III. The Life of George In this section, FOH demonstrates that both the mugger and doctor subordinate George’s humanity. The former subordinates George’s humanity by overvaluing self-interest, and the latter subordinates humanity’s value by promoting George’s self-interest, and ignoring his reasoning.
(Case A): George v. The Mugger Unlike deceitful promising, mugging is transparent. George knows that he would die if he refuses to hand over the money. George also knows that the mugger is acting from self-interest. Prima facie, acting from a conditional value of self-interest seems to be the problem, however, the problem is end containment (4:430). The mugger offers a forced choice that subordinates George’s will to his, which George cannot …show more content…
The Doctor In the mugging case, self-interest subordinates George’s humanity. In the doctor case, self-interest does not subordinate George’s humanity. The doctor’s maxim is: lie to patients when it necessarily benefits them. Even though she promotes George’s self-interest, she subordinates George’s humanity. The problem is that George’s reasoning (even if it is fallible) is being ignored by her. The lie disables George from reasoning, it merely subordinates his reasoning to her own. The mere fact that the doctor does something beneficial for George does not justify doing something that would otherwise be wrong. Since FOH is a CI formulation, we cannot lie to benefit (it is a conditional value)—it does not matter whether self-interest benefits the doctor or the patient (4:429). But suppose we grant that George is irrational, and alas, after the procedure his capacity for good reasoning grasps that he was irrational prior to the procedure. In this case, treating reasoners who are sometimes irrational in this way would not be treating them as the human, but rather as things (4:428). As shown above, the human has vulnerabilities—our rational wills are subject to making irrational choices. Hence, if we followed the doctor’s line of reasoning, we would (at some point) treat every rational being as things. But FOH commands that we treat the human as an end in itself—as an objective regulative end (4:428). Thus, we would have a problem if we universally accepted humanity’s value while at the same time subordinating humanity whenever an agent errs. Therefore, since treating reasoners as things subordinates the value of their humanity, FOH shows that the doctor’s maxim is
(Case A): George v. The Mugger Unlike deceitful promising, mugging is transparent. George knows that he would die if he refuses to hand over the money. George also knows that the mugger is acting from self-interest. Prima facie, acting from a conditional value of self-interest seems to be the problem, however, the problem is end containment (4:430). The mugger offers a forced choice that subordinates George’s will to his, which George cannot …show more content…
The Doctor In the mugging case, self-interest subordinates George’s humanity. In the doctor case, self-interest does not subordinate George’s humanity. The doctor’s maxim is: lie to patients when it necessarily benefits them. Even though she promotes George’s self-interest, she subordinates George’s humanity. The problem is that George’s reasoning (even if it is fallible) is being ignored by her. The lie disables George from reasoning, it merely subordinates his reasoning to her own. The mere fact that the doctor does something beneficial for George does not justify doing something that would otherwise be wrong. Since FOH is a CI formulation, we cannot lie to benefit (it is a conditional value)—it does not matter whether self-interest benefits the doctor or the patient (4:429). But suppose we grant that George is irrational, and alas, after the procedure his capacity for good reasoning grasps that he was irrational prior to the procedure. In this case, treating reasoners who are sometimes irrational in this way would not be treating them as the human, but rather as things (4:428). As shown above, the human has vulnerabilities—our rational wills are subject to making irrational choices. Hence, if we followed the doctor’s line of reasoning, we would (at some point) treat every rational being as things. But FOH commands that we treat the human as an end in itself—as an objective regulative end (4:428). Thus, we would have a problem if we universally accepted humanity’s value while at the same time subordinating humanity whenever an agent errs. Therefore, since treating reasoners as things subordinates the value of their humanity, FOH shows that the doctor’s maxim is