Following this further, Boeker (2017) demonstrates from John Locke’s notion of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, suggesting that the theory of personal identity very much exists as being classified as a combination of what he’s coined as sameness and closeness. In this case, sameness and closeness represent in a similar fashion what the soul-continuity theory initially did, that the relationship between the two and their distinctions exist as a fusion resulting from antecedent experiences (paradoxically, the basis for future events). For instance, consider the scenario with one who has Alzheimers, the sameness and closeness between the two for that individual can appear to be rather inexistent, until it is. And if
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By this, it then presents itself as being completely inexplicable to the human race. Therefore, if going by this notion, one may never truly arrive at a solution for the problem of personal identity, merely because if we’re unable to understand human consciousness and it’s origin, that is, the true origin of thinking as being this substance, then we may as well never arrive at a convincing solution to personal identity—let alone what personal identity is. Conversely, taking into account Garrido’s (2017) explanation of personal identity, provides a bit of relief for those who may find this to be quite troubling. To be specific, the explanation simply states that in order for one to be able to identify who they are, in an attempt to resolve this underlying tension, one must be able to personally extract from their environment the current situation and adopt a character with one that is best suitable for that event. However, this would require possessing a series of mental constructs that aim to serve the purpose of personal identity and thus, being required a …show more content…
Parfit (1971) begins to explain the existing difficulties that surround the great dilemma of personal identity as being this subjective and arbitrarily induced response to what we currently know of ourselves today. Focusing much on our emotional intellect, he states that an individual will then be able to reflect on an experience as being either theirs or not theirs, but in order to arrive at a response to that question one must be existing already. Whether this might be a case of retrospection serving as some kind of illustrative foundation is uncertain, but it certainly prompts the question in determining personal identity as being this construct of personal experiences, and if, an accumulation of just that. For example, he gives a scenario in which we have a brain that is divided equally into two and placed into two separate bodies. The question then becomes, who is who, and how much of that person still exists in each body? Do both of these posses the same amount of memories? What about cognitive abilities? Is personal identity a result of cognitive function? Because if that’s the case, then personal identity for each body will diminish substantially given that each part of the brain
By this, it then presents itself as being completely inexplicable to the human race. Therefore, if going by this notion, one may never truly arrive at a solution for the problem of personal identity, merely because if we’re unable to understand human consciousness and it’s origin, that is, the true origin of thinking as being this substance, then we may as well never arrive at a convincing solution to personal identity—let alone what personal identity is. Conversely, taking into account Garrido’s (2017) explanation of personal identity, provides a bit of relief for those who may find this to be quite troubling. To be specific, the explanation simply states that in order for one to be able to identify who they are, in an attempt to resolve this underlying tension, one must be able to personally extract from their environment the current situation and adopt a character with one that is best suitable for that event. However, this would require possessing a series of mental constructs that aim to serve the purpose of personal identity and thus, being required a …show more content…
Parfit (1971) begins to explain the existing difficulties that surround the great dilemma of personal identity as being this subjective and arbitrarily induced response to what we currently know of ourselves today. Focusing much on our emotional intellect, he states that an individual will then be able to reflect on an experience as being either theirs or not theirs, but in order to arrive at a response to that question one must be existing already. Whether this might be a case of retrospection serving as some kind of illustrative foundation is uncertain, but it certainly prompts the question in determining personal identity as being this construct of personal experiences, and if, an accumulation of just that. For example, he gives a scenario in which we have a brain that is divided equally into two and placed into two separate bodies. The question then becomes, who is who, and how much of that person still exists in each body? Do both of these posses the same amount of memories? What about cognitive abilities? Is personal identity a result of cognitive function? Because if that’s the case, then personal identity for each body will diminish substantially given that each part of the brain