On October 30, 1991, in the Salon de las Columas at the Royal Palace in the Spanish capital, the Madrid Peace Conference was held. Hosted by U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, attendees included Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, King Hussein of Jordan, and the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat. Bush stood before the delegates of the Middle East, in an unprecedented meeting that many hoped would help resolve a conflict that had been in existence since 1948. President Bush, in his opening remarks, stated the “objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with
…show more content…
Secretary of State James Baker’s single contribution to Arab-Israeli diplomacy, the Madrid Conference, was very much an exercise in low expectations and surprise diplomacy. Between 1989 and 1990 Baker agreed to use a combination of telephone diplomacy, secretarial letters, and meetings in New York and Washington. The objective was to gain Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli agreement on key points to start an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Given the prospects, this relatively hands off approach was about right. Baker’s strategy was a two-track approach involving the Arabs and Palestinians. It was a two pronged initiative designed to get both the Arab states and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians into a negotiation with Israel. The peace conference would hopefully meet the Arab world’s need for an international symbol but assuage Israel’s concern about its having any real authority or power. Getting the Arabs to participate, particularly Syria, was critical to hooking Shamir; structuring the conference and getting the Palestinians was essential to hooking the Arabs. Multilateral negotiations between Israel and Arab states on issues of water, refugees, economic development, and regional security were added to sweeten the deal for the Israelis (Miller, 2008). The conference was a way to break taboos and create an investment trap that would keep Arabs and Israelis at the table for a long
Secretary of State James Baker’s single contribution to Arab-Israeli diplomacy, the Madrid Conference, was very much an exercise in low expectations and surprise diplomacy. Between 1989 and 1990 Baker agreed to use a combination of telephone diplomacy, secretarial letters, and meetings in New York and Washington. The objective was to gain Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli agreement on key points to start an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Given the prospects, this relatively hands off approach was about right. Baker’s strategy was a two-track approach involving the Arabs and Palestinians. It was a two pronged initiative designed to get both the Arab states and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians into a negotiation with Israel. The peace conference would hopefully meet the Arab world’s need for an international symbol but assuage Israel’s concern about its having any real authority or power. Getting the Arabs to participate, particularly Syria, was critical to hooking Shamir; structuring the conference and getting the Palestinians was essential to hooking the Arabs. Multilateral negotiations between Israel and Arab states on issues of water, refugees, economic development, and regional security were added to sweeten the deal for the Israelis (Miller, 2008). The conference was a way to break taboos and create an investment trap that would keep Arabs and Israelis at the table for a long