Euthyphro Dilemma The Euthyphro dilemma is an argument that was brought about by a question asked by Socrates during Plato’s Euthyphro. The question is seen to object the Divine Command Theory. Socrates asked, “is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” or in other words, “Are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because they are willed by God?” (Philosophy of Religion The Origin of the Euthyphro Dilemma). The Divine Command theorist faces problems that will not allow them to be able to answer the Euthyphro dilemma. Either way, out of both the branches that the Divine Command theorist could pick, there are consequences that they cannot
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He argues that, moral goodness and badness are a part of the axiological concepts while deontological concepts are more about moral obligation and duty. Also, he says that deontological concepts depend on God’s commands, while axiological concepts depend on God himself. (Lowder). Alston, just like Aquinas, is convinced that the Euthyphro dilemma is false and is a defender of the Divine Command Theory. He argues that because God is morally perfect he would never command any immoral or unjust actions (Koons). This would make all acts willed by God morally good and acts that are morally good willed by God because of their moral goodness. One worry for Alston’s argument is that is brings about the question “what does God’s essential goodness consist of?” A supporter of the Divine Command theory may reply that the essential goodness consists in His distinctive assets that represent who He is. Traits that He embodies are being loving and kindness but using these two traits creates an opportunity for a revised Euthyphro dilemma to be written. Are the properties of being loving and kind good because they are assets that God exemplifies, or is God good because he exemplifies those traits? Both of these possibilities are not accepted completely. The first because it seems to deprive God from the claim that He is good of all its content, and the second because it makes goodness separate from God
He argues that, moral goodness and badness are a part of the axiological concepts while deontological concepts are more about moral obligation and duty. Also, he says that deontological concepts depend on God’s commands, while axiological concepts depend on God himself. (Lowder). Alston, just like Aquinas, is convinced that the Euthyphro dilemma is false and is a defender of the Divine Command Theory. He argues that because God is morally perfect he would never command any immoral or unjust actions (Koons). This would make all acts willed by God morally good and acts that are morally good willed by God because of their moral goodness. One worry for Alston’s argument is that is brings about the question “what does God’s essential goodness consist of?” A supporter of the Divine Command theory may reply that the essential goodness consists in His distinctive assets that represent who He is. Traits that He embodies are being loving and kindness but using these two traits creates an opportunity for a revised Euthyphro dilemma to be written. Are the properties of being loving and kind good because they are assets that God exemplifies, or is God good because he exemplifies those traits? Both of these possibilities are not accepted completely. The first because it seems to deprive God from the claim that He is good of all its content, and the second because it makes goodness separate from God