Political Structure Between The Swedish Parliamentary And Korean Presidential System Of Legislative Governance

2198 Words Oct 20th, 2016 9 Pages
Introduction: Parallels in political structure between the Swedish parliamentary and Korean presidential systems of legislative governance provide a baseline where the study of cross structural stability can be analyzed while holding the independent variables such as unicameral legislative bodies, coalition based majorities in these bodies, and executive-legislative interactions constant. In this paper the Tsebelis ' sub veto player theory on “absorption rule” will be examined in the context of legislative stability in unicameral political democracies. While the unicameral nature of the countries ' legislatures creates environments of decreased legislative stability, this instability is unevenly counteracted by factors of executive dominance and multiparty coalitions in both countries.

Party Systems and Legislative Structure: Korea and Sweden both present cases of multiparty unicameral legislative bodies. Through the use of proportional representation and plurality rule single-seat constituency election systems , both in Korea and only PR in Sweden, these countries legislative bodies require the use of coalition formation to secure a majority in legislative processes. Increased legislative party representation in both Presidential and Parliamentary regimes suggests increased political stability in legislative processes, though this stability is at the same time partially undermined by the unicameral nature of the legislature.

Sweden: With the exception of under a…

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