2.1 The first case: pro-government intervention that targets the physical capability gap, 1965-september 1970
The independent variable: assessing the type of intervention?
The British intervention started in 1965 to help the Omani government fight the Dhofari insurgency. During the period from 1965 till late 1970, the British intervention aimed at increasing the physical capabilities of the Omani government. The British intervention tried to influence the physical capabilities of the government by providing assistance in building intelligence cells in Dhofar, directly engaging in fighting alongside the Omani forces, and commanding Omani battalions and Platoons mandated by the Sultan to engage in direct fighting. In this sense, the British …show more content…
The British advisors proposed the strategy of collective punishment to the Sultan for the sake of stopping the tribal rebellion in Dhofar (McKeown 1988, 33). This advice was based upon the past experience of the British in crushing out a prior rebellion in Oman with a collective punishment policy (Goode 2014, 449). The Sultan’s forces destroyed water wells and ordered measures of collective punishments against villagers who were suspected of supporting the DLF (White 2008). The British forces in SAF even used “draconian campaign” of mass detention, destruction of wells, and reprisal attacks (Hughes 2009, …show more content…
The increase of rebels’ popular support was instrumental in increasing rebels offensive and defensive capabilities. DLF’s political platform which was based on attaining regional autonomy and development attracted considerable popular support during the early years of the rebellion (DeVore 2012, 148). The strength of DLF’s platform to reflect Dhofaris’ problems was a factor in influencing the defection of a number of Dhofari soldiers in the Sultan’s bodyguard team who tried to assassinate the Sultan in 1966. This was intertwined with the countereffect of Said’s collective punishment policies that turned many of the population in the villages of Dhofar into active supporters for DLF (White 2008). Collective punishment decreased the governmental legitimacy-- something that DLF used to its advantage. Many of would-be-leaders of DLF and later PFLOAG mainly joined the rebellion because of the “offhand treatment of the British Officers” (Jones 2011,
The independent variable: assessing the type of intervention?
The British intervention started in 1965 to help the Omani government fight the Dhofari insurgency. During the period from 1965 till late 1970, the British intervention aimed at increasing the physical capabilities of the Omani government. The British intervention tried to influence the physical capabilities of the government by providing assistance in building intelligence cells in Dhofar, directly engaging in fighting alongside the Omani forces, and commanding Omani battalions and Platoons mandated by the Sultan to engage in direct fighting. In this sense, the British …show more content…
The British advisors proposed the strategy of collective punishment to the Sultan for the sake of stopping the tribal rebellion in Dhofar (McKeown 1988, 33). This advice was based upon the past experience of the British in crushing out a prior rebellion in Oman with a collective punishment policy (Goode 2014, 449). The Sultan’s forces destroyed water wells and ordered measures of collective punishments against villagers who were suspected of supporting the DLF (White 2008). The British forces in SAF even used “draconian campaign” of mass detention, destruction of wells, and reprisal attacks (Hughes 2009, …show more content…
The increase of rebels’ popular support was instrumental in increasing rebels offensive and defensive capabilities. DLF’s political platform which was based on attaining regional autonomy and development attracted considerable popular support during the early years of the rebellion (DeVore 2012, 148). The strength of DLF’s platform to reflect Dhofaris’ problems was a factor in influencing the defection of a number of Dhofari soldiers in the Sultan’s bodyguard team who tried to assassinate the Sultan in 1966. This was intertwined with the countereffect of Said’s collective punishment policies that turned many of the population in the villages of Dhofar into active supporters for DLF (White 2008). Collective punishment decreased the governmental legitimacy-- something that DLF used to its advantage. Many of would-be-leaders of DLF and later PFLOAG mainly joined the rebellion because of the “offhand treatment of the British Officers” (Jones 2011,