but Turkey was not what world peace was hinging on, it was Cuba (Stern 151). Robert Kennedy made the point that the public would view the offer by Khrushchev as “quite reasonable…. Therefore, we just can’t out of hand reject this...and [if] after twenty-four hours we go and make a bombing attack, we’re going to be in tough shape (Stern 161).” Discussions continued into
Saturday afternoon as to how to answer Khrushchev’s letters, without committing to the removal of missiles in Turkey, and how the missiles and Turkey would affect NATO (Stern 170). During this protracted discussion on the answer to Khrushchev’s letter, General Taylor reminded the group that a strike should occur by Monday. October 29, with an invasion to follow in 7 …show more content…
After the ExComm concluded their meeting, the president invited Ball, Bundy, Gilpatric, McNamara, Rusk, Sorensen, Thompson, and RFK to the Oval Office. At that time, he revealed the plan for Robert Kennedy to discuss the deal with Dobrynin, and for this group to give advice on some possible items that could come up at the meeting (Kennedy 81). It was decided that the RFK would provide a copy of the letter that was being sent to Khrushchev and he would reveal that U.S. military action was imminent; the U.S. would pledge not to invade Cuba if the missiles were withdrawn; but that there would be no public quid pro quo on the Turkish missiles, yet they would be removed after the Cuban crisis was resolved--any public mention of the Turkish offer and the U.S. would make it null and void (Stern …show more content…
When U Thant arrived in Cuba on October 30, he was met by a furious Fidel Castro, who ranted and raved how he had been deceived by the Soviets (Stern 205). The quarantine would remain in place until the Soviet installations, missiles, and bases were inoperative and dismantled, as verified by the U.N. inspectors. Several of the particulars of the agreement took longer than anticipated in order for the crisis to be resolved. Kennedy considered the IL-28 bombers “offensive weapons” that Castro had in Cuba, and the president wanted them removed (Stern 206). On November 8, all Soviet missile bases had been dismantled but Castro would not budge on the IL-28s and neither would Kennedy (Stern 207). Finally, after pressure from Khrushchev, Castro relented and allowed the Soviet nuclear bombers, to be removed and indicated in the official letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on November 20, 1962 (Stern 209). Many of the problems resulted from the fact that Castro refused to communicate with Kennedy, thereby having the Kremlin act as the referee. Unfortunately, relations between the U.S. and Cuba never improved and there continued to be covert operations to remove Castro from office. Relations between Castro and Khrushchev did not fare much better but Khrushchev continued to try to repair relations with Castro (Stern 210). Kennedy and Khrushchev had both looked into the abyss and stepped
Saturday afternoon as to how to answer Khrushchev’s letters, without committing to the removal of missiles in Turkey, and how the missiles and Turkey would affect NATO (Stern 170). During this protracted discussion on the answer to Khrushchev’s letter, General Taylor reminded the group that a strike should occur by Monday. October 29, with an invasion to follow in 7 …show more content…
After the ExComm concluded their meeting, the president invited Ball, Bundy, Gilpatric, McNamara, Rusk, Sorensen, Thompson, and RFK to the Oval Office. At that time, he revealed the plan for Robert Kennedy to discuss the deal with Dobrynin, and for this group to give advice on some possible items that could come up at the meeting (Kennedy 81). It was decided that the RFK would provide a copy of the letter that was being sent to Khrushchev and he would reveal that U.S. military action was imminent; the U.S. would pledge not to invade Cuba if the missiles were withdrawn; but that there would be no public quid pro quo on the Turkish missiles, yet they would be removed after the Cuban crisis was resolved--any public mention of the Turkish offer and the U.S. would make it null and void (Stern …show more content…
When U Thant arrived in Cuba on October 30, he was met by a furious Fidel Castro, who ranted and raved how he had been deceived by the Soviets (Stern 205). The quarantine would remain in place until the Soviet installations, missiles, and bases were inoperative and dismantled, as verified by the U.N. inspectors. Several of the particulars of the agreement took longer than anticipated in order for the crisis to be resolved. Kennedy considered the IL-28 bombers “offensive weapons” that Castro had in Cuba, and the president wanted them removed (Stern 206). On November 8, all Soviet missile bases had been dismantled but Castro would not budge on the IL-28s and neither would Kennedy (Stern 207). Finally, after pressure from Khrushchev, Castro relented and allowed the Soviet nuclear bombers, to be removed and indicated in the official letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on November 20, 1962 (Stern 209). Many of the problems resulted from the fact that Castro refused to communicate with Kennedy, thereby having the Kremlin act as the referee. Unfortunately, relations between the U.S. and Cuba never improved and there continued to be covert operations to remove Castro from office. Relations between Castro and Khrushchev did not fare much better but Khrushchev continued to try to repair relations with Castro (Stern 210). Kennedy and Khrushchev had both looked into the abyss and stepped