Kripke draws a distinction between ‘the number of planets’ and ‘eight’ in terms of “rigidity”. What is rigidity? What is the evidence for the claim that names are rigid? How does Kripke’s notion of rigidity help address Quine’s objection to de re modality?
While Kripke’s predecessors argued that proper names are hidden descriptions of the objects they designate, Kripke notes that names function not as descriptions, but as a means of referring to objects themselves. By examining intuitions of how language is used, Kripke is able to show that proper names can be used to refer to objects directly, independently of what we know about the objects. What Kripke has to say about proper names is part of a greater discussion regarding his concept of rigidity. In order to understand what Kripke means by rigidity, as detailed in Naming and Necessity, I will first outline the Quinean example he addresses regarding the distinction between ‘the number of planets’ and ‘eight’ and briefly address Quine’s concerns regarding the incoherency of de re modality. I will then unpack Kripke’s response to Quine’s objections through his notion of rigidity. I will then further …show more content…
Kripke works off the basic intuition that, “although someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 could have been the U.S. President in 1970, … no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon” (48). Thus ‘U.S. President in 1970’ is a non-rigid or accidental designator, while ‘Nixon’ is a rigid designator. Even in the case where the person Nixon is called Joe in a counterfactual situation, we would still understand that individual to be Nixon from our perspective. Another example of this would be if in a possible world, dogs were called dinosaurs. We would not say that dinosaurs exist in that world, but that dogs exist in the world and are known as
While Kripke’s predecessors argued that proper names are hidden descriptions of the objects they designate, Kripke notes that names function not as descriptions, but as a means of referring to objects themselves. By examining intuitions of how language is used, Kripke is able to show that proper names can be used to refer to objects directly, independently of what we know about the objects. What Kripke has to say about proper names is part of a greater discussion regarding his concept of rigidity. In order to understand what Kripke means by rigidity, as detailed in Naming and Necessity, I will first outline the Quinean example he addresses regarding the distinction between ‘the number of planets’ and ‘eight’ and briefly address Quine’s concerns regarding the incoherency of de re modality. I will then unpack Kripke’s response to Quine’s objections through his notion of rigidity. I will then further …show more content…
Kripke works off the basic intuition that, “although someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 could have been the U.S. President in 1970, … no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon” (48). Thus ‘U.S. President in 1970’ is a non-rigid or accidental designator, while ‘Nixon’ is a rigid designator. Even in the case where the person Nixon is called Joe in a counterfactual situation, we would still understand that individual to be Nixon from our perspective. Another example of this would be if in a possible world, dogs were called dinosaurs. We would not say that dinosaurs exist in that world, but that dogs exist in the world and are known as