Landmark Supreme Court Rulings - Rights Of The Accused

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
A young man was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. His lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client. He subsequently confessed to murder. Was he denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment? Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent." The accused had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.

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Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
A man was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. He lacked funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for him, the court refused, stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. The accused defended himself in the trial; he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison. Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for the accused violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments? In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that he had a right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."

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Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
A fourteen-year-old girl was accused of smoking in the girls' bathroom of her high school. A principal at the school questioned her and searched her purse, yielding a bag of marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. Did the search violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? No. Citing the peculiarities associated with searches on school grounds, the Court abandoned its requirement that searches be conducted only when a "probable cause" exists that an individual has violated the law. The Court used a less strict standard of "reasonableness" to conclude that the search did not violate the Constitution. The presence of rolling papers in the purse gave rise to a reasonable suspicion in the principal's mind that the girl may have been carrying drugs, thus, justifying a more thorough search of the purse.

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New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba? Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.

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Rasul v. Bush - 2004

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
A woman was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." The accused had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

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Mapp v. Ohio, 1961

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use? No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

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Raich v. Gonzales, 2005

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
In the fall of 2001, an American citizen was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for the father of the accused, in an attempt to have his detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system. The district court ruled for the accused, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination. Did the government violate this American citizen's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"? Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized this citizen's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing his challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that the accused had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized his detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.

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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A fifteen-year-old male was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. He had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with his parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, the accused was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21. Were the procedures used to commit this juvenile defendant constitutionally legitimate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? No. The proceedings of the Juvenile Court failed to comply with the Constitution. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in his case met none of these requirements.

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In re: Gault, 1967

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted. Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist? No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, " wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, "medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana." Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that "[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors." Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

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United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 2001

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
Ernesto Miranda was a poor Mexican immigrant living in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1963. Miranda was arrested after a crime victim identified him in a police lineup. Miranda was charged with rape and kidnapping and interrogated for two hours while in police custody. The police officers questioning him did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney. As a result of the interrogation, he confessed in writing to the crimes with which he was charged. His written statement also included an acknowledgement that he was aware of his right against self-incrimination. During his trial, the prosecution used his confession to obtain a conviction, and he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison on each count. Miranda's defense attorney appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. His attorney argued that his confession should have been excluded from trial because he had not been informed of his rights, nor had an attorney been present during his interrogation. The police officers involved admitted that they had not given Miranda any explanation of his rights. They argued, however, that because Miranda had been convicted of a crime in the past, he must have been aware of his rights. The Arizona Supreme Court denied his appeal and upheld his conviction. The case comes down to this fundamental question: What is the role of the police in protecting the rights of the accused, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution? The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." The Sixth Amendment states that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." But do the police have an obligation to ensure that the accused person is aware of these rights? If so, at what point in the criminal justice process must the defendant learn of these rights? The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear Miranda's case. At the same time, the Court agreed to hear three similar cases, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart. The Court combined the four cases. Since Miranda was listed first among the four cases considered by the Court, the decision came to be known by that name. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court in a 5 to 4 decision in favor of Miranda. Briefly stated: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, it means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed . . . the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed...

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Miranda v. Arizona, 1966

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
The accused was indicted for robbery in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Maryland. Due to lack of funds, he was unable to employ counsel, and so informed the judge at his arraignment. He requested that counsel be appointed for him. The judge advised him that this could not be done as it was not the practice in Carroll County to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in prosecutions for murder and rape. Without waiving his asserted right to counsel, the accused pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried without a jury. At his request witnesses were summoned in his behalf. He cross-examined the State's witnesses and examined his own. The latter gave testimony tending to establish an alibi. Although afforded the opportunity, he did not take the witness stand. The judge found him guilty and imposed a sentence of eight years. While serving his sentence, the accused filed with a judge of the Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been deprived of the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. Was the petitioner's conviction and sentence a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of the court's refusal to appoint counsel at his request? No. The Court noted that in the great majority of the states at that time, it was the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, according to the Court, the matter was generally deemed one of legislative policy. In the light of this evidence the Court was unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states, whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case. Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness. In the interest of fairness, the Court described several "special circumstances" in which indigent defendants would be guaranteed the right to counsel, appointed by the state. But this right was not, at that time, granted to each and every indigent defendant.

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Betts v. Brady, 1942

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
Acting on a suspicion that a man was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by him. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, the accused was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, he challanged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari. Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? Yes. The Court ruled that the defendant was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

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Katz v. United States, 1967

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
Nine black youths -- young, ignorant, and illiterate -- were accused of raping two white women. State officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. State law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This cases was decided together with two others. Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.

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Powell v. Alabama (1932)

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
A young man was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the state's Supreme Court stayed his execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the state's Supreme Court decided to reconsider this case. Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the state court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The state court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people. Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

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Roper v. Simmons - 2005

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What is the title and date of this Supreme Court case?
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a man had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, the accused was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding his mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that he would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of his former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine the accused's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original trial. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced the accused to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the accused's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. His petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed. Was a Texas trial court's supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence of mental retardation under the state's "special circumstances" for sentencing in capital murder cases to a jury constitutionally adequate? Does the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with the defendant violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination? No and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the supplemental instruction was constitutionally inadequate. "Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in [the first trial]," wrote Justice O'Connor "'A reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that [the accused] did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.'" Unanimously, the Court held that "considerable doubt" that the psychiatric report "even if erroneous, had a 'substantial and injurious effect'" on the verdict, meant not overturning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of this man's Fifth Amendment claim.

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Penry v. Johnson, 2001

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A man was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. His lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client. His client subsequently confessed to murder. Was the accused denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment? Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent." The accused had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.

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Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A man was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with this; these cases concerned the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions). Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

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Furman v. Georgia, 1972

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in an Oregon school district participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the school district adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. A student was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing. Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment? No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

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Vernonia School District v. Acton -1995

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A poor Mexican immigrant living in Phoenix, Arizona, was arrested after a crime victim identified him in a police lineup. He was charged with rape and kidnapping and interrogated for two hours while in police custody. The police officers questioning him did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney. As a result of the interrogation, he confessed in writing to the crimes with which he was charged. His written statement also included an acknowledgement that he was aware of his right against self-incrimination. During his trial, the prosecution used his confession to obtain a conviction, and he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison on each count. His defense attorney appealed to the state Supreme Court. His attorney argued that his confession should have been excluded from trial because he had not been informed of his rights, nor had an attorney been present during his interrogation. The police officers involved admitted that they had not given him any explanation of his rights. They argued, however, that because the accused had been convicted of a crime in the past, he must have been aware of his rights. The state Supreme Court denied his appeal and upheld his conviction. The case comes down to this fundamental question: What is the role of the police in protecting the rights of the accused, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution? The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." The Sixth Amendment states that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The Supreme Court of the United States had made previous attempts to deal with these issues. In Brown v. Mississippi (1936), the Court had ruled that the Fifth Amendment protected individuals from being forced to confess. In 1964, after this convicted felon's arrest, the Court ruled that when an accused person is denied the right to consult with his attorney, his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated. But do the police have an obligation to ensure that the accused person is aware of these rights? If so, at what point in the criminal justice process must the defendant learn of these rights? Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear this case. At the same time, the Court agreed to hear three similar cases. The Court combined the four cases. Since this case was listed first, alphabetically, among the four cases considered by the Court, the decision came to be known by that name.

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Miranda v. Arizona, 1966

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, a man was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. He challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the state Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Is a statutorily mandated sentence that does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors a violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments? No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while his life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.

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Harmelin v. Michigan, 1991

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A jury found a man guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the state Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. He challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. The death penalty statute of the state in this case assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule this state's legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

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Gregg v. Georgia, 1976

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, an Ohio doctor challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. The accused, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When the accused appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial, due to context and publicity, as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial? In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of the doctor confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against the defendant as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.

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Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
A man pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. State law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after determining the defendant had acted with "deliberate cruelty." The defendant appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review. Does a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory standard range need to be proved by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt? In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an exceptional sentence increase based on the judge's determination that the defendant had acted with "deliberate cruelty" violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Citing its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court ruled that facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissents by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer argued the ruling will diminish legislatures' ability to set uniform sentencing guidelines.

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Blakely v. Washington, 2004

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate. Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.

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Board of Education v. Earls, 2002

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, a man made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. He was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that the accused was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. The defendant said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, he filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court granted the defendant's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court." May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation? No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."

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Dickerson v. USA, 2000

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What is the title and year of this Supreme Court case?
This case deals with the constitutional right to assemble peaceably and petition the government (it is NOT a "criminal rights" case). In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech. Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

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Hurley v. Irish American Gay Group of Boston, 1995