There can be no argument that the use of intelligence has been around for thousands of years. Some of the earliest of examples comes from the biblical period. Recorded in the Old Testament, Moses is told to “send men to spy out the land of Canaan” (Numbers 13:24). Of course, the ways in which intelligence is gathered and used has evolved over the centuries. Reasons of evolution can be attributed to cultural changes in society such as the threat and impact of war and advances in technology. The impact of war, particularly in the last century has influenced immense changes to Intelligence processes, the way it is collected, analysed and disseminated. This essay will cover a brief background of the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Intelligence failures prior to the attack and how those failures have impacted Intelligence.
Background of the attack on Pearl Harbour
During the early 1940s the US had concerns over Japans relations with Nazi Germany and their presence in South East Asia. Because of this the US cut off oil trade with Japan, which the Japanese with little natural resources took as a threat (Vogel, 2012). On the 7th of December 1941 the Japanese fleet attacked Pearl Harbour. This attack came as a surprise to US military in Hawaii. Based off intelligence given, the US were under the impression the Japanese fleet were at home. Even though the US pacific fleet were stationed at Pearl Harbour in the event Japan were to attack. An attack to the US wasn’t a concern to military and state officials who believed Japan did not pose a credible threat to the US. This misconception impacted judgements on intelligence analysis and what intelligence was deemed important regarding Japan prior to Pearl Harbour (Vogel, 2012). Perception and its affects on Intelligence collection With an alliance between Japan and Nazi Germany and the presence of Japanese forces in South East Asia, the US considered an attack by the Japanese however believed due to the superior size of the US military compared to that of Japan, that an attack by Japan was not likely or at least not at Pearl Harbor (Zimm, 2011). Ultimately the US had no interest in joining the war unless absolutely necessary. This belief sets the standard to how intelligence was to be collected and what was deemed important. US analysts and policy makers were so strongly focused on analysing and decoding what was known as ‘Purple’ messages sent between policy makers in Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington (Kahn, 1991). From the Intelligence being received US policy makers had not deemed it necessary to invest any more resources. Little intelligence was coming from Japanese military. Lack of analysts meant Japanese military codes were not able to be deciphered. Information on any plans of an attack travelling between Japanese military officials were missed. Not only were there not enough analysts used to decipher messages, there were not enough agents working overseas particularly in areas occupied by Japan to relay Intelligence back to the US. Absence of HUMINT The US Naval Intelligence (ONI) was the principle agency of Intelligence in the US during WW2. The US Naval attaché in Tokyo gathered most of his Intelligence through Open Sources such as Newspapers, Magazines, Radio and other public sources. However, the Intelligence gathering became difficult as the Japanese began to censor these open sources (Borch, 2003). Other than the Naval attaché, the US had no other Human Intelligence agents in Japan, nor did the US employ any Japanese informants. Allied Intelligence agencies such as the British however did during WWII employ HUMINT agents and informants. Was it …show more content…
Today Intelligence practices are taught in Universities and Defense colleges. The concepts of collection, analysis and dissemination are fundamental for an analyst to be successful.
Improvement of concepts such as HUMINT and SIGINT have come a long way since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Today we use a multitude of forms of Intelligence collection. HUMINT has become an important form of collection with agencies dedicated to HUMINT alone. SIGINT too has developed over the century, particularly due to the advances in technology. Even with new technology, an important process of SIGINT still remains, the need to sort the SIGINT from the