The individual itself comes into existence when “[necessary causes] interact with one another until particular things come to exist as a result.” Avicenna’s specific term for the principle being is the “Necessary Existent,” to capture the concept that all being necessarily comes from the Necessary existent. From this idea, Avicenna describes the Necessary Existent’s intellecting powers, “It intellects by way of Itself anything of which it is a principle.” From thence, the Necessary Existent does not know singulars in themselves, by the fact that they are not eternal and unchanging in the intellect. For if the NE knows now that “A is”, but knows later that “A is not” (or “A does not exist”), Its knowledge changes, for both propositions are separate objects of the intellect. However, one can know in the universal way the fact that something exists and does not exist later, and the intellect does not change. The distinction lies between knowing a certain individual in time, and knowing at a certain time within certain circumstances that an individual exists. Thereby it knows the singulars, however Avicenna distinguishes our knowledge from
The individual itself comes into existence when “[necessary causes] interact with one another until particular things come to exist as a result.” Avicenna’s specific term for the principle being is the “Necessary Existent,” to capture the concept that all being necessarily comes from the Necessary existent. From this idea, Avicenna describes the Necessary Existent’s intellecting powers, “It intellects by way of Itself anything of which it is a principle.” From thence, the Necessary Existent does not know singulars in themselves, by the fact that they are not eternal and unchanging in the intellect. For if the NE knows now that “A is”, but knows later that “A is not” (or “A does not exist”), Its knowledge changes, for both propositions are separate objects of the intellect. However, one can know in the universal way the fact that something exists and does not exist later, and the intellect does not change. The distinction lies between knowing a certain individual in time, and knowing at a certain time within certain circumstances that an individual exists. Thereby it knows the singulars, however Avicenna distinguishes our knowledge from