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99 Cards in this Set
- Front
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A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US
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The federal government has NO authority to regulate intrastate transactions having an indirect effect on interstate commerce.
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United States v. Darby
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Darby (D) was a lumber manufacturer, some of whose goods were later shipped in interstate commerce. He was indicted for violation of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and defended on the ground that as an intrastate producer he was not subject to federal regulation.
We learned from Darby, and the cases that followed it, to ask whether Congress has a rational basis to believe that the activity, in the aggregate nationwide, substantially affects interstate commerce. |
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Wickard v. Filburn
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Filburn (D) was ordered to pay a penalty imposed by the Agriculture Adjustment Act for producing wheat in excess of his assigned quota.
This case works on the principles of Darby. C can regulate not only acts taken alone that have a substantial effect on ISC, but CLASS OF ACTS that taken together would have substantial effect. |
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Garcia v. SAMTA
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Congress passes minimum-wage and overtime provisions, which are made applicable to all businesses of a certain size. The statute contains no exemption for employees of state-owned mass transit systems.
State and local governments can be required to follow regulations that apply equally to private actors |
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NY v. US
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C provides that each state must arrange for toxic waste w/in its borders or be penalized.
Congress may not simply “commandeer the legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” |
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Printz v. US
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The Brady Act case amending the Gun Control Act
Congress may not compel a state or local government’s executive branch to perform functions, even ones that easy-to-do and involve no discretion. |
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Reno v. Condon
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A federal statute regulated the disclosure of private info contained in state MVD records. The statute was challenged as violating the 10th A.
C can tell the states what to (if acting w/in commerce power) but it cannot force them to regulate their citizens in service of a federal regulatory scheme. |
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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US
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Motel refused to rent rooms to African Americans.
Congress, under the Commerce Clause, may regulate businesses local in scope, if their business activities have some impact on interstate commerce. Aggregation Theory: Commerce includes interstate movement of people, a discriminating motel impacts moving people. |
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What are the four activities Congress can constitutionally regulate under the Commerce Clause?
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Channels
Instrumentalities Articles Moving in IC "Substantially Affecting" Commerce |
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Pierce County v. Guillen
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The highway car accident case.
An example of the modern Commerce Clause's power to regulate channels. |
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Gonzales v. Raich
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The marijuana case. Court said cannot regulate home-grown weed.
If the activity doesn't directly affect IC but collectively, substantially effects IC, then C has the power regulate |
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US v. Lopez
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The gun case.
court reaffirmed the deference but distinguished those cases as regulating “economic” activity. But the possession of guns in and around schools was seen as “noneconomic” activity subject to much less deference by the court. |
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US v. Morrison
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The rape case.
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is the exclusive jurisdiction of local government. |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer
(Steel Seizure Case) |
President issues an “executive order” directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the mills and operate them under federal direction. The President does not ask Congress to approve the seizure.
"Zone of Twilight" The President, is bound to enforce the laws within the limits of the authority expressly granted to him by the Constitution, and he cannot usurp the lawmaking power of Congress by an assertion of an unspecified aggregation of his specified powers. |
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US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp
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The Bolivia and Paraguay case.
The scope of the President’s powers may be at least somewhat expanded by Congress’ agreement to his exercise of the power. This congressional acquiescence will be dispositive, but in a close case, the fact that Congress agreed in the President’s conduct may be enough to tip the balance, and to convince the Court that the President is merely carrying out the laws rather than making them. |
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
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US citizen designated and detained as enemy combatant was challenges due process.
Congress did not intend to give the President this power, so he doesn’t have it, and his proposed commission to try D is therefore unconstitutional. |
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Boumediene v. Bush
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Enemy combatant is not entitled to use a habeas corpus petition. P challenges it.
Held for P. The court saw the right to habeas corpus embodied in the suspension clause as a part of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus the court is called upon to guard against the arbitrary use of government’s power in wartime and to maintain the “delicate balance of power” designed to protect the liberty of the individual. |
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What are the three requirements in order to avoid violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?
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(1) The regulation must pursue a legitimate state end;
(2) The regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate state end; and (3) The regulatory burden imposed by the state on interstate commerce must be outweighed by the state’s interest in enforcing its regulation |
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Under the DCC, a statute that is discriminatory in effect will be upheld where:
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Legitimate State Interest
No Other Nondiscriminatory Alternatives |
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Slaughterhouse Cases
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Narrowly defined a state citizen’s federal rights and took all the force out of the privilege or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture & Markets of New York
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Milk case w/ NY vs. MA.
If the state is promoting its residents’ own economic interests, this will not be a legitimate state objective, so the regulation will virtually automatically violate the Commerce Clause. |
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Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin
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An example of a Discriminatory in Effect statute that was struck down because there was a nondiscriminatory alternative.
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Philadelphia v. NJ
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NJ prohibits the importing of most solid or liquid waste into the state.
Violates the CC States may not protect their environment at the expense of their neighbors, unless there is no less-discriminatory way to achieve the same result. |
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Carbone v. Clarkstown
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The Town of Clarkstown (P) entered an arrangement with a local contractor that the latter would build and operate a solid-waste transfer station, which, in five years, would be sold back to the town (P).
Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local businesses is per se invalid unless the municipality can demonstrate under rigorous scrutiny that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest. |
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Maine v. Taylor
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The transporting of fish case.
State law upheld. A facially discriminatory law can be upheld if less discriminatory alternatives are unavailable. |
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Pike v. Bruce Church
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The melon case.
Non-discriminatory laws are upheld so long as the benefits to the government outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce. |
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South-Central Timber Dev. v. Dept. of Natural Resource of Alaska
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If a state imposes burdens on commerce within a market in which it is a participant, but the burdens have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market, they are per se invalid under the Commerce Clause.
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United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
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The ordinance required haulers of trash to deliver the trash to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation. State law upheld.
An ordinance requiring that trash be delivered to a state-created public benefit corporation does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. |
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Hunt v. Washington Apple Commission
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NC required apples sold in the state to be packed in cartons carrying only the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture grade or no grade at all. State law struck down.
When discrimination is found, the state has the burden of justifying its regulation both in terms of the local benefit and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives that can effect such benefit. |
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Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery
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MA protecting MA farmers.
Facially neutral laws can also be found to be discriminatory if they were enacted for a protectionist purpose: helping in-staters at the expense of out-of-staters. |
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Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel
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The truck case.
Safety regulations can also be considered unconstitutional if the safety purpose is outweighed by its degree of interference with interstate commerce. |
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Reeves, Inc. v. William Stake
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SD cement case. State action upheld.
Market Participant. When acting as a market participant rather than a regulator, a state is free to act in that capacity to favor its own citizens over others without violating the Commerce Clause. |
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Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MD
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MA (D)’s legislature, perceiving a need to protect local dairy producers, enacted an assessment system wherein a certain levy was placed on all dairy products sold in MA (D), the proceeds of which were disbursed to MA’s producers only.
State law struck down. A facially neutral law that burdens some interstate companies with disparate impact is not discriminatory merely because it imposes such burdens. |
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn A. Piper
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Piper (P), who lived in VT, passed the NH bar examination, but was not admitted because NH made residency a prerequisite to admission. She challenged this requirement as a violation of the PIC.
NH residency struck down. PIC The Right to Practice One’s Profession: |
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United Building & Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor & Council of the City of Camden
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A NJ municipal ordinance required that 40 percent of all workers on city constructions projects be residents of the city.
Ordinance struck down. PIC The Right to Be Employed |
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Toomer v. Witsell
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Fishing license for out-of-staters
Struck down. PIC Right to Engage in Business |
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Lester Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commn. Of Montana
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Elk hunting statute.
Upheld. PIC does not cover recreational activities. |
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What fundamental rights does the Privileges and Immunities Clause protect?
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Fundamental in National Unity that are all related to commerce:
The Right to Be Employed The Right to Practice One's Profession The Right to Engage in Business Recreational Activity is NOT considered a fundamental right. |
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Lochner v. New York
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A state labor law prohibited employment in bakeries for more than 60 hours a week or more than 10 hours a day. Lochner (P) permitted an employee in his bakery to work over 60 hours in one week.
Court struck down on law. Laissez faire. This case announced three themes: o Freedom of Contract was a right protected by the Due Process Clause o Government could interfere with freedom of contract only to serve a valid police purpose of protecting public health, public safety, or public morals o The judiciary would carefully scrutinize legislation to ensure that it truly served such a police purpose. |
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West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
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WA state had a law that set the minimum wage for women.
Court upheld. The pressure on the court intensified to reinterpret the due process clause and to redefine its own role in the democratic process and defer to legislative judgments in the economic sphere. In West Coast Hotel the court expressed a new-found willingness to do that. |
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United States v. Carolene Products Co
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Carolene Products (D) was attempting to have the “Filled Milk Act” declared unconstitutional because D was indicted on breaking the law.
Court upheld the law. Know Footnote 4 In cases challenging the constitutionality of legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions, the Supreme Court will apply the RATIONAL BASIS TEST, which means that the person challenging the legislation has the burden of showing that a rational basis does not exist. |
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Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
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A state law prohibited any person from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an eye or ear doctor.
Upheld. The Due Process Clause will no longer be used to strike down state laws regulating business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. |
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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The state of SC, in order to protect against coastal erosion, prohibits landowners from building any permanent habitable structure at all on certain parcels. P owns 2 vacant parcels, on which the building ban applies.
A land-use regulation must not “deny an owner economically viable use of his land,” or it will be considered a taking. |
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Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
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If land-use law merely temporarily prevents all economically viable use of a parcel, this will not necessarily constitute a taking – all surrounding circumstances must be considered to determine whether the interference with use is significant enough to constitute a taking.
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp
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The state requires landlord to permit cable TV companies to install their cable facilities in the landlord’s building.
This was a taking If the government makes or authorizes permanent physical occupation of the property, this will automatically be found to constitute a taking, no matter how minor the interference with the owner’s use and no matter how important the countervailing governmental interests. |
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
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A PA statute forbade the mining of coal in such fashion as to cause the subsidence of any structure used by human habitation.
Court ruled there was a takings. The more drastic the reduction in value of the owner’s property, the more likely a taking is to be found. But a very drastic diminution in value (almost certainly much more than 50%) is required. |
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Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
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NYC Grand Central case.
• Landmark preservation schemes, just like zoning and environmental regulations, will rarely be found to constitute a taking. This is especially true where the designation of a particular building to landmark status occurs as part of a comprehensive city-wide preservation scheme. |
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Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
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A Property Owner Can Bring a Takings Challenge to Regulations that Already were in Place
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Kelo v. City of New London
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The City of New London, as part of an economic-development plan for the City’s waterfront area, condemns 15 houses owned by the Ps.
Held for the City The property need not be open to the general public after the taking. Therefore, the fact that the property is turned over to some private user does not prevent the use from being a public one as long as the public can be expected to derive some benefit (ex: economic development) from the use. |
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
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Exactions under the Takings Clause
Unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purposes as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion. |
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Dolan v. City of Tigard
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The City of Tigard (D) granted Dolan’s permit to expand her store, conditioned on her dedicating a portion of her property to provide a flood plain and a bike path. P sued saying the exactions were unfair.
Roughly Proportionate Rule Exactions imposed by the municipality’s permit conditions must be roughly proportionate to the impact of the proposed development. |
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What is the Takings Clause?
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The Takings Clause is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others.
It is “to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” |
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What are the interests that are fundamental under substantive due process?
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Marriage
Child-Bearing Child-Rearing Use Birth Control Live Together With Your Family Direct the Upbringing of Children Education of Children |
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Skinner v. Oklahoma
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Skinner (D) was deemed to be a habitual criminal and was ordered sterilized under a State (P) statute.
A statute that arbitrarily excludes a class from its purview violates the EPC of the 14th Amendment where fundamental rights are involved. |
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Griswold v. Connecticut
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Doctor (D) and layman (D) were prosecuted for advising married person on the means of preventing conception.
Individuals’ interest in using birth control is “fundamental.” So whether a person is married or single, he or she has a fundamental interest in contraception, and the state cannot impair that interest without satisfying strict scrutiny. |
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Eisenstadt v. Baird
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MA made it a crime to give contraceptives to an unmarried person. Baird (D) gave a contraceptive to a single person and was convicted under the MA law. Baird challenged his conviction under the EPC.
Whatever the rights of the individual to access contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for unmarried and married alike. Right of privacy is the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a person, like decision to bear a child. |
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Roe v. Wade
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Roe (P), a single woman, wished to have her pregnancy terminated by an abortion
The right of abortion is the primary example of a right protected by substantive due process. But the right of abortion as it stood under Roe v. Wade had been largely overhauled – and cut back – by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey. |
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey
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After Planned Parenthood, a woman has a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in choosing to have an abortion before viability. However, the state has a somewhat countervailing interest in protecting “potential life,” even before viability.
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Zablocki v. Redhail
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Redhail (P) brought this action challenging the constitutional validity of a Wisconsin statute that provides that members of a certain class may not marry without first obtaining a court order granting permission.
Court struck down When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. |
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Michael H. v. Gerald D.
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Biological link alone does not guarantee constitutional rights regarding the child, but showing that a parent denies access to formerly connected persons with whom child has substantial relationship may in some states render parent unfit and allow state to intervene to grant visitation (child’s interests also important)
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Moore v. East Cleveland
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A city may not enact a zoning ordinance that prevents first cousins from living together, because the right of members of a family – even a non-nuclear family – to live together is “fundamental,” and any state interference with that right will be strictly scrutinized.
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Meyer v. Nebraska
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Meyer (D) was convicted under a Nebraska (P) statute that made it a crime to teach children any language other than English. Meyer challenged his conviction on due process grounds.
A parent has a fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children. |
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Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York
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NY traffic regulation bans advertisements on trucks unless company advertising its own products. Purpose to reduce traffic hazards. NY didn’t have to get rid of all advertisements in Times Square for; okay to eliminate just some of the hazard. Difference between tolerating those acting in self promotion and those doing it for hire.
The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a statute eradicate all evils of the same type or none at all. |
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United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
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Fritz (P) and other active and retired railroad workers alleged that the portions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, which denied them retirement benefits, violated equal protection standards.
Court upheld. This issue – whether any conceivable legitimate purpose is sufficient or whether it must be actual purpose – is crucial in determining the impact of rational basis review. If any conceivable purpose is sufficient, very few laws will fail the rational basis test. Government lawyers can invent some legitimate conceivable purpose for virtually every law. |
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City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
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A city makes it harder for group homes for the mentally retarded to achieve zoning permission than for other group living arrangements to do so. This classification, based upon mental status, will not be treated as suspect or quasi-suspect, and will thus be subject only to “mere rationality” review.
However, such a zoning procedure was found to violate even “mere rationality.” Legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest in order to withstand equal protection review. |
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Romer v. Evans
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Colorado amends its constitution to prohibit any state or local law that protects homosexuals against discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or conduct.
Mere Rationality “With Bite:” But the Court now seems to review anti-gay legislation a bit more skeptically than most legislation not involving a semi-suspect or suspect class, even though gays still don’t have suspect or semi-suspect status. |
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Washington v. Davis
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Local police force test.
If the government enacts a statute or regulation that merely has the unintended incidental effect of burdening, say, African Americans worse than whites, the court will not use strict scrutiny. Racially disparate effect alone will not be deemed an equal protection violation or activate strict scrutiny. Rather, discriminatory purpose is required. Evidence of differential impact or effect would be enough to establish a plaintiff’s case for racial discrimination. Distinguishes Palmer |
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Personnel Administrator of MA v. Feeney
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MA provided that veterans were to be preferred for civil service jobs over other similarly qualified applicants. Feeney (P), a female state employee, challenged the preference on equal protection grounds, asserting that the preference discriminated against women because most veterans are men.
Court upheld employment preference. The Court’s definition of intent is narrow, defining the intent as the desire to cause the certain result. This places a greater burden of proof on those claiming that a facially neutral law has a discriminatory purpose. Effect alone cannot establish an equal protection claim or activate strict scrutiny when there’s some non-racial explanation. The allegedly discriminatory decision must be “because of” and not “in spite of” the disparate effect. |
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
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Metropolitan Housing Development Corp applied to the Village of Arlington Heights for a rezoning of land from single-family to multi-family to permit construction of low-income housing. The Village refused and MHDC sued, charging that the refusal was racially discriminatory in violation of the EPC.
Rezoning upheld. Arlington Heights tells us what kind of evidence in addition to statistical disparities may be relevant on the decision of discriminatory purpose: 1) The history of the decision that is assertedly discriminatory; 2) The sequence of events leading to the decision and whether there were departures from the norm; and 3) The legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by the decisionmakers or reports submitted to them. |
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Palmer v. Thompson
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Jackson, MI, closed its swimming pools after a federal court ordered them to be desegregated. Negro citizens (P) of Jackson challenged the closings as a violation of the EPC.
Court upheld the closing This case stands for the principle that a decision or law made without overt reference to race and that does not result in a disparate impact along racial grounds will not be deemed a racial classification solely on grounds of motive. But it is clear that an equal protection claim based on race must show that race was a motivating factor in the decision at issue. |
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Loving v. Virginia
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Virginia forbids interracial marriage. It claims that blacks aren’t disfavored, because whites are blocked from marrying blacks just as much as blacks are blocked from marrying whites.
Held: The statute’s legislative history shows that it was enacted to protect the “racial purity” of whites, so the classification is invidious and violates Equal Protection. RULE:Restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classification violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Brown v. Board of Education
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Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children.
Court struck down. The clearest example of a classification involving a suspect class and this requiring strict scrutiny is segregation, the maintenance of physical separation between the races. Bigger Concept: Those with Political Power versus those without – EP protects those without power and those with power enact the laws to protect themselves. Only way to get into the power group = interaction. Do it at an early age. |
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Grutter v. Bollinger
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Grutter, a white resident of MI, applied for admission to the law school at the University of Michigan. Under its race-conscious admissions policy, the law school provisionally admitted Grutter, placing her on a waiting list, but ultimately declined to admit her.
Court upheld. Affirmative action case. The school treats as a major “plus” factor an applicant’s membership in one of three historically-discriminated-against groups: blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans. The school does so to create a “critical mass” of these minority students, so that they will participate without feeling isolated. This form of affirmative action is constitutional. The interest in a diverse student body is a compelling one, and the approach here – in that it relies on an individualized, non-mechanical evaluation of each applicant – is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. |
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Gratz v. Bollinger
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Gratz and another high school student, both Caucasian, were denied admission to an undergraduate program at the University of Michigan. Gratz was denied when other student applications who were African-American, Hispanic, and Native American students were effectively guaranteed admission to the University. Every black or Hispanic applicant automatically gets 20 points for diversity. 100 points are needed for admission. The extra 20 points for minority-group status has the effect that virtually every minimally-qualified black or Hispanic applicant is admitted, whereas many well-qualified non-minority applicants are rejected.
This form of affirmative action is unconstitutional, because it is not narrowly-tailored to the achievement of the compelling interest in student-body diversity. The scheme here is a mechanical one that is equivalent to a quota, not an individualized-evaluation scheme like the one approved in Grutter. And the fact that “near-misses” can be flagged for individualized review does not save the scheme. |
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Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
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Two metropolitan school districts sought to assign students to schools to achieve racial balance.
Assignment struck down. No individual student’s race may be considered in making that student’s public high-school or elementary school assignment, if the district is not combating prior official segregation. |
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Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
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The city of Richmond (D) passed a set-aside program whereby general contractors on city construction projects were required to subcontract at least 30 percent of the contract amount to minority-owned businesses. J.A. Croson Co. (P), the sole bidder on a city construction contract, was denied the contact on the basis of the program and sued, alleging that the program was unconstitutional under 14th Amendment’s EPC.
White contractor wins, court struck down on program. The court said the compelling government interest did not have to be the city's own prior discrimination in order for it to provide a remedy b/c the city has some responsibility to prevent private discrimination. The Court agreed that the city had authority to remedy the discrimination, but it did not have the broad authority of Congress to do so. |
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Craig v. Boren
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OK forbids the sale of low-alcohol beer to males under the age of 21, and to females under the age of 18.
Held: This statutes violates the equal protection rights of males aged 18 to 20, because it is not substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. The problem with the classification was that the statistics given as evidence was not happening: the statistics of DUIs from males compared to females. The court said that those statistics were not substantial enough. |
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United States v. Virginia
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Virginia maintains Virginia Military Institute as an all-male college, because of the state’s view that only men can handle the school’s harsh, militaristic method of producing “citizen soldiers.”
Facially Discriminatory Held: this sex-based scheme does not satisfy mid-level review, because it stems from traditional ways of thinking about gender roles; there are clearly some women who are qualified for and would benefit from the VMI approach, and these women may not be deprived of the opportunity to attend. |
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Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
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Hogan (P) sought to strike down a Mississippi statute that excluded males from enrolling in a state-supporting nursing school.
Court struck down Gender classifications benefitting women based on role stereotypes generally will not be allowed. The Supreme Court frequently has invalidated laws that benefit women and disadvantage men when the Court perceives the law as based on stereotypical assumptions about gender roles. |
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Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
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Michael (P), 17 ½ years olds, engaged in sex with a female under the age of 18 and sought to set aside a criminal complaint brought under a California statute that imposes criminal liability for sex with underage females but not with underage males.
Court upheld criminal statute. The compelling government interest is preventing teen pregnancy. Rehnquist explains that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to teen pregnancy. The statute’s purpose is to protect minor females, and to criminalize females for sex would defeat its purpose of protection. The males need to be punished more because the males are not burdened with the consequences of pregnancy. |
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Frontiero v. Richardson
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A statute provides that servicemen’s wives are automatically eligible for benefits as dependents while servicewomen must demonstrate that their husbands are dependent on them before they are eligible for the benefits.
Court struck down. By according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the statutes are unconstitutionally discriminatory and violate the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. |
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Nguyen v. INS
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The INS (P) initiated deportation proceedings against the foreign-born Nguyen (D), son of an unwed U.S. citizen father and a Vietnamese mother, after he pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault and was sentenced to eight years on each count. Nguyen (D) was ruled deportable despite a belated court order establishing that the U.S. citizen was Nguyen’s (D) biological father.
Heightened scrutiny applied. The relationship between the father and son is enough. |
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health
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Missouri (D) required clear and convincing evidence of prior consent by an individual prior to the cessation of life support systems operating upon that individual.
The state may insist that if the parents can’t show “clear and convincing evidence” that during her conscious life P showed a desire not to be kept alive by such artificial measures, the measures must be continued. |
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Washington v. Glucksberg
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A group of Washington physicians (P) and a nonprofit organization (P) that counseled people considering physician-assisted suicide filed suit seeking a declaration that the state’s assisted-suicide ban was facially unconstitutional.
No protected right for due process for assisted suicide. No fundamental right. Therefore, we apply rational basis interest. |
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Lawrence v. Texas
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Police officers saw Lawrence (D), a man, having anal sex with another man inside an apartment. The two men were charged with, and convicted of, the Texas crime of deviate sexual intercourse with a member of the same sex.
Rational-Relation Review “With Bite”: However, although the Court will generally review restrictions on adult sexual activity under the mere-rationality test, the Court will sometimes strike down the regulation on the grounds that it interferes with people’s sexual autonomy. |
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Troxel v. Granville
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The Troxels (P) petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren over the protest of the children’s mother (D).
A parent has a fundamental interest in deciding who will spend time with the child. Therefore, the state may not award visitation rights to a child’s grandparents over the objection of the child’s fit custodial parent, unless the state first gives “special weight” to the parent’s wishes. |
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Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C.
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Republican Party of Minn. v. White
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City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
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Schneider v. NJ
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Chaplinksky v. N.H.
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Schenck v. U.S.
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Gitlow v. NY
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Brandenbug v. Ohio
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U.S. v. O'Brien
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Texas v. Johnson
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Hill v. Colorado
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism
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Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
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