Comparing and Contrasting Scientific realism and Phenomenology
Scientific realism incorporates three stances, or theses, which are known as the metaphysical, semantic and epistemic, according to Psillos (1999). The metaphysical stance argues that the world is definitive in its nature and that it is a “mind-independent natural-kind structure.” In other words, it suggests that the world exists independently of what humans are able to know, verify or recognize. Semantic realism is the second stance of scientific realism and interprets the world as being occupied by unobservable objects and processes. Scientific theories are often accepted as they are with the understanding that they possess truth-conditioned descriptions about the world that they describe. Oftentimes, these descriptions may be true or false. Thus, conjectural declarations are not reducible to the assertions about the behavior of the observable object. The assumption is that if scientific theories are true, the unidentifiable processes and entities are evident and are pervasive throughout the world.
The third thesis of scientific realism, or the epistemic stance, regards established scientific theories that have