The Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and Satyanath article “Commercial Imperialism?” once again takes a different route in determining what compels a state to participate in international trade. Focusing on US exports they find that political influence from CIA interventions were used to increase demand for US products in areas where there was a comparative disadvantage. In their study the independent variable is the level US government influence on other states and the dependent variable is the annual bilateral trade level between the US and said state. They measure international trade (using the gravity model) between the US and states in which the CIA has either installed a new leader or supported the one currently in power. Based on their quantitative
…show more content…
Driving their initial hypothesis that US government influence over states vis-à-vis CIA control of a state’s leadership determines trading levels is an inherently Realist notion. Their findings are found to be robust according to their multiple levels of analysis and controlling for any countervailing influence the USSR might have in its efforts to manipulate markets through controls of foreign leaders. I find this article to perhaps be the most convincing of the three due to its empirical nature and reliance on evidence rather than hypothetical models. However, despite their robustness checks and analysis of alternative hypothesis, I believe they overlooked the possibility of reverse causality. While they test for “trade integration, political ideology, and loans and grants” what could be missing is the inherent dependence on the US for support in the possibility of a counter/initial revolution. In such a case they would be more than willing to endure the economic hit in exchange for the military power necessary to maintain government stability and stay in …show more content…
Other IR theories and empirical studies have been conducted to determine why states participate in international political institutions, Krasner mentions how “analysts of IR have… pro forma set of variables… to show the distribution of power in the political system”. However, a great deal more work could go into how such variables determine state behavior in the arguably much newer international economic system. States have a great deal of selectivity when determining what rights they wish to surrender as a sovereign state in order to get the benefits of participating in the international political system, and that same sort of cost-benefit analysis is made for the economic system as well. States are selective about economic treaties, regional trade agreements, bilateral agreements, etc. Why and how they participate is just as important to the field of IPE as any other aspect of trade or
Driving their initial hypothesis that US government influence over states vis-à-vis CIA control of a state’s leadership determines trading levels is an inherently Realist notion. Their findings are found to be robust according to their multiple levels of analysis and controlling for any countervailing influence the USSR might have in its efforts to manipulate markets through controls of foreign leaders. I find this article to perhaps be the most convincing of the three due to its empirical nature and reliance on evidence rather than hypothetical models. However, despite their robustness checks and analysis of alternative hypothesis, I believe they overlooked the possibility of reverse causality. While they test for “trade integration, political ideology, and loans and grants” what could be missing is the inherent dependence on the US for support in the possibility of a counter/initial revolution. In such a case they would be more than willing to endure the economic hit in exchange for the military power necessary to maintain government stability and stay in …show more content…
Other IR theories and empirical studies have been conducted to determine why states participate in international political institutions, Krasner mentions how “analysts of IR have… pro forma set of variables… to show the distribution of power in the political system”. However, a great deal more work could go into how such variables determine state behavior in the arguably much newer international economic system. States have a great deal of selectivity when determining what rights they wish to surrender as a sovereign state in order to get the benefits of participating in the international political system, and that same sort of cost-benefit analysis is made for the economic system as well. States are selective about economic treaties, regional trade agreements, bilateral agreements, etc. Why and how they participate is just as important to the field of IPE as any other aspect of trade or