Dealing with the Kremlin
1. Importance
The Russian Federation is playing a game of risk, showing an aggressive hand just enough to provoke condemnation, but slight enough to avoid another international arms race- as of yet. Succeeding the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the U.N Security Council, the latter half of our 21st century has seen the Kremlin all but reject the principles of allegiance and armistice the United Nations was fashioned to uphold. Deep-seated into the fifteenth year of Vladimir Putin's ideological campaign for reclaiming a throne once held by the USSR, Russia is once again taunting international boundaries, asserting the weight of Putin’s militaristic, expansionist Kremlin against little global resistance. Since …show more content…
Following this, Moscow was split into several independent states, commonwealths, and eventually a compilation of states that formed the greater Soviet Federation. The Federation was tasked with the reformation of the large, communist economy, into a privatized, free-market economy. By policy advocated from Western allies, the Federation underwent swift economic changes, characterized as “shock economy” , releasing the market from Moscow regulation almost instantly and simultaneously. This policy led to an economic depression that amounted to an 80% reduction in international trade and 40% GDP loss . Belittled and bankrupt from their sharp decline, Moscow officials blamed Western policy for their losses. In a wave of nationalism, Vladimir Putin gathered the people’s support and laid out a new plan for Russia that disparaged democratic reforms. Vilifying the West, Putin narrated the geo-political atmosphere as an oligarchy of Western injustices to Russia disguised in the name of human rights and democracy. Under the perception that history had neglected the Kremlin, Putin won public opinion for his campaign to rebirth Russian supremacy and nationalism. In doing so, Putin revamped military spending, claiming that by 2009, “he could, at will, occupy any …show more content…
European dependence of Russian energy exports has left them with little room for imposing meaningful sanctions, and ties not bounded by a NATO alliance with Ukraine left military action improbable. In President Barrack Obama’s address to the Kremlin, he essentially echoed the ‘do little now and hope that Russia doesn’t act again’ response of the European Union, “An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever ask again, ‘who will come to help,’ you’ll know the answer—the NATO alliance, including the armed forces of the United States of America.” Yet Putin has shown no signs of retreat, just recently carrying out flyovers in Turkish airspace and airstrikes in competition with a U.S campaign in Syria. While strong rhetoric has increased from the U.S along with harsh sanctions, the EU has shown no real desire to cut off trade with a major monetary partner. That inability to produce meaningful Russian sanctions has left the EU with little more than a hopeful deterrence, and no strategic purpose. But as more countries now join Ukraine, Syria, Turkey, Georgia, etc., in their call upon Western allies to disrupt Putin’s resurrection of Russian supremacy, Washington and the EU are forced to consider abandoning rational
1. Importance
The Russian Federation is playing a game of risk, showing an aggressive hand just enough to provoke condemnation, but slight enough to avoid another international arms race- as of yet. Succeeding the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the U.N Security Council, the latter half of our 21st century has seen the Kremlin all but reject the principles of allegiance and armistice the United Nations was fashioned to uphold. Deep-seated into the fifteenth year of Vladimir Putin's ideological campaign for reclaiming a throne once held by the USSR, Russia is once again taunting international boundaries, asserting the weight of Putin’s militaristic, expansionist Kremlin against little global resistance. Since …show more content…
Following this, Moscow was split into several independent states, commonwealths, and eventually a compilation of states that formed the greater Soviet Federation. The Federation was tasked with the reformation of the large, communist economy, into a privatized, free-market economy. By policy advocated from Western allies, the Federation underwent swift economic changes, characterized as “shock economy” , releasing the market from Moscow regulation almost instantly and simultaneously. This policy led to an economic depression that amounted to an 80% reduction in international trade and 40% GDP loss . Belittled and bankrupt from their sharp decline, Moscow officials blamed Western policy for their losses. In a wave of nationalism, Vladimir Putin gathered the people’s support and laid out a new plan for Russia that disparaged democratic reforms. Vilifying the West, Putin narrated the geo-political atmosphere as an oligarchy of Western injustices to Russia disguised in the name of human rights and democracy. Under the perception that history had neglected the Kremlin, Putin won public opinion for his campaign to rebirth Russian supremacy and nationalism. In doing so, Putin revamped military spending, claiming that by 2009, “he could, at will, occupy any …show more content…
European dependence of Russian energy exports has left them with little room for imposing meaningful sanctions, and ties not bounded by a NATO alliance with Ukraine left military action improbable. In President Barrack Obama’s address to the Kremlin, he essentially echoed the ‘do little now and hope that Russia doesn’t act again’ response of the European Union, “An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever ask again, ‘who will come to help,’ you’ll know the answer—the NATO alliance, including the armed forces of the United States of America.” Yet Putin has shown no signs of retreat, just recently carrying out flyovers in Turkish airspace and airstrikes in competition with a U.S campaign in Syria. While strong rhetoric has increased from the U.S along with harsh sanctions, the EU has shown no real desire to cut off trade with a major monetary partner. That inability to produce meaningful Russian sanctions has left the EU with little more than a hopeful deterrence, and no strategic purpose. But as more countries now join Ukraine, Syria, Turkey, Georgia, etc., in their call upon Western allies to disrupt Putin’s resurrection of Russian supremacy, Washington and the EU are forced to consider abandoning rational