Ford estimated that the present design would result in approximately 180 fatalities, which would cost them roughly 49.5 million dollars, whereas the cost of implanting the protective gas tank would cost about 137 million dollars. From these figures an economic decision was made. With this knowledge of a threat to public safety the engineers signed off approval on the car design and the car testing reports were labelled as confidential. The car was released to the public in 1971. This flawed car design was used for 6 years, from 1971 to 1976, and resulted in 500 burn deaths. In 1977, the protected fuel tank design was incorporated into production after a change in the standard regulations. The engineers involved in the production of the Ford Pinto understood the risks associated with the design of the fuel system, and that these flaws could be corrected at a reasonable cost. For six years the engineers involved failed to meet their responsibilities to the public by neglecting to educate the public about the risks associated with the design of the Pinto. Furthermore, numerous passengers may have continued to perish if the standards had not been …show more content…
The Challenger was a space shuttle carrying seven crew members, and on January 28th, 1986, the shuttle exploded 73 seconds after liftoff. All seven crew members were killed. The horrific accident was due to a technical failure from a piece known as the O-ring. This portion of the shuttle possesses similar properties to rubber and is used to seal objects against extremely high pressure. This seal was placed on the right rocket booster and failed after liftoff, allowing hot gas and flame to escape and ultimately set fire to the fuel tank. This started a chain reaction as other equipment failed until finally one of the external fuel tanks became damaged, releasing high amounts of liquid hydrogen that caused the explosion of the Challenger. Though a technical failure of the O-ring led to the disaster, there is much to be said about the decisions made leading up to the launch date of the shuttle. The night before the launch a meeting was held between NASA and the shuttle contracting firm Morton-Thiokol. Managers and engineers from both parties were involved. The engineers from Morton-Thiokol had discovered the O-ring performed poorly when used in low temperature environments, and recommended to NASA personnel that the launch date be postponed until the temperature reached a minimum of 53˚F. The NASA personnel were not pleased with this new information. The four Morton-Thiokol