Sarah Freihon
Professor Hsu
Philosophy 117
19 December 2014
Part B: In the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein commits himself to the view that everything that can be said or thought is a truth function of elementary propositions. I will begin, with a brief explanation of Wittgenstein’s argument that there are in a certain sense no negative facts, no disjunctive facts, and no conjunctive facts.
Then, I will examine Wittgenstein’s claim that the truth or falsity of a general proposition is solely determined by all the (relevant) particular facts. Later, I will provide a philosophically tenable explanation of Bertrand Russell’s account of substitutional quantification and its relationship with general facts. Finally, I will conclude with an evaluation of the dispute between Wittgenstein and Russell regarding the existence of general facts. Wittgenstein argues that much like commas and parentheticals, logical connectives …show more content…
In the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell argues that the fundamental constituents of this logically ideal language are atomic propositions and their corresponding atomic facts. Atomic propositions consist of (i) logically proper names for a particular object and (ii) a predicate expressing the property of the particular object referred to. For example, consider a sentence of the form Andrew is intelligent (or n is F). The atomic proposition consists of the logically proper name, Andrew, and ‘is intelligent’ is a predicate expressing a property of the object referred to by the logically proper name, Andrew. The truth or falsity of atomic propositions is determined by atomic facts. Continuing the example, the truth or falsity of the atomic proposition, Andrew is intelligent, consists in the particular object, Andrew, actually possessing the property of
Professor Hsu
Philosophy 117
19 December 2014
Part B: In the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein commits himself to the view that everything that can be said or thought is a truth function of elementary propositions. I will begin, with a brief explanation of Wittgenstein’s argument that there are in a certain sense no negative facts, no disjunctive facts, and no conjunctive facts.
Then, I will examine Wittgenstein’s claim that the truth or falsity of a general proposition is solely determined by all the (relevant) particular facts. Later, I will provide a philosophically tenable explanation of Bertrand Russell’s account of substitutional quantification and its relationship with general facts. Finally, I will conclude with an evaluation of the dispute between Wittgenstein and Russell regarding the existence of general facts. Wittgenstein argues that much like commas and parentheticals, logical connectives …show more content…
In the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell argues that the fundamental constituents of this logically ideal language are atomic propositions and their corresponding atomic facts. Atomic propositions consist of (i) logically proper names for a particular object and (ii) a predicate expressing the property of the particular object referred to. For example, consider a sentence of the form Andrew is intelligent (or n is F). The atomic proposition consists of the logically proper name, Andrew, and ‘is intelligent’ is a predicate expressing a property of the object referred to by the logically proper name, Andrew. The truth or falsity of atomic propositions is determined by atomic facts. Continuing the example, the truth or falsity of the atomic proposition, Andrew is intelligent, consists in the particular object, Andrew, actually possessing the property of