Cases For Property Quiz 2

Front 1

Timberlake v. Heflin

Back 1

P and D were married and purchases a home. The deed held that they were to hold the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They divorced and agreed that D would deliver a deed for her interest in the home. D's statements that she would sell the property contained in a divorce proceeding, constituted judicial admissions and rendered the statute of frauds inoperative because they constituted a sufficient memorandum. P died but his half ownership of the home did not pass to D because D was still obligated to fulfill the contract with P's heir. The written affidavit is signed by D (Ms. Heflin) and includes a description of the property. There was intent presumed based on consideration

Front 2

Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag

Back 2

P developed condominiums and contracted with D for the purchase of a unit. D gave a deposit and delivered a check for 10% of the total purchase price. D notified P that he would be unable to complete the purchase and stopped payment on the check. P failed to show any compelling reasons for specific performance to be granted because the damages sustained by D's breach were readily measurable and the damage remedy at law was wholly adequate. The condominium apartment units, regardless of their realty label, shared the same characteristics as personal property.

Front 3

Ross v. Bumstead

Back 3

D contracted to buy property from P. Possession was to be given upon delivery of the title papers and deed. After the parties entered into the contract of sale, the packing plant and warehouse, together with the contents, were destroyed by fire. D requested adjustment for the loss and D refused. The contract between the parties was not subject to any condition and followed the majority rule finding the risk of loss fell on D as the equity owner.

Front 4

Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Sphinx Investment Co.

Back 4

P own the interests in property adjacent tracts and to D. P and D reached an agreement in general terms for option purchase contracts for the property. D placed a 100k deposit for the option. The contract held that if any merchantable defects were found P was to remedy them by May 1, 1970 or D would have the option to waive the defect and accept or notify by May 15, 1970 to cancel the contract. It was discovered that a portion of the land was conveyed to another company but P had acquired the portion by adverse possession. It would take 60 days to acquire quitclaim. D opted out of the contract. P was not compelled to accept a title based on adverse possession when a contract calls for the delivery of merchantable title. The burden of establishing such title was on D. The adverse possession makes it good and indefeasible but not marketable. The title is not marketable because it could expose P to litigation

Front 5

Brown v. Lober

Back 5

P purchased real estate from the Bost's and received statutory warranty deed containing no exceptions. P granted a coal option to for the coal rights on the tract. P later discovered they only owned 1/3 interest in the subsurface coal rights because a prior grantor reserved 2/3 interest in mineral rights on the tract. P believed they were the sole owners because they had their abstract of title examined for loan purposes. P filed action for breach of the covenant of seisin in their warranty deed against seeking damages but the 10 year statute of limitations barred the suit. Seisin was breached when the property was transferred and statute begins at that point. P could not recover under quiet enjoyment theory because there was no constructive eviction and therefore no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment since there was no interference with plaintiff's right of possession by actual or constructive eviction.

Front 6

Anderson Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick

Back 6

D knew the quality of the land and P’s intention for use of the land to be purchased. The ground appeared ordinary but would not sustain the drive-in theatre P wanted to put in. Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, P the buyer could not recover from D the seller for defects on the property that rendered the property unfit for ordinary purposes. The only exception was if the seller actively concealed latent defects.
P had no right to rely upon the representations D as to its quality where he has a reasonable opportunity of examining the property. The lease made no warranty regarding the suitability of the land P’s purpose of constructing and operating a drive-in theatre. The rule of caveat emptor applies where a lease does not include an implied warranty of suitability and no verbal misrepresentations regarding suitability were made.

Front 7

Jaber v. Miller

Back 7

P rented a building from its owner for a 5 year term. P transferred the lease to Norber and Son stating that P hereby transfers and assigns to Norber and Son the lease contract for the remainder of the lease contract but reserved the right to retake possession if Norber fails to pay the rent of the notes. P reserved the right of re-entry, making it a sublease not an assignment. The parties intended an assignment and not a sublease, as evidenced by the document's title. All its language was that of an assignment rather than a sublease. The consideration was stated to be in payment for the lease and not in satisfaction of a tenant's debt to his landlord. The deferred payments were evidenced by promissory notes, which were not ordinarily given by one making a lease. The court reversed, holding that the document transferring an interest in a building to plaintiff was an assignment, and therefore promissory notes to defendant were cancelled.

Front 8

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company

Back 8

P and D entered into a five year lease for office space. D took possession and soon after another tenant moved into the adjoining space in the building. D made numerous complaints about the excessive noise and the loss D's parking spaces. D gave notice and vacated the premises. P remodeled the premises and leased them for the remainder of the lease. The other lessor vacated and declared bankruptcy and the office remained vacant. D breached the lease agreement by vacating the premises and failing to pay rent. The law imposed a duty upon landlords to mitigate their damages by re-letting premises after a tenant has wrongfully vacated and defaulted on the covenant to pay rent. The court found that leases are essentially commercial transactions, contractual in nature and that the economies of both the state and the nation benefited from a rule that encourages the re-letting of premises, which returns them to productive use, rather than permitting a landlord to let them sit idle while it seeks rents from the breaching tenant.

Front 9

Adrian v. Rabinowitz

Back 9

D by an indenture leased a store to P. During this time the premises were tenanted by another who failed to respond to D's notice to vacate. D executed dispossession proceedings and P took possession two days later. The court held that where the term is to commence in the future there is an implied undertaking by the lessor that the premises shall be open to the lessee's entry, legally and actually. There were implied and express agreements for lessor to deliver premises at beginning of term.

Front 10

Petroleum Collections Inc. v. Swords

Back 10

Texaco leased a service station to including a sign which could be seen for 1/2 mile down the freeway. The sign was found to be fastened improperly and a fire hazard. The sign was taken down and an antique billboard was put up which could not be seen from the freeway. D requested a new sign and no new sign was erected. Texaco and D cancelled the lease and D vacated the premise. Two months prior to cancelation D subleased to a third party, no rent was paid. A tenant could remain in possession and seek appropriate relief or could surrender possession of the premises within a reasonable time. The elected to remain in possession and his obligation to pay rent continued. If the tenant elected to surrender possession of the premises, a constructive eviction occurred and tenant would be relieved of his obligation to pay rent. D was not relieved of his obligation because he remained in possession of the premises.

Front 11

Javins v. First National Realty Corp.

Back 11

P rented an apartment from D. D failed to comply with the housing code and P stopped paying rent and D attempted to evict P. A warranty of habitability measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations are implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by those Regulations and that breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract. Leases should be viewed as contracts, and modern contract law implied warranties of quality to meet expectations of buyers. Common law rule placing the burden of repair on tenant was no longer valid because modern urban tenants' interest in property had nothing to do with the land itself, but was an interest in having suitable living quarters. Since the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they were entitled to expect that the landlord would continue to keep the premises in their beginning condition during the lease term. Covenants should be considered mutually dependant – and therefore tenant should be excused from her obligation by the failure of the landlord to comply with the code.

Front 12

Walls v. Oxford Management Company

Back 12

P was sexually assaulted while parked at the apartment owned and managed by D. This complex has been the site of a number of crimes.
The scope of the duty imposed is limited by what risks, if any, are reasonably foreseeable. As a general rule D will not be held liable for negligence if he could not reasonably foresee that his conduct would result in an injury or if his conduct was reasonable in light of what he could anticipate. As a general principle, landlords had no duty to protect tenants from criminal attack. Such a duty may arise when a landlord had created, or was responsible for, a known defective condition on premises, which foreseeably enhanced the risk of criminal attack. A landlord that undertook, either gratuitously or by contract, to provide security would thereafter have had a duty to act with reasonable care. The warranty of habitability implied in residential lease agreements protected tenants against structural defects, but did not require landlords to take affirmative measures to provide security against criminal attack.

Front 13

Edwards v. Habib

Back 13

P rented a house from D on a month to month basis. P complained to of code violations D failed to remedy. D then gave P the 30 day statutory notice to vacate. A landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not, free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities. Where the housing code effected a change in the relative rights of landlords and tenants, retaliatory motive could constitute a defense. The effectiveness of remedial legislation will be inhibited if those reporting violations of it can legally be intimidated is so fundamental that a presumption against the legality of such intimidation can be inferred as inherent in the legislation even if it is not expressed in the statute.

Front 14

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co

Back 14

a. 42 USC § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law. In sharp contrast to the Fair housing Title (Title VIII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the statute in this case deals only with racial discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination on grounds of religion or national origin

Front 15

Federal Fair Housing Act

Back 15

1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), as amended, prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including children under the age of 18 living with parents of legal custodians, pregnant women, and people securing custody of children under the age of 18), and handicap (disability).
2. Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp. (1989)
a. Disparate Treatment v. Disparate Impact
b. Burden once a prima facie case is made:
c. Disparate Treatment: Would person have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons?
d. Disparate Impact: Is there a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to justify action or policy?

Front 16

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp

Back 16

b. The Supreme Court upheld the village’s decision to deny the rezoning. It applied a case it had recently decided, Washington v. Davis, to hold that a violation of the equal Protection Clause requires proof for a racially discriminatory intent as a motivating factor, although proof of disproportionate impact could be relevant as evidence of intent.
i. The village had relied on zoning factors that were not novel criteria in the Village’s rezoning decisions, and that neighboring property owner had relied on the maintenance of single-family zoning on the developer’s site.

Front 17

Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp

Back 17

P, a minority recipient of section 8 attempted to rent D's apartments. P said she could meet the rent with her section 8 but was told she probably wouldn't meet the earned income check. P was told the results of her application weren't in yet even though they were and also told that they were not accepting section 8.
Statistical evidence offered by P made a prima facie case of disparate impact. D’s had not met their burden to prove that the policies served a legitimate business goal. They had not offered any evidence to show that the polices were reasonably necessary to insure rent payment or that renting to Section 8 tenants or tenants who did not meet the triple income test had resulted in losses. Defendants' willingness to rent to tenants who participated in a program similar to Section 8 was evidence against the necessity of the policy.

Front 18

Robinson v. Lofts Realty Co

Back 18

The leading disparate treatment case. Used this test for refusing to sell an apartment for racial reasons.

a. As adapted for housing discrimination cases, that test requires a showing
i. That the applicant is black
ii. That he applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing
iii. That he was rejected
iv. And that the housing opportunity remained available

Front 19

Giles v. Sheridan

Back 19

P (Minnie Giles) and D's (John and Helen Sheridan) were grantees to a deed. P being a single person and D's were joint tenants. P conveyed an undivided 1/20 of her interest in property to her nephew Harley. Where a conveyance of property is made to two or more persons, and the instrument is silent as to the interest which each is to take, the rebuttable presumption is that their interests are equal. The deed which created the joint tenancy specifically provided that the grantees assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage. By the terms of the deed, therefore, the grantees were equally liable for the discharge of the obligation. The court concluded that a joint tenant who was compelled to pay more than his share of the common debt was entitled to contribution from each of the other joint tenants.

Front 20

3. Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mutual Ins. Co.

Back 20

a. A duty to test for lead paint arises whenever the landlord of a residential property constructed before 1978 either knows or in the use of ordinary care should know that there is peeling or shipping paint on the rental property. (minority view)

Front 21

1. Funchess v. Newman

Back 21

a. We are not inclined to establish a rule that would discourage landlords from improving security. Transforming a landlord’s gratuitous provision of security measures into a duty to maintain those measures and subjecting the landlord to liability for all harm occasioned by a failure to maintain that security would tend to discourage landlords from instituting security measures for fear of being held liable for the actions of a criminal.

Front 22

McKnight v. Basilides

Back 22

D married Ms. King, moved to Seattle and D bought two pieces of property and she became co-tenant. After she died D continued to live there and pay the taxes and make improvements. The court held that husband could not establish adverse possession, because he did not have possession for the required amount of time, and because his possession was not adverse. The court determined that D was required to pay back rent to her heirs for collecting rent from third parties, due to husband's action in refusing to allow heirs occupancy of the premises. The fairest method in cases in which the cotenant occupies and uses common property, instead of renting it out, is to charge him with its reasonable rental value.

Front 23

Robinson v. Trousdale County

Back 23

- P sued D for damages for the taking of certain real estate owned by them as tenants by the entirety, for the purpose of widening a public road adjacent to their property and for incidental damages. D claims the husband alone conveyed the property in a deed to D in fee simple. The court held that each tenant had a joint right to the use, control, and rents of the property and was unable to sell the property without the consent of the other tenant. Because everyone in this action received what they had bargained for except the wife, the court held that she was presently entitled to her award.

Front 24

Hoak v. Hoak

Back 24

Facts: P working spouse was married to D during which time D obtained a profession degree in medicine. P monetarily supported D during his education and even changed jobs out of her expertise to make more money. D graduated from medical school and soon after they parties separated. A trial judge in a divorce proceeding may in an appropriate case award reimbursement alimony to a working spouse who contributed financially to the professional education of a student spouse, where the contribution was made with the expectation of achieving a higher standard of living for the family unit, and the couple did not realize that expectation due to divorce. The court concluded that a professional degree was not marital property. The court adopted instead the concept of reimbursement alimony as a means of compensating the working spouse in this kind of "professional degree/divorce decree" case. The proper place for the earning capacity is in an award of permanent alimony.

Front 25

Storke v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co

Back 25

The deed contained a condition that no saloon or liquor would be on the premises and if they were then the premises would immediately revert to the grantor. D obtained the premises by quitclaim deed which contained no covenant prohibiting the use of saloons on the premises. D’s tenant operated a saloon on the premises. Courts prefer to construe provisions that terminate an estate as conditions subsequent rather than conditional limitations, and in doubtful cases will so construe them. The deed didn't contain a right of re-entry. Re-entry being necessary to effect the forfeiture, and there being no reservation of a right of re-entry, it lacked elements to make a partition suit. The court found that the heirs' action was partition and, in order to maintain partition, it was requisite that the heirs have title. The court held that it was not within the power of equity to make the legal estate necessary to maintain a suit in partition. There being no title in the heirs, and there having been no re-entry, or provision for re-entry, the case was properly dismissed, as lacking in the elements necessary to maintain a partition suit.

Front 26

Brokaw v. Fairchild

Back 26

Isaac Brokaw bought a plot of land in Manhattan and built a residence. It was intended to be rented as a residence but there was no demand for rental of private homes. After Isaac died a life estate was granted to P who wanted to demolish the residence and build apartments. It has been generally recognized that any act of the life tenant which causes permanent injury to the inheritance is waste. The life tenant may do whatever is required for the general use and enjoyment of his estate as he received it. The life tenant is entitled to use the building and plot reasonably for his own convenience or profit. To demolish that building and erect upon the land another building, even one such as contemplate would be and exercise of ownership and dominion. The project would constitute waste even though the value of the property would be enhanced by the alteration. The life tenancy restricted P to the use of the property, and this right did not include making permanent alterations without the express permission of the testator.

Front 27

Rutherford v. Keith

Back 27

The will of Fount Cox left to his wife a life estate, and after her death the real estate would go to the wife's sister Ms. Woosley if she is alive and unmarried. If Ms. Woosley dies or is married before the death of the wife the real estate will go to his two brothers equal shares. If one of the two brothers dies and they have children they will inherit the real estate. The sister had married during the life of the wife. The widow had also remarried and she and her husband conveyed the land to the two brothers. Thereafter, the brothers executed a deed to the grantee. The court held that the wife had been devised a life estate and the first intervening estate, or contingent remainder, was eliminated by the marriage of the sister. The second contingent remainder never vested in the two brothers because of they died before the widow. Therefore, the third remainder to the brother’s children vested in them on the death of the widow.

Front 28

Fletcher v. Ferril

Back 28

A deed was executed in 1923 where JW Fletcher conveyed to Masonic Lodge property reserving a life estate in himself providing that the property was to be used exclusively for a orphans home and school and when it ceases to be used as such, or when the home moves the property shall revert to the heirs of JW Fletcher. (Fee Determinable) Fletcher died in 1930 leaving a will that named his widow as his residuary devisee. The Lodge took possession of the property and used the property to benefit orphans until 1948 when the orphanage ceased to exist. The deed created a possibility of reverter in Fletcher rather than an executory interest in his heirs. Fletcher reserved a life estate in himself. The deed vested a determinable fee in the Lodge, and upon termination of that estate the title would pass to the appellees (Heirs), not by inheritance from Fletcher but by virtue of the executory limitation in that deed. The heirs would thus have an executory interest in the property throughout the existence of the determinable fee. Such an executory interest is not a vested estate and therefore must vest within the periods allowed by the rule against perpetuities.

Front 29

Cushman Virginia Corp. v. Barnes

Back 29

P and D both owned property that was originally part of one large farm, divided among three heirs in a partition proceeding known as "Midway." P acquired a right of way through lot 2. D acquired parts of lots 1, 2 and 3 by two deeds subject to the right of way established in the Durrett partition. D was also conveyed a right of way over Farmington Inc's land and when he purchases his portion of lot 2 he found a sign marked no passin. P informed D of his intention to subdivide the tract of land and use the Durrette road. The court found that there was sufficient credible evidence to support the determination that the width of the road was limited to its width at the creation of the right of way. Ps were entitled to make such use of the right of way as its narrow width permitted. Where the width of a right of way is not specified in a grant, it is limited to the width as it existed at the time of the grant.

Front 30

Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n

Back 30

Frank Miller and his brother Rufus owned lands and constructed a dam to create a lake. Pocono Spring Water Inc granted to Frank Miller, his heirs and assigns forever the exclusive right to fish and boat in the waters. Frank granted Rufus 1/4 interest in the fishing, boating and bathing rights. The two brothers erected boat and bath houses to be rented and profits divided according to rights. Rufus died, and his estate granted a license to D purporting to grant to appellant permission to use the lake. Rufus’s right could not be used and licensed without Ps' consent. P was the one originally granted the rights and privileges. The two brothers worked hard and capitalized on the boat and bath houses they built. These privileges are easements in gross and may be assigned but only with the consent and joinder of the present owners who must act as one stock. Thus Rufus's estate didn't have a right by them to grant a license to D.

Front 31

Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co

Back 31

P leased land from D with old coffin road connecting P's land with the state highway traversing over land owned by D. D padlocked a gate across an old road. The court was satisfied that P was entitled to access to his property over the old road, either on the basis of a way of necessity or on the basis of an implied easement appurtenant to the land. P had no other practicable access and the conditions for finding an easement by implications were also fulfilled. Rule: The essentials to the creation of an easement by implication are, as variously stated by this court, the following: (1) a former unity of title, during which time the right of permanent user was, by obvious and manifest use, impressed upon one part of the estate in favor of another part; (2) a separation by a grant of the dominant tenement; and (3) a reasonable necessity for the easement in order to secure and maintain the quiet enjoyment of the dominant estate. At common law where land is sold or leased and has not outlet, the lessor by implication of law grants ingress and egress over the parcel to which he retains ownership.

Front 32

MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club

Back 32

D owned a golf course and entered into an agreement with the previous owner of P's property where D granted a strip of property to be another entrance for the previous owner by deed containing a building restriction so that D's use of the land as a rough for its sixth fairway could be maintained. In exchange, the previous owner granted D a tunnel easement. P purchased the property and sought to build on the land. An equitable servitude was created and P failed to show that enforcement of the building restrictions would be inequitable. The continuous use of the easement over a long period of time without interference was presumptive evidence of the existence of a prescriptive easement to use the property. The existence of the deed and the undisputed evidence that the land had served as a rough for 40 years with P's actual knowledge of the use that included the frequent driving of golf balls onto the subject property established that D's use was adverse, under claim of right, and generally accepted.