The Afghans now had a leader, Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammed, who joined the rebellion (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 19, para. 14). Khan was not the universal leader of the rebellion, but his lineage gave him some legitimacy as the Afghan rebellion took on a jihadist character, aimed at expelling foreigners regardless of who led the rebellion or who sat on the throne (Tanner, 2009, 173). Khan and MacNaughton negotiated safe passage out of Kabul back and forth for several weeks. Finally in late December 1841, Akbar agreed to meet MacNaughton to discuss his terms. Shah would remain as king of Afghanistan (with Akbar as his vizier). The British would leave in the spring to India never to return. The ringleaders of the murder of Alexander Burnes would be given to the British for justice. Akbar would also receive a £300,000 pound lump sum in addition to British assistance against his rivals in the future (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 18, para. 19). Despite trusted human intelligence sources who warned MacNaughton not to trust Khan, MacNaughton met with Khan away from the cantonment on December 23rd (Tanner, 2009, p.175-176). He was murdered by Khan (Forbes, 1892, Chapter 6), whose men mutilated MacNaughton’s body and his remains were put on display in the Kabul bazaar (Tanner, 2009, 175). General Elphinstone mounted no response …show more content…
Elphinstone had 4,500 troops under his command. These included the 44th Regiment of Foot, five regiments of Bengal infantry, and a few guns from the Bengal artillery (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 20, para. 8). Elphinstone would be bogged down by as many as 12,000 camp followers, servants, and family members (Tanner, 2009, 176). The Afghans, by comparison, numbered in the tens of thousands (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 19, para 13). The British and Afghans each had muskets, but the Afghan jezails far outranged the British Brown Bess muskets (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 19, para. 11). The Afghans were light forces that required little sustainment capabilities while the British had to leave much of their provisions in the cantonment when they retreated (Hopkirk, 1990, Chapter 20, para. 9). Elphinstone, as ineffective as he was, was in command of the British retreat while Khan was the strongest of a group of leaders in Afghanistan that did not exert influence to every tribesman the way a British commander did his Soldiers (Tanner, 2009, p.173). The Afghans were intimately familiar with their home terrain and the path the British were to take whereas the British had little in the way of intelligence gathering to aid their arduous journey. As will be seen, aggressive patrolling was not possible in the confines of the passes with serious consequences to the British. The British