In this essay, human rights will be defined as the ideals belonging to all mankind, inherent to personhood, by which cultures attempt to preserve human dignity. I will begin from the assumption that human rights are a universal concept and not just a western construct, and I will counterargument the two notions that challenge my initial assumption. These notions relate to the religious conception of human rights and the transactional conception of the Soviet Union. These two different interpretations were used by Jack Donnelly to argue that human rights as we understand them today are a strictly western notion not shared by any other culture. My essay will instead strive to show how the concept of human rights is consistent, although not identical,
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He argues that in the West, these duties are not conceived as arising from the possession of one’s own rights, so for example: “the duty to respect another person’s liberty is imposed on me by his right to liberty, not mine”. However, this conception ignores the importance given to agency in the UDHR and it also amounts to a flaw in reasoning. From the point of view of equality, having rights for all is morally equivalent to having rights for no one, as in both of those cases all human beings are equal. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that it is morally desirable to have rights for everyone rather than to not have rights at all. Therefore there must be a mechanism in place by which the rights of one person guarantee the rights of another. The only way that one person’s rights can logically lead on to mine is if that person, in enjoying rights, enjoys them conditionally, subjected to the duty of respecting my rights. This is the only way in which a society can ensure inherent rights for all; if my right implies only a duty on someone else’s behalf, and no duty on my own, then that is a tyranny on my side. The juxtaposition of duties and rights, which was heavily emphasised by the Soviets, is therefore perfectly consistent with the accepted Western conception of human rights. This can be clearly seen in practice: to use a Soviet example, it is your right to participate in society, meaning that no one can arbitrarily be excluded from participating. But it is also the duty of individuals to participate, as that is how a society is formed. In over 80% of countries, Western and
He argues that in the West, these duties are not conceived as arising from the possession of one’s own rights, so for example: “the duty to respect another person’s liberty is imposed on me by his right to liberty, not mine”. However, this conception ignores the importance given to agency in the UDHR and it also amounts to a flaw in reasoning. From the point of view of equality, having rights for all is morally equivalent to having rights for no one, as in both of those cases all human beings are equal. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that it is morally desirable to have rights for everyone rather than to not have rights at all. Therefore there must be a mechanism in place by which the rights of one person guarantee the rights of another. The only way that one person’s rights can logically lead on to mine is if that person, in enjoying rights, enjoys them conditionally, subjected to the duty of respecting my rights. This is the only way in which a society can ensure inherent rights for all; if my right implies only a duty on someone else’s behalf, and no duty on my own, then that is a tyranny on my side. The juxtaposition of duties and rights, which was heavily emphasised by the Soviets, is therefore perfectly consistent with the accepted Western conception of human rights. This can be clearly seen in practice: to use a Soviet example, it is your right to participate in society, meaning that no one can arbitrarily be excluded from participating. But it is also the duty of individuals to participate, as that is how a society is formed. In over 80% of countries, Western and