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4 Cards in this Set

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Mens rea= the state of mind required by the definition of the offence charged•Mens rea= the mechanism we establish whether the offender was morally responsible for his/her behaviour.



A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence-a) Shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of these actions; but b) Shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper.





1.A consequence is intended if it is the aim or objective of the actor (“direct”intention)2.A consequence is intended when it is the aim or objective of the actor, or is foreseen as a victual practical or moral certainty as a by-product of the actor’s aim (“oblique” intention)



•Hyam – HL said foresight of death or GBH as“highly probable” = intention•Moloney– HL said test was whether D foresaw result as natural consequence of his act?•Hancock and Shankland– HL overruled Moloney – “the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen, and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended”. •Nedrick – Lord Lane CJ in CA attempted to synthesise the HL’s decisions. His model direction was approved by the HL in Woollin



Woolin

the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is notenough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to [find*] the necessaryintention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was avirtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of thedefendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case. *replaces “infer” in Nedrick

Cunningham 1957 Subjective test for recklessness laid down:Did D foresee the possibility of the consequence occurring?Was it unjustifiable or unreasonable to take the risk?



Stephenson 1979- D a schizophrenic who failed to realise that lighting fire inside haystack could lead to damage.CA allowed appeal; conviction for arson quashed. Subjective test applies. Law requires D to foresee risk.


Caldwell 1982 A person charged with an offence under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 is ‘reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged’ if he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and when he does the act he either had not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it








•R v G – applies to criminal damage. Other authorities apply Cunningham recklessness to other offences.•e.g.Spratt [1990]– applied Cunningham recklessness to assault. •Brady – “many of their Lordships’ observations have much wider application•A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) – “general principles were laid down”



11& 12 year old boys set fire to wheelie bin. Fire spread to shop causing major damage. •HL overruled Caldwell. Subjective Cunningham recklessness applies to criminal damage.



Transferred Malice

Latimer (1886) belt •“if a person has a malicious intent towards one person, and in carrying into effect that malicious intent he injures another man, he is guilty of what the law considers malice against the person so injured”




•Pembliton(1874)•WhereD throws a brick at V but misses and breaks a window nearby, D cannot be liable for criminal damage where he is not aware of the existence of the window.




Gnango


•D and bandana man (BM) having a shoot out in a car park when innocent passer-by shot and killed by BM.•SC- foresight of risk that BM might kill D with intention to do so could be transferred in respect of death of V, the passer-by. D guilty of murder.




AG’sreference (no.3 of 1994)


D stabbed pregnant woman intending GBH. Baby born prematurely and died as a result •HL– cannot have a double transfer of malice from mother to foetus and from foetus to child it becomes.









Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea

Thabo Meli [1954]


General principle is that MR must be proved at time that AR is committed. Some scope for leeway-defendants had a prearranged plan, hit the victim, thought he had died so dumped him off cliff to make it look like an accident. He died of exposure-didn’t have necessary mens rea when dropped off cliff because had no intention to kill because thought was dead. PC- said liable for murder, series of act preplanned in order to bring about death, intention to kill, did carry out intention and as long as had that act at some time then you are liable for murder.

Church (assault, river) - jury could convict of murder if they regarded D’s behaviour from moment he first struck V to the moment he threw her in the river as a series of acts designed to cause her death or GBH•Le Brun (drag head and dropped) – D liable (for manslaughter) as chain of causation not broken between original assault and death.•Fagan v MPC– D unknowingly drove onto PC’s foot but then refused to move car off it. Court interpreted act as a continuous one. MR could be superimposed on existing AR.