A neutral stance to this is the claim that “ one can be held morally responsible for one’s actions only if one could have acted otherwise in a given set of circumstances.” (The Philosophical Review, page 440). Determinist would disagree with this claim because it is if an agent is never in control of the situations that they are forced into, how can they be morally responsible. Free will does not easily tie into the premise because if we choose our own action then we should be held morally reasonable for them, but if one said that “X” did Y because she/ he could it fails to prove moral responsibility and seems as if our action or arbitrary or random. However if an act is described as “not determined” or “uncaused” that means that free will cannot be used because the action is random therefore not in the agent’s power, thus making morally responsibility invalid. Simply, without the just the agent being the cause of an action, they cannot be held to moral …show more content…
In Denial, there are two premises. Denial of the first premise in which Soft Determinist David Hume maintains that determinism is true and correlates with free will and moral responsibility (i.e. meaning that freedom of choice is only valid in moral responsibility by personal motive, regardless of casual determination). Denial of the second premise derives from Libertarian Richard Taylor, who disagrees with determinism because human actions are “uncaused” and intelligible. He uses “uncaused” as a term referring to actions not caused by factors external to the agent (i.e. actions are done for a reason that derives from the agent). Thus according to Taylor make the agent morally responsible because an agent has an intention behind an action. Embracing the conclusion stems from Hard Determinist John Hospers, who “denies that conclusion is unacceptable because according to his theory choices are determined by character, values, goals, etc., in which are determined not by the agent but by factors external and beyond their control “ (The Philosophical Review, page