Warren herself …show more content…
This situation better replicates the situation that a careless woman may put themselves into in becoming pregnant. She still states that the one missing difference is that the woman would give life to the baby that the fetus becomes, where this is not the case in the altered violinist case. She uses this to come to the conclusion that the person’s “responsibility for [the violinist’s] existence does not seem to lessen his obligation to keep [the violinist] alive, if he is also responsible for [the violinist’s] being in a situation in which only he can save him” (Warren …show more content…
The first being at what point a being gains it rights if not as a fetus. The second questions whether or not the potential personhood of a fetus would give it rights. She begins to answer these by defining the difference between an embryo which is in the third trimester and a newborn baby. The factor that seems to be different in this case is the lack of consciousness and by extension, the lack of self awareness in the embryo which a newborn clearly has. I personally believe that this is evident enough to prove that the fetus, at any stage before birth lacks the criteria to personhood and thus, is unable to have its own rights, thus making abortion unmoral. Warren agrees with this in her conclusion of these questions, believing that “even a fully developed fetus is not personlike enough” (Warren 40) to be given the rights that the moral community has or a right to