Malayan Campaign - the Matador Plan Essay

5821 Words Nov 11th, 2012 24 Pages


“Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her expansion, or England must willingly give up some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein lies a cause for war.”

Lt Cdr Tota Ishimaru, Imperial Japanese Navy

1. The fall of Malaya and Singapore to the hand of the Japanese is a tremendous sign that showed the failure of Operation Matador. In this battle study, there are chronology of events that will guide us very closely in knowing and understanding the reason why this operation failed to meet its objectives. In doing the research on the background of the battle of Malaya and the relativity to the Operation Matador, our syndicate members
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However, a threat to British and American possessions in the area was not considered to be imminent, as revealed in a letter from Prime Minister Churchill to US President Roosevelt, dated 15 February 1941:

“I do not myself think that the Japanese would likely to send the large military expedition necessary to lay seige to Singapore. The Japanese would no doubt occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East Indies and thereabouts that they covet, and thus get a far better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore later on. They would also raid Australian and New Zealand ports and coasts, causing deep anxiety in those Dominions, which had already sent all their best trained fighting men to the Far East”.

8. In October 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East, and the G.H.Q. Far East opened at Singapore on the 18th November, 1940. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the operational control and direction of training of British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of these territories. It also includes the control and training of British air forces in Ceylon and of reconnaissance squadrons in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. His headquarters was an operational one, not administrative, and had no control over any naval forces. So

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