Polarization is when the extremist drive the groups apart and and create multiple hate groups to begin broadcasting polarizing propaganda. While tearing the Rwandan culture apart, they had to flee their homes and become refugees in neighboring countries, despite them sharing a common history and same language (Rugma). Even whistles were blown so the Tutsi’s knew when to evacuate their homes and go into hiding to remain safe (Straus). The MNRD and interahamwe used all forms of media available to spread the Hutu power ideology, the message was clear to others; the Hutus were better than the Tutsis (Klinghoffer). The Hardliners even deployed the president and prime minister from the prefect (the leading administrative authority) and threatened
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During the last few months it had more more often indulged in drunkenness and abuses of civilians, quite independently from the ethnic violence to which some of its militant members were increasingly prone (Prunier 174). Additionally, the main reason for failure to resist lowering the morale and military discipline it its recruits since the May 1992 mutinies. The army was living in worse material conditions as the government financial situation deteriorated (Prunier 174). By July 1994, the Tutsi rebels took control of the country, the killers had accomplished much of what they set out to achieve (Rwanda’s Genocide, International Relations 26). The genocide only ended due to the fact the Tutsi dominated rebel group (RBF), defeated the Hutu regime. Subsequently, President Paul Kagame took control (News …show more content…
During the genocide, there were no efforts on the part of the United States to restrict the representation of the genocidal government in its agencies, organizations, and institutions (Cohen 148). The United States did not favor either direct or United Nations military intervention to stop the killings as it maintained that the process of peacemaking had become dangerously over utilized, and that Rwanda was of marginal strategic importance (Klinghoffer). President Clinton’s initial reaction to the genocide typified the US response as he called for national reconciliation and an end to the violence. The American position was thus one of regret and non-partisanship with no intimation of strong action (Klinghoffer). Eventually, however, three hundred US marines were transferred from Somalia to help with the operation (Klinghoffer). The mission ended up being successful. American policy then focused on arranging a ceasefire in a place as a precondition to negotiations, and on implementing the Arusha power sharing agreement. Ending the civil war, not the genocide was the major concern as most American policymakers seemed to believe that mutual ethnic killings and an ethnic civil war were evolving hand in hand (Klinghoffer). Although eventually the United States hindered into the massacre, it wasn’t soon enough and should have had more
During the last few months it had more more often indulged in drunkenness and abuses of civilians, quite independently from the ethnic violence to which some of its militant members were increasingly prone (Prunier 174). Additionally, the main reason for failure to resist lowering the morale and military discipline it its recruits since the May 1992 mutinies. The army was living in worse material conditions as the government financial situation deteriorated (Prunier 174). By July 1994, the Tutsi rebels took control of the country, the killers had accomplished much of what they set out to achieve (Rwanda’s Genocide, International Relations 26). The genocide only ended due to the fact the Tutsi dominated rebel group (RBF), defeated the Hutu regime. Subsequently, President Paul Kagame took control (News …show more content…
During the genocide, there were no efforts on the part of the United States to restrict the representation of the genocidal government in its agencies, organizations, and institutions (Cohen 148). The United States did not favor either direct or United Nations military intervention to stop the killings as it maintained that the process of peacemaking had become dangerously over utilized, and that Rwanda was of marginal strategic importance (Klinghoffer). President Clinton’s initial reaction to the genocide typified the US response as he called for national reconciliation and an end to the violence. The American position was thus one of regret and non-partisanship with no intimation of strong action (Klinghoffer). Eventually, however, three hundred US marines were transferred from Somalia to help with the operation (Klinghoffer). The mission ended up being successful. American policy then focused on arranging a ceasefire in a place as a precondition to negotiations, and on implementing the Arusha power sharing agreement. Ending the civil war, not the genocide was the major concern as most American policymakers seemed to believe that mutual ethnic killings and an ethnic civil war were evolving hand in hand (Klinghoffer). Although eventually the United States hindered into the massacre, it wasn’t soon enough and should have had more