The direct and indirect causes connected to the sequence of events in the Bourbon Dolphin accident are listed below:
• External forces from weather and current;
• Unfavourable heading of the vessel in relation to external forces;
• Machinery black out and the consequent reduction of manoeuvrability;
• Lowering the towing pin, which led to larger angle of attack;
• Loading condition and vessel stability characteristics.
• Weakness in vessel design;
• Poor planning and risk analysis;
• Lack of situational awareness concerning the development of the large vessel drift-off and static heeling angle;
• Lack of awareness of the effect of influencing factors on the vessel static heeling angle …show more content…
The Royal Commission report (Lyng et al., 2008) describes how a series of problems and misunderstandings caused the oil rig support AHV to capsize. All aspects of the operation up to and after capsizing were investigated in depth by the Commission, Transocean (the owners of the rig), and Chevron (the operator, who hired the ships). It is clear from the accident report that vessel stability is an issue, and it had been paramount in the minds of the crew of the ship. If the vessel master (or person in charge of a vessel during an AHO) had been provided with appropriate information timely, there would not have been a vessel capsizing …show more content…
During an anchor-handling operation, thrusters are always used in practice for manoeuvring and dynamic positioning. The real bollard pull is then materially reduced. The company did not itself investigate whether the vessel was suited to the operation but left this decision to the master.
• The company did not see to the acquisition of information about the content and scope of the assignment the “Bourbon Dolphin” was set to perform. The company did not itself do any review of the Rig Move Procedure (RMP) with a view to risk exposure for crew and vessel. The company was thus not in a position to offer guidance.
• The Norwegian classification society Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate were unable to detect the failures in the company’s systems through their audits.
• In specifying the vessel, the operator did not consider that the real bollard pull would be materially reduced by using thrusters. In practice, the “Bourbon Dolphin” was unsuited to addressing the great forces to which the vessel was exposed.
• The mooring system and the deployment method chosen were demanding to handle and vulnerable in relation to environmental