Problem Statement
7th ID provides Security Force (SECFOR) support to a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) firing battery Task Force (TF) in the PACOM AOR. SECFOR consists of a Company(-) of 71 personnel conducting fixed-site security and 1 medic conducting medical support to the TF. Responsibility for the SECFOR mission will transition from 25th ID in early January 2017 and will reside with 7th ID until relieved, which is currently anticipated to be in early December 2017. During that time, both of 7th ID’s SBCT’s and DIVARTY will undergo NTC rotations and associated ITS preparation, as well as Pacific Response Force (PRF) responsibility, Pacific Pathways (PP) rotations and other partnership events. 16th CAB, 17th FAB, 201st EMIB and 555th EN support numerous CTC rotations as echelon above brigade (EAB) enablers, engage in exercises with international …show more content…
This COA would also degrade PRF readiness in the third and fourth quarter. COA #2 preserves 2-2 SBCT forces for NTC 17-03, allows time to request alignment of mission to 555th EN and allows potential to revert to COA 1 if alignment of mission to 555th EN is disapproved. The only disadvantage is that it potentially removes one Company(-) from NTC certification. COA #3 preserves 1-2 SBCT forces for their NTC rotation and potentially removes only one Company(-) from NTC certification, but it requires to prepare 2 additional units for rotation and 1 as a backstop.
Conclusion
COA #2 is the best solution because it allows time to pursue alignment of rotation 2 to 555th EN, while retaining the capability of 2-2 SBCT to assume rotation 2 if 555th EN alignment is disapproved. Additionally, within this COA there exists the possibility for 1-2 SBCT to construct an aggregate task force under a non-UIC SECFOR commander to avoid direct impacts to existing plans for Battalion ITS
7th ID provides Security Force (SECFOR) support to a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) firing battery Task Force (TF) in the PACOM AOR. SECFOR consists of a Company(-) of 71 personnel conducting fixed-site security and 1 medic conducting medical support to the TF. Responsibility for the SECFOR mission will transition from 25th ID in early January 2017 and will reside with 7th ID until relieved, which is currently anticipated to be in early December 2017. During that time, both of 7th ID’s SBCT’s and DIVARTY will undergo NTC rotations and associated ITS preparation, as well as Pacific Response Force (PRF) responsibility, Pacific Pathways (PP) rotations and other partnership events. 16th CAB, 17th FAB, 201st EMIB and 555th EN support numerous CTC rotations as echelon above brigade (EAB) enablers, engage in exercises with international …show more content…
This COA would also degrade PRF readiness in the third and fourth quarter. COA #2 preserves 2-2 SBCT forces for NTC 17-03, allows time to request alignment of mission to 555th EN and allows potential to revert to COA 1 if alignment of mission to 555th EN is disapproved. The only disadvantage is that it potentially removes one Company(-) from NTC certification. COA #3 preserves 1-2 SBCT forces for their NTC rotation and potentially removes only one Company(-) from NTC certification, but it requires to prepare 2 additional units for rotation and 1 as a backstop.
Conclusion
COA #2 is the best solution because it allows time to pursue alignment of rotation 2 to 555th EN, while retaining the capability of 2-2 SBCT to assume rotation 2 if 555th EN alignment is disapproved. Additionally, within this COA there exists the possibility for 1-2 SBCT to construct an aggregate task force under a non-UIC SECFOR commander to avoid direct impacts to existing plans for Battalion ITS