In chapter one of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that human’s purpose is not happiness, mainly in order to further defend his previous claim that a good will can be considered good without any necessary qualification.
Kant agrees with the principle that no instrument for any purpose would be found in a being unless it was the most appropriate instrument for that purpose. This is why he claims that nature would have made a grave mistake if it burdened reason with finding happiness. Happiness, he writes, could be “attained far more surely by instinct than it ever could be by reason”. Instinct seems to mesh much better with finding happiness than reason does, as reason can cause desires to be skewed, while instinct
Kant agrees with the principle that no instrument for any purpose would be found in a being unless it was the most appropriate instrument for that purpose. This is why he claims that nature would have made a grave mistake if it burdened reason with finding happiness. Happiness, he writes, could be “attained far more surely by instinct than it ever could be by reason”. Instinct seems to mesh much better with finding happiness than reason does, as reason can cause desires to be skewed, while instinct