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26 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Third wave of Democratization |
-Samuel Huntington - The surge in democratic transitions that have occurred around the world since 1974 (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Latin America) -First wave: 1827-1926, American and French revolutions and WWI -Second wave: 1943-1962, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Austria etc |
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Bottom-up democratic transition |
One in which the people rise up up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a poplar revolution |
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Top-down transition |
One in which the dictatorial ruling elite introduces liberalizing reforms that ultimately lead to democratic transition |
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Gorbachev's reforms in 1985 |
-Perestroika (economic restricting) A reform policy aimed at liberalizung and regenerating the Soviet economy
-Glasnost (openness) was a reform policy aimed at increasing political openness -This triggered reforms in other countries
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Collective action |
Refers to the pursuit of some objective by groups of individuals. Typically, the objective is some form of public good |
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Public good |
-Nonexcludable and nonrivalrous |
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Collective action or free-rider problem |
Individuals members of a group often have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good that will benefit all members of the group -Explains rare protest in east europe |
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Incentive |
You only have incentive to join if your participation makes it successful |
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Two equilibria |
-No one participated -Exactly K people participate |
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The difference between K and N |
-If k=n there's no incentive to free ride - If k <n then there is an incentive to free ride - The larger the difference between K and N the greater incentive to free ride -Vice versa for collective action |
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The size of N |
-Larger groups will find it harder to overcome collective action problems -Smaller groups are more powerful |
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Tipping models |
Provide an explanation for mass protests |
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Preference falsification |
It's dangerous to reveal opposition to dictatorships in public so individuals who oppose the regime often falsify their preferences in public |
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Revolutionary threshold |
-The size of protests at which an individual is willing to participate -As a protest grows in size it become harder to punish individuals so the threshold declines |
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Revolutionary cascade |
When one person's participation triggers the participation of another, and so on |
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Change in revolutionary threshold |
-Grievanves will cause people thresholds to lower |
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Revolutions are impossible to predict |
Because of our inability to observe private preferences and revoltionary threshold |
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Communism seemed inevitably |
-Due to preference falsification |
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Policy liberalization |
Entails a controlled opening of political space -Designed to stabilize dictatorships |
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Period of liberalization |
-Results from a split in the authoritarian regime between hard liners and soft liners -Split is often caused by declining economic conditions or social unrest |
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Complete information game |
-One in which each player knows all the information that there is to know about the game -Top-down transition can only happen with incomplete info, it's a necessary condition |
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Implications |
Dictatorial institutionalization only occurs when the soft-liners think that the opposition has moderate strength |
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Incomplete information game |
One in which a player does not know all of the relevant information about some other player's characteristics |
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Expected payoff |
- The sum of the payoffs associated with each outcome multiplied by the probability with which each outcome occurs
-(prob outcome 1 occurs ×payoffs from outcome 1) + (prob outcome 2 occurs ×payoffs from outcome 2) |
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The soft-liners will open up when |
Expected payoff (Open) > Expected payoff (Do nothing) |
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More implications |
A strong democratic opposition has an incentive to avoid taking actions that would reveal it's strengths |