Tavits (2005) examines the effect of some factors on electoral volatility, such as national economic performance, average age of parties, ideological polarization. One of my critiques for her argument is about average age of parties and its relationship with electoral volatility. She argued that if a party survives many elections and gather a serious support from …show more content…
Even if the party is an accepted as an established party in the political system, the voter does not necessarily look at the age of parties. Rather, they are more likely to focus on what policies the parties in the government produced and how much the voters benefit from these policies. I argue that the parties can survive multiple election if they can produce beneficial policies for the voters. Even if the parties in the government are old parties, they will run with their policies, not with their ages. The insignificant statistical result on age, which Tavits (2005) found, supports my idea. Instead of age, she should focus on previous vote shares because percentage of vote share in previous elections may be an indicator of how much the voters are satisfied with the party or we can focus on economic performance of these old parties. In 1999 in Turkey, Democratic Leftist Party, Fatherland Party and Nationalist Movement Party established a coalition and the former two parties are old parties. After two years, this coalition collapsed in the 2001 election and AKP, which …show more content…
These two studies are two important evidences for better understanding of electoral volatility across regions. One of the important difference between two articles is focused on the effect of ideological polarization. Even though Tavits (2005) and Robert and Wibbels (1999) found that ideological polarization tend to reduce electoral volatility, Robert and Wibbels (1999) argued that electoral volatility will increase as the ideological polarization increase. Although both two studies use the same measurement, Tavits’s (2005) theoretical framework seems to be stronger than Robert and Wibbels’s (1999) theory. Robert and Wibbles (1999) argue that ideological polarization encourages the emergence of multiple parties. In fact, they describes ideological diversity, not ideological polarization, because multiple parties can emerge without any polarization and proliferation of parties in the political system is highly related with diversity of ideological positions. Polarization in ideology, instead, requires highly differential ideological positions and these differences should be sharp (Tavits, 2005). Tavits (2005) describes ideological polarization that voter’s ideological positions are highly different and switching their votes means switching their ideology, which is too unlikely. For example, in