Socrates The Good

In Plato's Republic, Socrates claims that “the form of the good” has greater significance than the Forms of the other virtues (505a). He dismisses the two most common definitions – that the good itself is either pleasure or knowledge – as inadequate (505b-c). The Good, whatever it might be, is something which “every soul pursues” and fails to comprehend, resulting in an obscuration of the other lesser Forms (505e). Glaucon asks Socrates for an explanation of the Good similar to that given of other virtues like justice, but Socrates responds that he cannot do so properly, proposing that they “abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being” in favour of determining what is derived from it (506d). This account takes the form …show more content…
In the Phaedo it is fairly unambiguous why the Forms are higher on the hierarchy of reality than physical things, as their constancy and unchangeability makes them more suitable objects of knowledge. It is not transparent, however, why there must be a hierarchy within the Forms as well, or why the Just or Pious must reflect or contain the Good. While relations existing between the Forms does not seem implausible, potential causal relations or relations of dependency between Forms should be more thoroughly explained. Forms such as the Equal or the Beautiful, too, have been mentioned as having physical representations that participate in them within the visible realm. The Good, on the other hand, remains in the dialogue this sort of abstract entity. If the Good is in the Just, Beautiful, Pious, or Equal, does that mean that the particular instances of these virtues also are manifestations of the Good? But it has already been explained that these other virtues are not equivalent to the Good. It seems that the form of the good should be capable of being isolated, just as the sun can be isolated from sight. So, there should be particulars reflecting the Good without requiring their participation in the other