Based on the requirements for attaining philosophic knowledge it could be justified merely by its overall effects; as well as its epistemic features. True belief, for example, might accomplish a sort of philosophic knowledge. However, true belief is more perilous compared to true knowledge; it can be subjected to all sorts of undermining, and therefore have its relevance erode over time. Knowledge might do better than true belief in inhibiting most non-rational motivations. This, however, may only be the indirect effect of features that make up knowledge. So, if it is justified then it is virtuous? In the Republic Plato expresses that a virtuous person will possess philosophic knowledge and that virtuous actions be based on such knowledge. For example, when two people do the same action but one has true knowledge of it while the other is simply acting based on opinion or otherwise. Plato maintains that only the virtuous can act virtuously. This is crucial since Plato does not think that ordinary, non-philosophers (citizens) and philosophers differ much in most of actions typically open to assessment as either virtuous or vicious; often both try and avoid many similar wrong doings when living; stealing, killing, not having sympathy …show more content…
“For the city to possess the virtue of wisdom, its rulers must possess knowledge” (428b-429a). “Therefore, someone who knows at least some forms can possess knowledge” (475d-480a). The rulers must know some forms to be philosophers. These thoughts bring us to the idea that mistakes will necessarily be made by non-philosophers (for they lack true knowledge) to which Plato suggests that on any moment of decision, the non-philosopher is very likely to choose incorrectly. Philosophic knowledge is wholly necessary for ruling to avoid many errors. The kind of knowledge that Plato stresses here is knowledge of what the just and therefore virtuous possess. To attain such knowledge, however, one is required to have knowledge of comparable forms in the first place since a necessary condition of truly appreciating a form is to know its definition. Among all forms, the form of the good is the most significant: "once they have seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model" (540a-b). Since knowledge of the form of the good requires having knowledge of many of the forms, particularly any concerned with that of virtue. Plato indicates an importance of such