Ir: Realism And Its Critics - John Donnelly

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structural realism and double abstraction (Donnelly)

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• Structural realism, is based on a double abstraction: from the attributes of states, and from their intentions. Waltz wants to say a ‘a small number of few and important things’ based on the knowledge that states seek at minimum their survival in a state of anarchy. Donnelly addresses the question of abstraction from states’ intentions.

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• Motives matter (Donnelley)

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• Motives matter. Structures might place constraints on units – actions, but the way that the units will respond to the constraints differs according various factors, that structural realism takes as extraneous to its theory. As Waltz admits, we do not know how states will respond to structural constraints, without the knowledge of their internal structure and disposition. D says in this means that ‘abstracting from all the state attributes yields a theory with no predictive or explanatory power. If Waltz’s theory is to do anything of interest, then it must have knowledge or assumptions about the character or motives of states’. Elsewhere, D has argued that W sees that states act out of other motives than a clear cut search for survival or domination in a structure of anarchy. If this is so however, the outcome that the theory predicts seems unlikely, since a expected balance of power will not follow unless states takes the steps necessary to balance. (these steps might be taken even if balance is not the direct objective).

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• Survival and relative gains (Schweller )

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The goal of states in a Waltzian universe is survival. But if all states wanted survival, there would be world of all cops and no robbers, as Schweller has put it. What triggers security dilemmas under anarchy is the possibility of predatory states. At least one aggressive state is needed to generate a world of inescapable conflict. This has led to many believing that what states seek is survival, and the assurance of survival is promised when the others do not have more relative power. This is the position of defensive positionalists. The idea is that power is not sought as a benefit for the state but only insofar as it translates into assurance due to others’ relative weakness

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defensive positionalists

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The goal of states in a Waltzian universe is survival. But if all states wanted survival, there would be world of all cops and no robbers, as Schweller has put it. What triggers security dilemmas under anarchy is the possibility of predatory states. At least one aggressive state is needed to generate a world of inescapable conflict. This has led to many believing that what states seek is survival, and the assurance of survival is promised when the others do not have more relative power. This is the position of defensive positionalists. The idea is that power is not sought as a benefit for the state but only insofar as it translates into assurance due to others’ relative weakness

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Offensive positionalists

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Offensive positionalists on the other hand, believes that ‘states seek to survive under anarchy by maximising their power over other states’ (see Mearsheimer, Zakaria). Donnelly believes that the lack of consensus and clarity in neorealism, as to where the motivational drive of states lies has created ambiguities for the realist model and limits its explanatory power.

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• Ad hoc motivational assumptions criticism of Waltz by Donnely

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• Ad hoc motivational assumptions. Even under the W model, do states seek only survival, or universal domination? What determines what they seek in between? See above on how W himself inserts plenty of other claims on motives of states. What W wants to say is that despite the fact that states act from a plurality of motives, the general outcome will be broadly in line with the predictions based on the nature of the structure alone, in much the same way that the theory of the market abstracts from the particular motives and actions of the firms, to come to a general conclusion as to what the market outcome will be, even though we all know that firms do not always act as profit maximisers, and ideal conditions never hold in real life. But, unlike the market model, which broadly expects firms to act as profit maximisers, there is not generally acknowledged end of states, which we can use as the main motivational state behaviour, which in a structure of anarchy determines results. Survival is one such motive, the maximisation of power is another. Ideology, moral considerations, economic motives, etc are other motives. This becomes all the more complicated when we consider that in structural theory, states respond to structural constraints, but their response depends on their perceptions of what these constraints are, and how they apply to them. Filters of perceptions account for the actions of states, in a way that cannot be interpreted by structural theory.

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• Abstracting from interaction

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• Abstracting from interaction. W also seeks to abstract from the interaction between states. But by considering only two structures, anarchy and hierarchy he bares the international order of many of its relative and obvious elements. One is institutions and the power of norms and international law. Although it might be essentially a state of anarchy, the IO is not a complete state of anarchy. Cooperation and increasing integration, has occurred, more obviously on a regional level (EU, ASEAN). The traditional realist mistrust on increasing cooperation, based on the belief that states seek relative gains, has not been realised. It might be the case that states abide to institutions, laws and norms when it serves their national interest, but there are two qualifications to make here, which are not in accordance with structural realism, at least in its Waltzarian form: one is that states see their national interest realised better through cooperation. Who they choose to cooperate with and why goes beyond the explanatory power of neorealism, which abstracts from the characteristics of the states. The second point is that in seeing their long term interests in cooperation, states might agree to compromise in the short run with the interest of other states, knowing that compromise will help them in the long term.

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• Balancing and bandwagoning

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• Balancing and bandwagoning. One of the most important neorealist predictions is that states will ‘seek to balance’ not bandwagon. This result does not follow straight from a structure of anarchy, but follows from the following assumption a. states are necessarily fearful and seek survival, b. fear of other states is pretty much equal, c. Absolute gains are valued only is so far as the do not even marginally reduce relative position.

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Snyder says we should take variations in state interests seriously because...

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• Taking seriously variations in state interests, which define different game types , of which there are many in any given distribution of capabilities.

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Snyder says Waltz is guilty of excessive ...

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• Snyder starts by noting that ‘Waltz is guilty of excessive parsimony, in the sense that the explanatory gain from some further elaboration would exceed the costs in reduced generality.’

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Snyder's remedy to Waltz' excessive parsimony

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• His remedy is to introduce three classes of ‘process variables’ which he calls relationships, interactions and structural modifiers. What Snyder does in effect is enlarge the relevant notion of system beyond structure, and how this affects the outcomes of international relations.

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Snyder says relationships...

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• Relationships provide the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behaviour. Relationships takes the response of states beyond the simple correlation to distribution of capabilities. For example, states are not as likely to respond in the same way to an agent with competing interests as with an agent with similar interests.

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Snyder says structural modifiers..

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• Relationships provide the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behaviour. Relationships takes the response of states beyond the simple correlation to distribution of capabilities. For example, states are not as likely to respond in the same way to an agent with competing interests as with an agent with similar interests.

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Snyder

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• Structural modifiers are elements in the structure which influence interaction systemically, but they are not interaction itself. Military technology, norms and institutions are examples of structural modifiers. Even if institutions are present only rudimentarily, it is the case that they are there. ‘Once realists allow that they are in principle structural, all kinds of potentially interesting conversations become possible.’

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How does donelay think we can explain balance of power during cold war?

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we can explain the balancing of the interwar period as the result of the possession of nuclear weapons of both great powers without necessarily assuming that it had anything to do with bipolarity itself.

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Theories of World Politics: Structural realism and beyond. – Keohane

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• Realism does not provide a satisfactory theory of world politics, if we require of an adequate theory that it provide a set of plausible and testable answers to questions about state behaviour under specified conditions. Realism is particularly weak in accounting for change, especially where the reasons for change lie in the world political economy or in the domestic structure of states. Realism does not work as a set of answers but it does as a sophisticated framework of questions an initial hypotheses. This means that we can introduce order and system in our enquiry of international outcomes, by asking how far do they conform to realist assumptions and hypotheses. Good Quote

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• Keohane on Snyder

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• Keohane on Snyder. Snyder begins with the hard core of Realism, but his most important contribution depends on his willingness to depart from those assumptions. How does he depart? Emphasis on ‘internal – external interactions’ A. Accounting for the importance on policy of ignorance, misperception and misinformation. Therefore, we have a move away from the systemic level factors reflected in game theoretic matrices, toward problems of perception, personal bias and group decision making.

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• The 3 tenets of classical realism (Keohane)

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• The 3 tenets of classical realism a. Statism the actors are states b. rationality condition; states act as rational agents c. power condition; states seek to maximise power. Waltz accepts these three propositions with certain qualifications. Rationality is important as a postulate, otherwise we cannot systematise the relationship between structure and unit response. But we have to recognise the asymmetry of information and other cognitive constraints. Power for Waltz is no longer an end in itself, the end as it was for Morgenthau, but it is the means to survival.

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Keohane's directive for structural realism

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• The need for a ameliorated research programme, that does not reject realism, but goes beyond it. ‘We need a multidimensional approach to world politics that incorporates several analytical frameworks or research programmes’.
• It seems to be that Keohane admires and approves of the systemic approach, and realisms parsimony and dedication to generality. But he wants less generality and more interpretation, less parsimony and more of Geertz’s ‘thick description’.

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A modified structural research programme Keohane

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the assumption that states are the primary players remains the same, but there is more emphasis on nonstate actors, intergovernmental organisations, and transnational and transgovernmental relations

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Rationalist assumption (Keohane)

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Rationalist assumption would be retained, but there would be qualifications placed on symmetry of information. The examination of information – processing can give valuable insights at to how conditions of uncertainly can influence the actions of states. The situation of complex interdependence is not merely one where it is difficult to use conventional power for certain purposes, but under which information levels are relatively high due to the existence of multiple channels of contact among states. Actors behave differently in information rich environments than in environments where uncertainty prevails. (Link this informational uncertainty argument with the role of institutions).

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Power as the state goal (Keohane)

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Power as the state goal would have to be modified severely. The influence of systemic elements other than structure determines how much power states seek and why.

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Three guidelines of the new approach: (Keohane)

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1. When trying to explain a set of outcomes always consider the hypotheses that the outcomes reflect underlying power resources without being limited to it

2. When considering different patterns of outcomes or different issue areas entertain the hypothesis that power resources are differently distributed in those issue areas ; examine to what extent these differences allow or constrain actors to transfer power resources from one area to another

3. When considering how states define their self interests, explore the effects of international structure on self interests as well as the effects of other international factors, and of domestic structure.

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Keohane and cooperation

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Keohane and cooperation He sees much more scope for cooperation than realism affords. He quotes Axelrod, how has discovered that in a series of infinite repetitions, cooperation would be the dominant strategy for players in a prisoners dilemma game.

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Keohane and change

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There is a very beautiful passage at the end of his book, that discusses the role of international relations theory in giving us cognitive freedom from events, and thus permitting us to see how we can improve. “We study politics not because is it beautiful, because we believe that it is governed by simple, knowable laws, or because it provides rich accessible data for the testing of empirical hypotheses. We study world politics because we think it will determine the fate of the earth’. Realism, by denying the disposition and character of the state any meaningful effect on outcome, is not very good at explaining change. The only change to the international structure that it foresees comes from the imposition of requirements by a hegemon. Waltz is very pessimistic about the prospect of world government, until at least this government would have the ability to impose its resolutions on its client states. Otheriwise, a strong central power would be needed, but the strongest the central power, the more the incentive on the client states to control it. Institutional liberalism on the other hand, sees the possibility for cooperation among states through institutional means ; especially when interest becomes defined more long term and more broadly.