As an originalist, Justice Thomas construes the Constitution’s text to have “the meaning understood [by the public] at the time of [its] enactment” (Bork 144). To do so, Thomas and other originalist judges look to documents from the Founding Era to discern which powers the public understood to be included in, for example, the power to “regulate Commerce…among the several States” (U.S. Constitution 6). As a corollary to the theorem that the one true meaning of a Constitutional provision is the one understood by the society that ratified it, originalists believe that stare decisis “is not, and never has been” “an ironclad rule” (Bork 155-6). In his Raich dissent, Thomas displays his originalist reasoning by seeking the Commerce Clause’s original understanding and by both ignoring and criticizing the Court’s precedential departure from that
As an originalist, Justice Thomas construes the Constitution’s text to have “the meaning understood [by the public] at the time of [its] enactment” (Bork 144). To do so, Thomas and other originalist judges look to documents from the Founding Era to discern which powers the public understood to be included in, for example, the power to “regulate Commerce…among the several States” (U.S. Constitution 6). As a corollary to the theorem that the one true meaning of a Constitutional provision is the one understood by the society that ratified it, originalists believe that stare decisis “is not, and never has been” “an ironclad rule” (Bork 155-6). In his Raich dissent, Thomas displays his originalist reasoning by seeking the Commerce Clause’s original understanding and by both ignoring and criticizing the Court’s precedential departure from that