The bailouts give rise to the famous “moral hazard” problem (Stiglitz, 2006). Moral hazard arises when a party does not bear all the risks associated with his action and as a result does not do everything he can to avoid the risk. In this case, the risk is of default, but Greece didn’t do much to avoid it. This is a display of no responsibility. To conclude, even though these countries, which can’t pay what they owe, have three alternatives. They are receiving more negative effects than positive outcomes. The debt forgiveness would weaken their self-determination. The restructuring would suffer their citizens and default would loose their reputation in the globe. The debtors should know well about the consequences before they make the decision to borrow money from other countries or international
The bailouts give rise to the famous “moral hazard” problem (Stiglitz, 2006). Moral hazard arises when a party does not bear all the risks associated with his action and as a result does not do everything he can to avoid the risk. In this case, the risk is of default, but Greece didn’t do much to avoid it. This is a display of no responsibility. To conclude, even though these countries, which can’t pay what they owe, have three alternatives. They are receiving more negative effects than positive outcomes. The debt forgiveness would weaken their self-determination. The restructuring would suffer their citizens and default would loose their reputation in the globe. The debtors should know well about the consequences before they make the decision to borrow money from other countries or international