The greatest war mankind has ever known might only have occurred 77 years ago, but several aspects of the war are still debated to this day. The question of how France could have fallen so easily and quickly is something that thousands of historians have debated, and over time, their opinions and theses have changed. This paper will look at and analyze three historians and their theses: Alistair Horne, Julian Jackson, and A.F. Kovacs. In addition, it will analyze an essay discussing Robert Doughty and his revolutionary historiography works based on the Fall of France. However, all of these essays, books, and arguments are meaningless without an accurate understanding of the situations leading up and occurring during France’s defeat to Germany.
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Julian Jackson, the author of The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 argues in his book that France’s defeat comes down to superior German tactics, and in general the German army having a bit more luck than the French. He argues against the notion that France’s defeat was sealed before the war even began. He reveals that France was in fact in a worse situation before World War One, but their crucial victory at the Marne helped them survive massively (Jackson 213-220). Jackson was born and lived in England only 10 years after the war ended, and was educated at the University of Cambridge. Since England was France’s ally during the war and the fact that he has lived through the cold war, means that his writing may have been less critical of the French, and possibly puts more of the reason for Frances’s defeat on Germany’s superiority. Jackson’s knowledge and expertise on France in the 1900’s is among the world’s best, and it is shown here in his thesis and his use of the sources. He shows how France’s commanders during the war favored more of an organized and centralized command system, which did not work for them well when they were engaging highly mobile German tanks combined with an effective German air force (Jackson 25). Even though it is unfortunately assumed by many …show more content…
The fact that he was alive during the war and actually served during the war certainly altered his views on the war. His views may also have been shaped by being born and raised during the era of the great depression, so it may not seem as surprising when his thesis is geared towards a more economic and political reason for France’s failure. He graduated from Jesus College, Cambridge, and wrote several books concerning a multitude of topics. He argues in his book To Lose a Battle: France 1940, that France’s defeat came from a large amount of political and economic Factors, such as a declining birth rate, a failing economy, political strife, and increasing distrust in the French government by its citizens. The general incompetence of the French command didn’t help either and to illustrate this point, he shows how towards the end of the war with German troops marching towards Paris, France’s high command decided to send tanks that could’ve been used anywhere else to the Maginot Line, which was left virtually unscathed by the German invasion (Horne 538). Such was the laughable incompetence of France’s command. Horne’s writings about the Fall of France were some of the earliest; he wrote this merely 25 years after France’s defeat during World War 2. He uses several primary sources and
Julian Jackson, the author of The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 argues in his book that France’s defeat comes down to superior German tactics, and in general the German army having a bit more luck than the French. He argues against the notion that France’s defeat was sealed before the war even began. He reveals that France was in fact in a worse situation before World War One, but their crucial victory at the Marne helped them survive massively (Jackson 213-220). Jackson was born and lived in England only 10 years after the war ended, and was educated at the University of Cambridge. Since England was France’s ally during the war and the fact that he has lived through the cold war, means that his writing may have been less critical of the French, and possibly puts more of the reason for Frances’s defeat on Germany’s superiority. Jackson’s knowledge and expertise on France in the 1900’s is among the world’s best, and it is shown here in his thesis and his use of the sources. He shows how France’s commanders during the war favored more of an organized and centralized command system, which did not work for them well when they were engaging highly mobile German tanks combined with an effective German air force (Jackson 25). Even though it is unfortunately assumed by many …show more content…
The fact that he was alive during the war and actually served during the war certainly altered his views on the war. His views may also have been shaped by being born and raised during the era of the great depression, so it may not seem as surprising when his thesis is geared towards a more economic and political reason for France’s failure. He graduated from Jesus College, Cambridge, and wrote several books concerning a multitude of topics. He argues in his book To Lose a Battle: France 1940, that France’s defeat came from a large amount of political and economic Factors, such as a declining birth rate, a failing economy, political strife, and increasing distrust in the French government by its citizens. The general incompetence of the French command didn’t help either and to illustrate this point, he shows how towards the end of the war with German troops marching towards Paris, France’s high command decided to send tanks that could’ve been used anywhere else to the Maginot Line, which was left virtually unscathed by the German invasion (Horne 538). Such was the laughable incompetence of France’s command. Horne’s writings about the Fall of France were some of the earliest; he wrote this merely 25 years after France’s defeat during World War 2. He uses several primary sources and