and brain are separate entities) The brain weighs 5 lbs the mind does not objection to dualism: it still constitutes an extremely naive and simplistic explanation of things; it reduces all dimensions of consciousness to only two principles, spirit and matter. Many deny that the soul can exist apart from the body; hence there dependence on the myth of bodily resurrection |
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Souls
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Immaterial substances (dualist belief)
Not believed in by materialists Dualists believe that to have a soul is to be a being with a mind |
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Interactionism:
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Descartes argued matter differs from mind and this is his explanation of how both interact
Type of dualism: how mind and body are related material influenced by nonmaterial. Mental events can cause physical events as well as other mental events Physical events can cause mental events as well as other physical events Interactionists assert that a mental event, as when John Doe wills to kick a brick wall, can be the cause of a physical action, his leg and foot moving into the wall. Conversely, the physical event of his foot hitting the wall can be the cause of the mental event of his feeling a sharp pain. causal interaction: mind influences matter Objection 1: Causation occurs over mental and physical Mary (materialist): how can physical events cause mental events and v.v. Physical- pain => mental- physical pain Dualist: Mental- soul => physical- cause pain (soul) Objection 2: Principle of conservation of energy: Violation Transfer of energy (billiard ball) M => P, P => M Physical world lose energy to cause something mentally Person flying remote control plane. Person = brain; plane=body; Mind causally related to brain, brain causally related to body. Person is the mind; remote is the brain; plane is the body. Remote control argument: objection to simple version of dualism. Determinism: mind effects body, body doesn’t necessarily effect mind. Mind could live on. Plane and body can have horrible things happen with mind remaining intact. Bodies are not like planes and remotes. If something happens to body and it is damaged, something happens to mind as well. Causal connection happening in many directions. Body and Brain effect mind. Interaction is a dualist view. Causal relation only in one direction. |
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Parallelism
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Type of dualism: does not violate the conservation of energy theory because no energy entering or leaving physical events
Physical events cause only other physical events Mental events only cause other mental events There is no mental-physical or physical-mental causations-harmony The body and mind do not interact with each other but simply run alongside one another, in parallel, and there happens to be a correspondence between the two but neither cause each other. for example: the physical event of burning my finger and the mental event of feeling pain just happen to occur simultaneously - one does not cause the other 2 planes – one where mind operates and one where body/physical operates |
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Epiphenomenalism
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dualist theory: all mental events are caused by physical events (i.e., brain states) but have no effect upon any physical events
According to this theory brain events cause mental events, but not vice versa P1=> M1 P1 also causes P2 Does not violate COE Mental events are present but don’t cause anything Mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive |
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Leibnez’s Law
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When 2 things named by the same term must have the same properties
When A and B are identical, they share all of their properties Can be used to est. that 2 things are different by establishing that one doesn’t have a specific property that the other has |
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The Conceivability argument
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Argument of Descartes (1st, 2nd, and 6th meditations) using Leibniz’s Law
If I can conceive of something w/o contradiction, then that thing is metaphysically possible-even if it is not really possible Metaphysically possible- if laws of physics were different. (run mile in 4 secs. If bones wouldnt break) Being conceivable- Green grass. Grass isnt purple (can imagine) Being inconceivable- Round square Married bachelor Taller than self 2. I can conceive of myself existing solely as a thinking thing, w/o my body 3. So, it is metaphysically possible for me to exist w/o my body 4. So, I am distinct from my body Capable of being created by a God is a possible state of affairs Physically possible: a person to lift 300 lbs. Physically impossible- run a mile in 4 seconds. Change charge of electron Metaphysically impossible- something be round and not round. 2+2=5 Metaphysically possible and conceivable coincide. Without contradiction. Metaphysically impossible and inconceivable coincide. |
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Arnauld’s Criticism
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Claims that the conceivability argument is false: perhaps Descartes is ignorant of some fact of himself (having a brain/body) so that’s why he can conceive of himself w/o said part
Ex: I can conceive of a triangle violating the Pythagorean theorem b/c I don’t know the theorem, but NOT metaphysically possible Amnesia case: I get amnesia and don’t know who I am, here people talking about Lauren and sounds like a horrible person I want to kill her, I can conceive of myself standing over her body with a knife though it is NOT metaphysically possible Could mentally conceive. However it is not the way the world actually is. Can conceive that the mind and brain are distinct but that does not mean they actually are distinct. Conceivable: Possible: Necessary. Descartes says if you can conceive, can necessarily be true. Arnauld says it is only possibly true. Just because you can conceive doesn’t mean its metaphysically impossible. Most philosophers agree with this criticism |
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The Argument from Rational Doubt
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I can rationally doubt whether my brain or “I”/body exist
Descartes: body (rationally doubtable) and not the mind (cannot rationally deny existence) But I exist, and obviously as a thinking being So, I cannot rationally doubt the existence of my mind Uses Leibniz’s Law: I can rationally doubt the existence of my brain I cannot rationally doubt the existence of my mind L.L. my mind NOT EQUAL to my brain The "Mind" and "Brain" are not the same Immaterial soul (nonphysical) = mind Brain = physical When A and B are identical, they share all properties If dont share properties, A and B are not identical One property that one has that the other lacks (rely on Leibniz's Law) Useful Properties: Brain divisible Mind cannot be divided Brain weighs 5 pounds Mind doesn’t weigh anything Does not have property of memory or thought (no Aunt Helen) Property of thought- Aunt Helen in mind Argument from rational doubt [ rationally doubtable by me ] I can rationally doubt the existence of my brain I can’t rationally doubt the existence of my mind LL- when my brain/body and mind have different properties, they aren’t the same. |
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Objections to the Argument from Rational Doubt
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Have to be careful when dealing w/ beliefs and L.L.
Ex: Lois Lane believes Superman is incredibly strong and can fly. She does not believe that Clark Kent can fly or that he is more than regularly strong. Using Leibniz’s Law in this case states that Clark Kent is not Superman b/c of the property: “being believed by Lois Lane that Superman is strong and can fly” Ex: water is NOT H20 b/c Matt afraid of water but not of H20 (He never had a chemistry class explaining that H20 is the chemical equation for water) so not same based on property that “water is feared by Matt while H20 is not. |
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Metaphysical Possibility
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Deeper conceptual possibilities given the laws of physics
Physical possibility: consistent with the laws of nature Metaphysically impossible: 5 sided square Descartes: conceive without apparent contradiction = metaphysically possible Not for physical possibility There are things conceivable, but still MP impossible Arnauld: pythagorean theorem [readings] Matt Kotzen (conceive killing and standing over his body) but MP impossible |
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Conceivability
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Descartes: I can conceive of my mind existing without my body without any apparent contradiction; Evil manipulative demon
If I can conceive of something without any apparent contradiction, that thing is MP possible [This is where Arnauld says it's false ] So, my mind existing without my body is MP possible So, my mind isn't my body |
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Token Identity Theory
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Identity theory: in general states that all mental events are physical events in the brain. An individual brain state is a physical token.
mental token are physical tokens=token identity theory To be in a particular mental state is to be in a particular token body state You think that you are in pain translates to the physical state of your brain and is spate from others. Criticism: What makes pains in common? Doesn’t have to be anything in common between other people’s pains Doesn’t create a pattern for all humans/animals Each individual brain state corresponds to a specific mental state—multiple realizability not a problem Octopus in pain = octopus brain state Human pain = human brain state Token identity theorist (type-type): mental events correspond to physical types-can mix and match. Can’t say exactly what it is like to be in pain because there are many possibilities. |
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Type Identity Theory
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Not each pain event are related, but the whole type pain event = type of mental state
Claims that all instances pain = neural state 928, no multiple realizability, but explains what mental states have in common Whole type pain = whole type being in a certain brain state All things of type water are identical to all things of type H20 We are in same mental state b/c in same brain state Chauvinist view though rules out creatures w/o same brain makeup as humans (octopus) have no c-fivers to trigger pain, yet still react to it |
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Behaviorism
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Classical behaviorism: (psychological) mental activity corresponds with physical activity; Studies of inputs and outputs (association with mental states)
Philosophical Behavioralism: versions of materialism: no soul; physical state is a type of behavior and the mental state is behavioral diposition. Mental states = behavioral dispositional states Get multiple realizability All creatures disposed to act in certain ways due to environmental stimuli regardless of brain type (alien/human/dog) Ex: wine glass always fragile but not always breaking, just disposed to break Other people can know just as much about your behavior as you do Will only be motivated to behave in ways if other mental stuff in order Avoids appealing to mental states No desires or pretending Behavior for and desire of are equal I act on getting a cookie (behavior) and that is the same as wanting the cookie (desire) |
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Functionalism
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Functional state = characterized by causal connections w/ inputs and outputs as well
Lots of physical states could have right type of machine to function a certain way Don’t care about “hardware” just “software” running Lots of creatures could have states w/ right type of causal connections so multiple realizability exists Respects fact that in order to characterize a mental state, must make references to other mental states (point not made by behaviorism) |
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Inverted Spectrum thought Experiment
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2 people are functionally identical but mentally different
Functionalist says all functional states = mental states, but this is not so in the inverted spectrum case Seems possible that 2 people could be qualia inverted (spectra inverted w/ red and green) Your red = my green Different qualia caused by same environmental input but have different experience when look at same colored object but still call it same name Still in the same functional state even though we have different inside experiences |
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China Brain case
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Critique of Functionalism.
Brain has billion neurons: china has a billion people Neurons are very simple-transfer signal: Can be replicated through person assembly lines transferring signals. Functionalist: if each person in assembly line responds the same successive way as neurons China can be said to have the same experiences as a person. No Qualia. Qualia=experiences that contribute to what it is like to be in a state; Seems bizarre that China can be in a mental state (Economy of Bolivia). If functionalism is true, China as a country can have the same experiences as a person. 3 causal relations: environmental input, mental events, behavioral output. Defines functional state. China brain case satisfies all 3 causal relations. Results in a rejection of Functionalism. Seems like we could get China to be in the same exact functional state as I am in So country of China has same mental sates, but this seems counterintuitive If China had same functional organization, crazy to think it would have the same mental state Every brain neuron in me = each individual person in China, so functionally organized in the same way |
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Superscientist Mary
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Knowledge Argument
Mary lives in a black and white room She knows all about the experience of seeing red, but never has actually experienced it before: Mary knows all physical information about vision: knows neurophysiology and all sciences about vision. Mary leaves black and white room for the first time and experiences red (rose) for the first time. Learns something new: what it is like to see red. Qualia: qualitative experiences of mental states; left out on physicalist story about vision. Physicalism fails to capture qualia. Physicalism must be false. Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. Physicalist’s claim: everything mental can be captured in physical terms Does she learn something new when she walks out of a room and sees red for the first time? Distinction between learned theoretical knowledge and experiential, practical knowledge |
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Numerical Identity
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Does LL make things impossible to change? No.
Matt kotzen and prof of phil are both same Matt is sad, but prof is happy [false] If terms refer to same person then true If they were identical things couldn’t change 7 yo matt is shorter than today matt So should we conclude that 7 yo matt and today are not the same? No we are not being sufficiently precise with properties One in the same thing relation you bear to yourself and nobody else L.L.: if A is NID to B, then every property that A has, B has, and vice versa Ex: morning star and evening star (both Venus) same but just different name |
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Qualitative Identity
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To share all of a certain type of characteristic [perfect duplicate: someone more like you than a clone---molecule for molecule]
Share intrinsic properties Refers to features that two objects share |
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Does Leibniz’s Law entail that its impossible for things to change?
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Ship of Theseus
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Ship of Theseus
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Planks are replaced one by one over time
Eventually all planks are replaced ship is made of entirely new material Is it still the same ship? Someone reconstructs a new ship out of all the old planks and claims it is the original ship of Theseus Which one is the real ship of Theseus? |
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Conventionalism
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Williams
View that there isn’t really any deep philosophical question We have conventions about how we use words “I” or “identity” All we need to do to settle these questions is create a convention that defines the words and makes a decision about using them Works for ship case, but not so much in case of human There are 2 people, A and B you start out as A A’s mind goes into B’s body and B’s mind goes into A’s body A and B will each receive something, one is a million $ the other is torture Who would you pick to be tortured? A body with B mind or B body with A mind? One view is that B body with A mind should get it because its “me” with new body Other view is that A body with B mind should get it because its “me” with false memories |
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Soul Account of Personal Identity
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A is the same person as B iff A and B have the same soul
Depends on whether you believe soul stays with the mind or the body (presents problem for proposal 1: as stated above) If psychological characteristics are the same, then soul is the same (mind= soul) OBJECTIONS: can’t see souls, so how do I know if they are the same? Couldn’t some new soul come into us while we were sleeping Why would a body with same psychological form have one same soul, couldn’t many psychologically similar souls occupy the body? |
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Body Account of Personal Identity
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A is the same persona as B iff A and B have the same body
Cannot have reasonable beliefs about things we cannot observe, hence no souls and identity is through body |
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Memory Account of Personal identity
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FIRST: Stage A* & B* are parts of the same person iff the later stage remembers or is able to remember events experienced by the earlier stage
SECOND: Stage A* & B* are parts of the same person iff the later stage genuinely remembers or is able to remember from the inside events experienced by the earlier stage THIRD: Stage A* & B* are parts of the same person iff they are parts of a chain, all of whose later stages genuinely remember or are able to remember from the inside events experienced by the immediately preceding stages (transitive property) |
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Reid’s Brave Soldier objection
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Old war hero was beaten as a child, in middle of life he remembers the childhood incident, but by time he is out of war and an old veteran he forgets the flogging.
Since he cannot remember from when he was a small child does that make him not the same person as the flogged child? |
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Memory “from the inside”
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Memory must be remembered from inside of you, happened directly to you
EX: cannot be the memory of me watching my sister go to prom..could have been a girl who looked exactly like her, but wasn’t her Only way to show true identity would have been to have experienced it as her, she is the only one how can remember going to prom “from the inside” |
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Factivity
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In order to have a factive notion towards something, it has to be true
Depends on concrete facts and actually has to have happened FACTIVE: knowing, remembering NOT FACTIVE: beliefs, fear, apparent memories |
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Circularity Objection
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building a notion of personal identity on memory is circular b/c memory is already based on personal identity
I can’t genuinely remember something unless “I” did it, presupposes the “I” which is an identifying factor Memory is identity Hypnotist case: one w/ real memories, one hypnotized to believe they had those memories…which is which? Can’t tell! but memory theorist says memories = me so if hypnotized person having those memories then they are me?....problem for memory theory |
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Apparent memories
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NONFACTIVE
People believe they had memories, but never actually firsthand experienced them X remembers A iff: X has an apparent memory of A (seems to you that something happened) A happened A happened to X [this is where problem is = circularity] Asking what you asked as an answer to what you asked |
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Quasi Memories
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helps respond to circularity argument
what makes two stages over time related? Memories S remembers E iff: S seems to remember E (has an apparent memory) E happened S’s apparent memory of E is caused by traces left by someone’s having experienced E Personal identity grounded in quasi memory instead of memory. Eliminates: Person with memory has to be related to event in appropriate way. Just says that someone has to have experienced the event. 1 quasi memory is not enough to verify identity. Many quasi memories prove identity. Some people have the intuition that if someone could extract your memories and put it into a new brain, many people have intuition that new person is still you. ***All quasi mems are apparent mems, but not all apparent mems are qmems*** One condition for qmem then it has to at least be an amem Not all apparent are qmems, because they might be crazy false (watermelon for breakfast) |
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Psychological Continuity Account of Personal Identity
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Stage A* & B* are parts of the same person iff they are parts of a chain of psychologically continuous person stages
(Stage A* & B* are parts of the same person iff they are parts of a chain all of hose later stages quasi-remember or are able to quasi-remember “from the inside” events experienced by the immediately preceding stages) psychological continuity is a relation that A* can bear to both B* and C*, even though B* and C* are not parts of the same person |
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One-oneness
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A relation I can only bear to one person (marriage, spouse)
Friendships are NOT one to one Identity is one to one Worry with directly above proposal: can bear psychological continuity w/ more than one person but can’t be identical to more than one person No competitors clause: Lost intrisicality (whether I am the same person shouldn’t depend on anything else in the universe, only me) |
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Psychological continuity with no competitors account of personal identity
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f A* & B* are parts of a chain of psychologically continuous person stages, and if the later stages in this chain do not co-exist with any other stages, not part of the chain, which are also psychologically continuous w/ A*, then A* & B* are parts of the same person
Creates one to oneness but loses intrinsicality |
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Intrinsicality
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Properties on the inside, based only on me
Doesn’t have to do with anything but the object |
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William’s thought Experiment
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Psychological data switched
Are you with your body? (physical) Are you with your psychological data? Are you with neither? Supposed to push PID |
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Teletransportation cases
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if A* steps into a teletransporter and her information is sent to both Mars and Venus, then the person-stage on Mars is psychologically continuous with A*, and the person-stage on Venus is also psychologically continuous with A*
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Swinburne fission cases
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Brain splits and goes into two different people.
Has the person survived the fission? If so which (left or right) exists and is identitical to the original person. Corresponds to 1:1 case Fission of self: two bodies of same person. Both carry same memories Difficult to figure out which is the real person. Try to switch back to physical view of identity: body and brain determine self Same problems with body such as teletransportation case |
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Chisholm’s Luz’s bone theory
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Teleport mishap
Swinburn - no better with physical Cant get 1:1 and intrinsocality (no competitors clause) Physical theory that is not vulnerable to duplication Some electron that is intact and allows me to exist Gets us out of the choice between 1:1 and intrinsicality I am a particular electron in my brain, so I am only myself No duplication = no 1:1 worry and no competitors clause Problem: accept crazy theory (this one) or accept one or the other This theory is void of objections Intrinsic = relation to nothing else in the world I am taller than you IDENTITY: want 1:1 and intrinisicality. Go back to physical accounts (body). Fission case: body (instead of mind). Where does identity lie? Identity in Luz Bone. Only 1, can’t be split in half. Impossible to get 1:1 and intrinisicality. |
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The connection between free will and moral evaluation
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free will dictates that people make their own choices and have options
therefore, they are responsible for their actions hence they are able to be morally held accountable for what they do/choose to do |
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Causal Determinism
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There are laws of nature and the world operates on these laws
The present determines a certain future under the laws of nature |
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Compatibilism
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Causal determinism is true
Free will is true Some way in which CD and FW coexist Some cases where people don’t act freely Lots of the time, choices are of free will Proposals 1-3 of how to act freely Proposal 3 is compatibalist but not something everyone except Incompatibilist could agree with proposal, but would deny CD With condition 3 you could do "other" action [Frankfurt] They distinguish cases of free action from non-free action NON FREE ACTION External impediment: chained to a wall Internal impediment: broken leg External force: pulled along by rope Coercion: gun put to head and told to do something |
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Incompatibilism
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Pereboom and chissolm
Free will says there are options depending on choice, you’re future can be different Only one future compatible with the laws of nature Therefore only one of the above is true |
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Hard Determinism
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Cannot have both CD and FW
Since CD is true (physics proves it), then there is no FW People wander the world subject to laws of physics I act as a result of forces (psychological and physical) that are pushing me in a certain direction |
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Soft Determinism
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Compatibilist theory
We do have free will and CD does exist They coexist in some way |
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Libertarianism
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Cannot have both CD and FW
Since FW exists, CD is false MOST SIMPLE VIEW The reason that some of our actions are free is that they are uncaused Caused actions are not free To act freely = act in an uncaused way Chisholm objection: if our free actions are just uncaused doing something in an uncaused way seems to not be acting freely |
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Agent-Causation Theory
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Any time anyone makes a free choice, she is introducing a new causal chain (agent-causing some event to take place) that had not previously existed
world is an indeterministic place physics causation still exists (billiard balls) but does not apply to our “free” agent-caused actions |
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Objections to Agent-Causation Theory
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Should be able to test this in a lab (seems to be empirically testable and falsified
When looking at the brain, you should see causes (other hand goes up so agent caused) X just happening and x being AC = primitive Where is the difference between an agent-caused action and a CD action? BUT every event that happens in brain/body happens due to a physical cause, not some special agent-causation There is a continuous line problem as well Suppose I agent-caused X, now consider event J: My becoming an agent-cause of X Did I have a choice in event J? I would have had to be the agent cause of J but then what of becoming an agent cause of J …continuous line never ends |
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Compatibilist’s Account(s) of acting freely
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PROPOSAL 1: you do x freely iff
You do x Doing x is what you want and decide to do |
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ompatibilist’s Account(s) of “could have done otherwise”
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ROPOSAL 2: you do x freely iff
You do x Doing x is what you want and decide to do If you had decided to do something other than x, you would have succeeded in doing that other thing The 3rd condition is compatible with CD If I had decided to do Y instead of X, I could do Y b/c I would’ve been CD to do so, and hence done it What if I were compelled to choose to doo x, not just compelled to do x? PROPOSAL 3: you do x freely iff You do x Doing x is what you want and decide to do If you had decided to do something other than x, you would have succeeded in doing that other thing If there were a good reason for you to act otherwise than x, you would have chosen to act otherwise than x Proposal 3 is the most sophisticated view It eliminates the drug addiction b/c drug addicts are acting free of reason Also eliminates wizard casting spell because a person under a spell acts devoid of their reason However, this doesn’t consider what is a good reason? What if I freely act against my better reason? Condition 4 doesn’t leave room for people to act freely where actions are stupidly done or done w/o good reason |
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Frankfurt cases
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-Makes objection to necessity of Proposal 3
-I want Jones to be dead -I have a hunch that Bob might be about to kill Jones and I am hoping he does it -I have a brain control device and someone calls me telling me Bob is going to Jones’ room and is most likely going to kill him -I will watch the room and if it looks like Bob isn’t going to kill Jones, I will take control of his brain and force him to -Bob walks into room and kills Jones 1)Am I morally responsible for his death 2)No, I was just a bystander, I didn’t DO it -Bob IS morally responsible -However Condition 3 is not met b/c Bob couldn’t have successfully done something else -If he had not killed him, I would have controlled his brain to do so -Neuroscientist Smith is controlling Jones and has implanted a chip in the brain. Smith wants Jones to do something really bad like rob a bank. If Jones doesn’t do it naturally Smith will activate the chip to make him do it. Jones on his own, decides to go rob a bank and Smith does not interfere at all. Frankfurt says that Jones is free. Didn’t need to do otherwise b/c Jones could not have done otherwise. -Moral accountability: we can only judge people if they are free. Jones robbed bank and he is held accountable for it. He seems free even though he couldn’t do otherwise. If Jones does otherwise could he have done otherwise? No. But he does the account on his own free will. If he wanted to do otherwise, he would have done otherwise. Condition 3 not necessary for free will. Jones does not satisfy condition 3 however he is still considered free still. |
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Pereboom on “living without free will”
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-Incompatibilist [Hard Determinist]
-Either determinism is true or false, if true, we don’t act freely; if false, we still don’t act freely but rather just randomly -Strictly speaking none of us is responsible for our actions b/c we don’t/can’t act freely -Can have desires about my behavior or your behavior even if you aren’t morally responsible or deserving of blame -Given that we lack knowledge of the future even though it is causally determined, we can still have hopes and expectations about it -Reactive attitudes: A & B can have a meaningful relationship 1)Moral indignation would disappear -Forgiveness: can’t have it but if you wrong me, I can still choose not to see you or to see you now for other reasons 1)Just don’t use moral blame as the reason -Murdering people is wrong, but murderer not blameworthy 1)We can look at the action and say to him that we need to communicate a sense of what is right 2)He is however a threat to the rest of the population so can be put in jail 3)However, criminals should not be punished more than the extent of removing their danger to society 4)We remove the danger of people w/ communicable diseases even though they may not be blameworthy (same scenario) |
