objections Socrates raises to K2 are broken up into three sub-arguments (the puzzle, the wax block, the aviary), and the final “nail in the coffin” is the jury argument. For the sake of time, I will focus primarily on the final jury argument provided by Socrates, but not without first briefly summarizing the arguments of false judgment found in the different objections. For it is at the end of this passage where Socrates gives us the direct refutation of K2.
The Puzzle, Wax Block, and Aviary Arguments (Cite Burnyeat Hardcore) These three objections to K2 span from 188a to 200c, and each focus intently on instances of false judgment, that is whether or not false judgment is possible. The puzzle’s main inquiry is into four questions Socrates …show more content…
The final theory, as Burnyeat describes it, is impressive despite lacking clear indication of what exactly it entails (128). This definition of course being that knowledge is true judgment with an account (K3). K3 resembles closely the most popular modern theory of knowledge, which is that knowledge is equal to justified true belief. For the same reasons that this theory is susceptible to refutation, so too is K3. The most interesting claim, as made by J. Angelo Corlett in his work Analyzing Social Knowledge, is that Socrates in this portion of the dialogue already said what Gettier presents in his paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? I believe that Corlett is correct in making this assumption. As was stated earlier, Socrates’ investigation of judgment is similar to that of justification, the key difference though between the traditional analysis of knowledge and K3 is this: the term used for ‘judgment’ in Attic Greek is ambiguous between conjecture (i.e., an opinion formed that is lacking in information) and a rational decision process. This is not the only ambiguity faced within part three of the Theaetetus, and due to the extremely abstract nature of the Socrates’ dream argument it can be difficult to discern what his intent is with it. The interpretations of the definition of knowledge used in refuting he provides against the dream argument seem not to coincide with K3 (Burnyeat, 128-129). The exploration of K3 begins by reaffirming that true judgment must be a part of the definition of knowledge, but that something must be added to it in order to avoid the previous mistake with K2’s jury argument (201c-d4). Aside from this though K3 does not appear to solve the issues faced by K2 in regards to the ability to have false judgment in a theory of knowledge. In order to discuss what the account portion of K3 consists of, Socrates
The Puzzle, Wax Block, and Aviary Arguments (Cite Burnyeat Hardcore) These three objections to K2 span from 188a to 200c, and each focus intently on instances of false judgment, that is whether or not false judgment is possible. The puzzle’s main inquiry is into four questions Socrates …show more content…
The final theory, as Burnyeat describes it, is impressive despite lacking clear indication of what exactly it entails (128). This definition of course being that knowledge is true judgment with an account (K3). K3 resembles closely the most popular modern theory of knowledge, which is that knowledge is equal to justified true belief. For the same reasons that this theory is susceptible to refutation, so too is K3. The most interesting claim, as made by J. Angelo Corlett in his work Analyzing Social Knowledge, is that Socrates in this portion of the dialogue already said what Gettier presents in his paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? I believe that Corlett is correct in making this assumption. As was stated earlier, Socrates’ investigation of judgment is similar to that of justification, the key difference though between the traditional analysis of knowledge and K3 is this: the term used for ‘judgment’ in Attic Greek is ambiguous between conjecture (i.e., an opinion formed that is lacking in information) and a rational decision process. This is not the only ambiguity faced within part three of the Theaetetus, and due to the extremely abstract nature of the Socrates’ dream argument it can be difficult to discern what his intent is with it. The interpretations of the definition of knowledge used in refuting he provides against the dream argument seem not to coincide with K3 (Burnyeat, 128-129). The exploration of K3 begins by reaffirming that true judgment must be a part of the definition of knowledge, but that something must be added to it in order to avoid the previous mistake with K2’s jury argument (201c-d4). Aside from this though K3 does not appear to solve the issues faced by K2 in regards to the ability to have false judgment in a theory of knowledge. In order to discuss what the account portion of K3 consists of, Socrates