Arguably more influential to U.S. policymakers than the fear of monolithic communism was the belief that “loss” of Vietnam would result in severe domestic backlash. This conclusion was drawn as a result of the domestic response to President Truman’s perceived “loss” of China. In the domestic sphere, both politically and publicly, Truman was vilified for being weak on communism and jeopardizing the safety of the United States as well as its allies. The Republican Party exploited these criticisms a great deal, gaining political capital by using the loss of China to strip the Democratic Party of any legitimacy in areas concerning national security. Ultimately, when examining the situation in Vietnam, the Johnson Administration could not help but
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Unlike Malaya and the Philippines, Korea was a far more aggressive military strategy. Having been such a polarizing event, the Korean produced considerable concern about the escalation of a limited war, the intervention of China, and public outcry over a prolonged war. Yet, these concerns were superseded by feelings of American fearlessness and tenacity regarding the Korean War. As May writes, “…[policymakers] believed the intervention in Korea had demonstrated America’s willingness to risk war in order to protect the integrity of other nations. They wanted to act in Vietnam in keeping with Truman’s example”(May 108). In their comparison of Vietnam to Korea, U.S. policymakers concluded that intervention was important to maintaining the principles and precedents established throughout our history. Assuming they could successfully implement strategies used in other Southeast Asian countries, policymakers believed they could protect South Vietnam like South Korea had been protected, maintaining the United State’s credibility and resilience. However, Vietnam and Korea were completely different events, under very different circumstances. As George Ball, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, once stated, “ ‘South Vietnam is not Korea…and in making fundamental decisions it would be a mistake for us to rely too heavily on the Korean analogy’”(May 109). Ball would continue to note examples of differences between Vietnam and Korea. One example being that Korean War had the active support of the United Nations as opposed to Vietnam where the United States would be fighting alone. Another key difference, according to Ball, was that South Korea had a reliable government and population willing to fight for their country. In Vietnam, this was not the case as Diem’s regime failed miserably, turning into an oligarchy that only distanced themselves farther from the predominant rural population (May 109-110).
Unlike Malaya and the Philippines, Korea was a far more aggressive military strategy. Having been such a polarizing event, the Korean produced considerable concern about the escalation of a limited war, the intervention of China, and public outcry over a prolonged war. Yet, these concerns were superseded by feelings of American fearlessness and tenacity regarding the Korean War. As May writes, “…[policymakers] believed the intervention in Korea had demonstrated America’s willingness to risk war in order to protect the integrity of other nations. They wanted to act in Vietnam in keeping with Truman’s example”(May 108). In their comparison of Vietnam to Korea, U.S. policymakers concluded that intervention was important to maintaining the principles and precedents established throughout our history. Assuming they could successfully implement strategies used in other Southeast Asian countries, policymakers believed they could protect South Vietnam like South Korea had been protected, maintaining the United State’s credibility and resilience. However, Vietnam and Korea were completely different events, under very different circumstances. As George Ball, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, once stated, “ ‘South Vietnam is not Korea…and in making fundamental decisions it would be a mistake for us to rely too heavily on the Korean analogy’”(May 109). Ball would continue to note examples of differences between Vietnam and Korea. One example being that Korean War had the active support of the United Nations as opposed to Vietnam where the United States would be fighting alone. Another key difference, according to Ball, was that South Korea had a reliable government and population willing to fight for their country. In Vietnam, this was not the case as Diem’s regime failed miserably, turning into an oligarchy that only distanced themselves farther from the predominant rural population (May 109-110).