Analytical Essay
Cuban Missile Crisis
"The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked"
Author(s): JAMES A. NATHAN and Graham Allison
Edwin Gutierrez
[09:30]
At the peak of cold war, Cuba took aid from the Soviet Union fearing US invasion. Feeding off each other inhibitions, both gained an edge from the USA. October 1962 when US were given word of missiles aimed to destroy the future. With our own missiles in Eastern Europe how is this justifiable from the US president? Therefore, we question how proactive the Kennedy administration was and if it was a whim of his gut or talented diplomacy. We will explore if this resolution can even be a so called ''template” to resolution. Analyze moments before the deal to end …show more content…
The President, although popular, did not win any resolve with "pure 'presidential' fortitude.' Researchers will agree the President was aggressive in his stance but here Nathan emphasizes it was Kennedy's strategy of "the deal" to be more significant.
Nathan continues immediately telling of the US presidents lack of transparency seeing as the Soviets side of bargain was public. The president's decision to keep secret of his meeting is a bit of obvious. Secret in part Kennedy's administrations feared they would appear weak to the public. Was Kennedy genuinely thinking voter disapproval? This was a detrimental move on the president's administration to be on, they allowed no influences or distraction consume their time. I feel regardless of the Soviets public bargain, the US to remain hidden was the upper hand they needed.
Just the right amount of secrecy from the Soviets, however the secrets remained within the administration. Nathan expresses facts of compromise were secret all the way to 1989, where Theodore Sorensen allegedly confessed that he had edited out details out of the published Attorney General Robert Kennedy's diary. Nathan seems confident in his assessments suggesting there were two sets of negotiations: the one with Moscow and the secret meets with Kennedy's trusted high-ranking advisors named, …show more content…
Although these members were few of his trusted advisors, Kennedy and secretary of state Dean Rusk were striving for a deal involving removing US missiles in Turkey. Confidently, Kennedy boldly called for the missile swap to be announced at the UN, IF Soviets would not accept secret meetings. This was a strong move one would ascertain was aggressive stance by the President himself, and a successful one at that. Moscow agreed to secret dealings. Meanwhile, trusted advisors from Ex-Comm were not in the know of this agreement. With diplomatic solutions barely considered, they occupied creating their own series of military plans—blockades to preemptive strikes.
Unsuspecting of how the deal was truly closed, US policymakers reviled in their inexperience win. To clarify again, they unknowingly had to carry-on and not give away their lack of information. “Kennedys administration got through the dealing because of their gumption, not their adept method of diplomacy.” This is important to note for it influenced succeeding administrations to follow the false characterizations dropping the conventional repertoire of diplomacy, international law, respect for negotiation, and prudent meaning of national
Cuban Missile Crisis
"The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked"
Author(s): JAMES A. NATHAN and Graham Allison
Edwin Gutierrez
[09:30]
At the peak of cold war, Cuba took aid from the Soviet Union fearing US invasion. Feeding off each other inhibitions, both gained an edge from the USA. October 1962 when US were given word of missiles aimed to destroy the future. With our own missiles in Eastern Europe how is this justifiable from the US president? Therefore, we question how proactive the Kennedy administration was and if it was a whim of his gut or talented diplomacy. We will explore if this resolution can even be a so called ''template” to resolution. Analyze moments before the deal to end …show more content…
The President, although popular, did not win any resolve with "pure 'presidential' fortitude.' Researchers will agree the President was aggressive in his stance but here Nathan emphasizes it was Kennedy's strategy of "the deal" to be more significant.
Nathan continues immediately telling of the US presidents lack of transparency seeing as the Soviets side of bargain was public. The president's decision to keep secret of his meeting is a bit of obvious. Secret in part Kennedy's administrations feared they would appear weak to the public. Was Kennedy genuinely thinking voter disapproval? This was a detrimental move on the president's administration to be on, they allowed no influences or distraction consume their time. I feel regardless of the Soviets public bargain, the US to remain hidden was the upper hand they needed.
Just the right amount of secrecy from the Soviets, however the secrets remained within the administration. Nathan expresses facts of compromise were secret all the way to 1989, where Theodore Sorensen allegedly confessed that he had edited out details out of the published Attorney General Robert Kennedy's diary. Nathan seems confident in his assessments suggesting there were two sets of negotiations: the one with Moscow and the secret meets with Kennedy's trusted high-ranking advisors named, …show more content…
Although these members were few of his trusted advisors, Kennedy and secretary of state Dean Rusk were striving for a deal involving removing US missiles in Turkey. Confidently, Kennedy boldly called for the missile swap to be announced at the UN, IF Soviets would not accept secret meetings. This was a strong move one would ascertain was aggressive stance by the President himself, and a successful one at that. Moscow agreed to secret dealings. Meanwhile, trusted advisors from Ex-Comm were not in the know of this agreement. With diplomatic solutions barely considered, they occupied creating their own series of military plans—blockades to preemptive strikes.
Unsuspecting of how the deal was truly closed, US policymakers reviled in their inexperience win. To clarify again, they unknowingly had to carry-on and not give away their lack of information. “Kennedys administration got through the dealing because of their gumption, not their adept method of diplomacy.” This is important to note for it influenced succeeding administrations to follow the false characterizations dropping the conventional repertoire of diplomacy, international law, respect for negotiation, and prudent meaning of national