Moral ambiguity, strategic, and expressive voting can be understood as facets of the “problem of consensus” and the exclusion of religious arguments (or the inclusion of the duty of civility) from PJP. Firstly, he considers the case of Hawaiian voting, from which he argues that since the contribution and reasoning behind a vote are morally vague, the duty of civility is not directly derivable and religious arguments should be accepted. (Gaus 8-9) This is tested by formulating the Shared Reasons View of the Duty of Civility (SRV) (Gaus 10). Through this formulation, Gaus argues that SRV is not warranted due to the vagueness of the polity, unnecessarily restricts arguments within communities that may provide coalitions (e.g. discussion within
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Given that this is not “wrong,” in a reasonable perspective, the argument in favor of religious reason appears to be supported, if insincere actions are a permissible fact of voting behavior. Thirdly, this argument is widened to incorporate further voting behaviors in the formulation of the Minimal Duty of Civility. (Gaus, 15) But MDC cannot account for expressive voting, in which the vote, perceived as not impactful, carries symbolic meaning rather than direct political will, and expresses a non-direct opinion of the voter (be it originated by the state of affairs more than the law itself, etc.). As in the case for strategic voting, if one has no reason to omit an expressive use of voting, one would not have no reason to reject arguments that are religious in …show more content…
Firstly, given that a law is accepted by independent reasons by all members of P, its application on a particular level is required, and is enacted by individuals who may not understand its general formulation in terms of its united and diverse reasons, making interpretation, delineation, and elaboration troublesome. Secondly, it becomes less clear, given that one takes religious arguments to be valid, what appeal is acceptable as a comprehensive doctrine, and what is expected for the new or decaying comprehensive doctrines within the public. An advantage of sharing a consensus on the basic structure of the state is that it provides a somewhat tangible conception to which rising religions may compare themselves, and understand the shared publicly moral project with which their adherents will be involved. (Macedo 30). This is not to mention that the procedure for religious exception requires a status or a shared understanding of what constitutes a religion to solve the “error of symmetry” seen in Gaus. Lastly, a “silos view” may harbor social division by rejecting burdens of judgement, a downplay of the pursuit of common life which underlies the liberal vision of the state, permitting attacks “ad animum” rather than discussion for a better life qua citizens. (Macedo
Given that this is not “wrong,” in a reasonable perspective, the argument in favor of religious reason appears to be supported, if insincere actions are a permissible fact of voting behavior. Thirdly, this argument is widened to incorporate further voting behaviors in the formulation of the Minimal Duty of Civility. (Gaus, 15) But MDC cannot account for expressive voting, in which the vote, perceived as not impactful, carries symbolic meaning rather than direct political will, and expresses a non-direct opinion of the voter (be it originated by the state of affairs more than the law itself, etc.). As in the case for strategic voting, if one has no reason to omit an expressive use of voting, one would not have no reason to reject arguments that are religious in …show more content…
Firstly, given that a law is accepted by independent reasons by all members of P, its application on a particular level is required, and is enacted by individuals who may not understand its general formulation in terms of its united and diverse reasons, making interpretation, delineation, and elaboration troublesome. Secondly, it becomes less clear, given that one takes religious arguments to be valid, what appeal is acceptable as a comprehensive doctrine, and what is expected for the new or decaying comprehensive doctrines within the public. An advantage of sharing a consensus on the basic structure of the state is that it provides a somewhat tangible conception to which rising religions may compare themselves, and understand the shared publicly moral project with which their adherents will be involved. (Macedo 30). This is not to mention that the procedure for religious exception requires a status or a shared understanding of what constitutes a religion to solve the “error of symmetry” seen in Gaus. Lastly, a “silos view” may harbor social division by rejecting burdens of judgement, a downplay of the pursuit of common life which underlies the liberal vision of the state, permitting attacks “ad animum” rather than discussion for a better life qua citizens. (Macedo