The relationship between moral luck and the condition of control creates a conflict that Nagel is trying to get across. When we consider the universal truths about responsibility, he outlines the accepted conditions which excuse moral judgement as having “clear absence of control” (Nagel, 25). This means that one cannot be morally assessed for what is not in one’s control. The condition of control is an ideology that can generally be agreed upon when it is an obvious lack of physical control, such as involuntary movement, but often fails to be seen when it is not so obvious. Nagel says that everything results from a “combined influence of factors,”(Nagel, 35) which further indicates nothing is truly within one’s control. The problem is that if the condition of control is true, then moral luck violates this understood notion. Moral luck is fundamentally concerned with moral judgement without due consideration of external inevitable factors, and herein lies the undeniable conflict. He discusses how moral luck cannot account for the condition of control, yet we tend to accept both as justification for moral assessment. When Moral Luck is reduced down to the main conflict, it is clear that the condition of control is accepted because it is an agreed-upon staple of fair judgement, but moral luck shows that we actually judge people based on the
The relationship between moral luck and the condition of control creates a conflict that Nagel is trying to get across. When we consider the universal truths about responsibility, he outlines the accepted conditions which excuse moral judgement as having “clear absence of control” (Nagel, 25). This means that one cannot be morally assessed for what is not in one’s control. The condition of control is an ideology that can generally be agreed upon when it is an obvious lack of physical control, such as involuntary movement, but often fails to be seen when it is not so obvious. Nagel says that everything results from a “combined influence of factors,”(Nagel, 35) which further indicates nothing is truly within one’s control. The problem is that if the condition of control is true, then moral luck violates this understood notion. Moral luck is fundamentally concerned with moral judgement without due consideration of external inevitable factors, and herein lies the undeniable conflict. He discusses how moral luck cannot account for the condition of control, yet we tend to accept both as justification for moral assessment. When Moral Luck is reduced down to the main conflict, it is clear that the condition of control is accepted because it is an agreed-upon staple of fair judgement, but moral luck shows that we actually judge people based on the