Who should bear the burdens? : Three Principles
Let us begin with the Polluter Pay Principle (PPP). According to the PPP, those who contributed to climate change should compensate the harm. The application of this principle has the advantage that the cost of the damage is reflected in the cost of the goods, playing the market its role. Along with this, prevention of harm would be mainly carried out by mitigation than adaptation which results lot cheaper (Vanderheiden, 2011). Although this principle results seems very intuitive, some important concerns should be taken into account. First, emissions of earlier generations cannot be accurately measured and even though the damage is determined, to find the author responsible would be very difficult. …show more content…
Following this, a third approach arises, with the aim to overcome some of the objections presented and to stablish the fundaments of a fair distribution of GHG emissions. This approach is called by Caney “the hybrid model” and arises as an attempt to supplement a qualified version of the PPP by ascribing a qualified version of the APP. These two new principles are the Poverty-Sensitive Polluter Pays principle and the History-Sensitive Ability to pay principle, respectively. As far as the Poverty-Sensitive PPP is concerned, persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused, however, this burden cannot be a detriment to a decent standard of living. On the other hand, regarding the History-Sensitive APP, the Remainder should be addressed by the wealthy; nevertheless, those whose wealth came about in unjust ways should contribute more than those whose wealth did not come about in unjust ways. Having said this, in order to eliminate some of the drawbacks of the PPP and the APP, Caney provides a new theoretical framework within which he thinks the problem should be addressed.
Distributive Justice: Caney’s own definition
Let us turn now to what Caney thinks about distributive justice. In the paper Distributive Justice and GHG emissions presented in 2009, Caney criticises three principles of distributive justice often mentioned and then he provides four claims about how the problem …show more content…
Since this principle does not distinguish between different standards of living, thesis IV cannot be supported by it. Although environmental pollution is a result of non-internalization environmental costs by polluters (Stiglitz, 2012), the PPP does not distinguish that a given amount of emissions does not necessary mean a determined wealth. Thus, forcing people to pay for their emissions regardless of their standard of living would affect our attempts to eradicate the poverty. Consider now the ability to pay principle. This approach is pointed out by Caney as an attempt to establish a principle which deals with emissions of earlier generations, non-human-induced climate change and the emission of the disadvantages. As Caney proposed in 2010, the revenues raised by selling emissions rights could deal with these issues thus, following this idea; the wealthy are not required to bear the burden of the
Let us begin with the Polluter Pay Principle (PPP). According to the PPP, those who contributed to climate change should compensate the harm. The application of this principle has the advantage that the cost of the damage is reflected in the cost of the goods, playing the market its role. Along with this, prevention of harm would be mainly carried out by mitigation than adaptation which results lot cheaper (Vanderheiden, 2011). Although this principle results seems very intuitive, some important concerns should be taken into account. First, emissions of earlier generations cannot be accurately measured and even though the damage is determined, to find the author responsible would be very difficult. …show more content…
Following this, a third approach arises, with the aim to overcome some of the objections presented and to stablish the fundaments of a fair distribution of GHG emissions. This approach is called by Caney “the hybrid model” and arises as an attempt to supplement a qualified version of the PPP by ascribing a qualified version of the APP. These two new principles are the Poverty-Sensitive Polluter Pays principle and the History-Sensitive Ability to pay principle, respectively. As far as the Poverty-Sensitive PPP is concerned, persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused, however, this burden cannot be a detriment to a decent standard of living. On the other hand, regarding the History-Sensitive APP, the Remainder should be addressed by the wealthy; nevertheless, those whose wealth came about in unjust ways should contribute more than those whose wealth did not come about in unjust ways. Having said this, in order to eliminate some of the drawbacks of the PPP and the APP, Caney provides a new theoretical framework within which he thinks the problem should be addressed.
Distributive Justice: Caney’s own definition
Let us turn now to what Caney thinks about distributive justice. In the paper Distributive Justice and GHG emissions presented in 2009, Caney criticises three principles of distributive justice often mentioned and then he provides four claims about how the problem …show more content…
Since this principle does not distinguish between different standards of living, thesis IV cannot be supported by it. Although environmental pollution is a result of non-internalization environmental costs by polluters (Stiglitz, 2012), the PPP does not distinguish that a given amount of emissions does not necessary mean a determined wealth. Thus, forcing people to pay for their emissions regardless of their standard of living would affect our attempts to eradicate the poverty. Consider now the ability to pay principle. This approach is pointed out by Caney as an attempt to establish a principle which deals with emissions of earlier generations, non-human-induced climate change and the emission of the disadvantages. As Caney proposed in 2010, the revenues raised by selling emissions rights could deal with these issues thus, following this idea; the wealthy are not required to bear the burden of the