Idiot Post Racialism Summary

Luvell Anderson’s thesis is that “the pursuit of a post-racial society by means of a change in our discursive practices leaves in place the social structures that fuel racial injustices.” To support this point, he describes the two forms of post-racialism - idiot post-racialism and prescriptive ideals - and claims that the result is simply worsened injustice. In particular, Anderson argues hermeneutical justices such as illocutionary silencing inevitable result. While Anderson raises important concerns, in his considerations of these he overlooks certain inherent aspects of the concepts he is analyzing, failing to practically prove how final societal ideals of post-racialism would destroy the process towards these and put society in a relatively …show more content…
The former basically states that one cannot declare post-racialism on the basis of one anomalous event which at most could indicate less racism. For example, it would qualify as idiot post-racialism to point to one successful person of color and say we must be beyond all issues related to race. It would be hard to contradict Anderson’s assertion and thus support this point, a clear logical fallacy. It is true that claiming post-racialism without incorporating a holistic view into analysis is very problematic. The issues in Anderson’s paper instead lie in his assumption that the other type of post-racialism, prescriptive ideals, are inherently bad. In his effort to arrive at this conclusion, Anderson employs a narrow perspective similar to that of idiot post-racialists to judge a broad …show more content…
Anderson explains how illocutionary silencing resulting from post-racialism qualifies as hermeneutical injustices due to a lack of perceived qualification of the speaker or lack of recognition of the speaker by the hearer, both of which can be due to race. Silencing is when there’s not a misunderstanding but rather a lack of recognition of speech, and the speaker is altogether dismissed on account of race. While Anderson does state that these forms of hermeneutical injustices can result from attempts at the prescriptive ideals, he initially notes that the reason for the ideals in the first place is to get rid of these. Therefore, risking the maintenance of these injustices is worth trying to remove them. If we pair the idea that hermeneutical injustices are already present with the previous comments of prescriptive ideals as end goals to gradually strive towards rather than prematurely assume, it is evident that they are valid ideas with potential for