In international politics, the driving forces behind many of the world’s actions possess similar characteristics. They are driven predominately by material interests, power statuses, and wealth, or realism, as opposed to a combination of ideologies, identities, loyalties, and emotions, or liberalism. Political speech may be riddled with these emotional calls for action, but behind closed doors, politicians discuss the language of realist goals. Realist interests are exemplified in the notion that countries are concerned with what I believe are security affairs, nuclear weapons, and the globalizing world. Due to inherent interests of states, countries around the world will pursue realist gains over liberal values.
Firstly, material and power …show more content…
The intense interest in nuclear weapons derives from their destructive nature. Modern states, like North Korea, desire a nuclear weapon because it feels afraid that its position in the world is threatened (Waltz, “Peace” 7). Despite the possibility of killing thousands of civilians, nuclear weapons are viewed as being able to allow smaller states to prevent being coerced by larger states (Waltz, “Peace” 11). If the US were to invade a country with a nuclear arsenal, they would pose an obstacle to US invasion forces (Waltz, “Peace” 11). With the potential for destruction, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is detrimental to states to maintain their influence in the international …show more content…
Countries are looked upon with a “responsibility to protect” in cases of humanitarian disasters (Evans 101). “The primary purpose of the intervention . . . must be to halt or avert human suffering” (Evans 104). The US and UN have assisted in many countries to alleviate the crisis, but they have also failed to act in other crises as well. “It is the responsibility of the whole international community to ensure that when the next case of threatened mass killing or ethnic cleansing invariably comes along, the mistakes of the 1990s will not be repeated” (Evans 110). Evans is referencing Rwanda where in 1994, the US failed to prevent the genocide of 800,000 people (Power 84). Some Cabinet-level officials in the Clinton Administration called the Rwandan genocide a “sideshow,” or even a “no-show” to what was occurring in Bosnia and Haiti (Power 97). The word genocide was even publicly avoided for fear of negatively influencing congressional elections (Power 96). US officials actively avoided becoming embroiled in Rwandan affairs because of its lack of direct connection to US affairs. To a degree, says Anthony Lake, one of Clinton’s National Security Advisors, the US didn’t care about Africa (Power 107). In comparison, the Bosnian genocide was viewed with higher importance because of its strategic location and the possibility of
Firstly, material and power …show more content…
The intense interest in nuclear weapons derives from their destructive nature. Modern states, like North Korea, desire a nuclear weapon because it feels afraid that its position in the world is threatened (Waltz, “Peace” 7). Despite the possibility of killing thousands of civilians, nuclear weapons are viewed as being able to allow smaller states to prevent being coerced by larger states (Waltz, “Peace” 11). If the US were to invade a country with a nuclear arsenal, they would pose an obstacle to US invasion forces (Waltz, “Peace” 11). With the potential for destruction, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is detrimental to states to maintain their influence in the international …show more content…
Countries are looked upon with a “responsibility to protect” in cases of humanitarian disasters (Evans 101). “The primary purpose of the intervention . . . must be to halt or avert human suffering” (Evans 104). The US and UN have assisted in many countries to alleviate the crisis, but they have also failed to act in other crises as well. “It is the responsibility of the whole international community to ensure that when the next case of threatened mass killing or ethnic cleansing invariably comes along, the mistakes of the 1990s will not be repeated” (Evans 110). Evans is referencing Rwanda where in 1994, the US failed to prevent the genocide of 800,000 people (Power 84). Some Cabinet-level officials in the Clinton Administration called the Rwandan genocide a “sideshow,” or even a “no-show” to what was occurring in Bosnia and Haiti (Power 97). The word genocide was even publicly avoided for fear of negatively influencing congressional elections (Power 96). US officials actively avoided becoming embroiled in Rwandan affairs because of its lack of direct connection to US affairs. To a degree, says Anthony Lake, one of Clinton’s National Security Advisors, the US didn’t care about Africa (Power 107). In comparison, the Bosnian genocide was viewed with higher importance because of its strategic location and the possibility of