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26 Cards in this Set

  • Front
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Third wave of Democratization

-Samuel Huntington



- The surge in democratic transitions that have occurred around the world since 1974 (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Latin America)



-First wave: 1827-1926, American and French revolutions and WWI


-Second wave: 1943-1962, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Austria etc


Bottom-up democratic transition

One in which the people rise up up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a poplar revolution

Top-down transition

One in which the dictatorial ruling elite introduces liberalizing reforms that ultimately lead to democratic transition

Gorbachev's reforms in 1985

-Perestroika (economic restricting) A reform policy aimed at liberalizung and regenerating the Soviet economy



-Glasnost (openness) was a reform policy aimed at increasing political openness



-This triggered reforms in other countries


Collective action

Refers to the pursuit of some objective by groups of individuals. Typically, the objective is some form of public good

Public good

-Nonexcludable and nonrivalrous

Collective action or free-rider problem

Individuals members of a group often have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good that will benefit all members of the group



-Explains rare protest in east europe

Incentive

You only have incentive to join if your participation makes it successful

Two equilibria

-No one participated


-Exactly K people participate

The difference between K and N

-If k=n there's no incentive to free ride


- If k <n then there is an incentive to free ride



- The larger the difference between K and N the greater incentive to free ride


-Vice versa for collective action

The size of N

-Larger groups will find it harder to overcome collective action problems



-Smaller groups are more powerful

Tipping models

Provide an explanation for mass protests

Preference falsification

It's dangerous to reveal opposition to dictatorships in public so individuals who oppose the regime often falsify their preferences in public

Revolutionary threshold

-The size of protests at which an individual is willing to participate



-As a protest grows in size it become harder to punish individuals so the threshold declines


Revolutionary cascade

When one person's participation triggers the participation of another, and so on

Change in revolutionary threshold

-Grievanves will cause people thresholds to lower

Revolutions are impossible to predict

Because of our inability to observe private preferences and revoltionary threshold

Communism seemed inevitably

-Due to preference falsification

Policy liberalization

Entails a controlled opening of political space



-Designed to stabilize dictatorships

Period of liberalization

-Results from a split in the authoritarian regime between hard liners and soft liners



-Split is often caused by declining economic conditions or social unrest

Complete information game

-One in which each player knows all the information that there is to know about the game



-Top-down transition can only happen with incomplete info, it's a necessary condition


Implications

Dictatorial institutionalization only occurs when the soft-liners think that the opposition has moderate strength

Incomplete information game

One in which a player does not know all of the relevant information about some other player's characteristics

Expected payoff

- The sum of the payoffs associated with each outcome multiplied by the probability with which each outcome occurs



-(prob outcome 1 occurs ×payoffs from outcome 1) + (prob outcome 2 occurs ×payoffs from outcome 2)

The soft-liners will open up when

Expected payoff (Open) > Expected payoff (Do nothing)

More implications

A strong democratic opposition has an incentive to avoid taking actions that would reveal it's strengths