The Harder Right
September 6, 2003, Avi Dichter, the head of Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, experienced his “toughest day” as a leader (Moreh, Fialon, & Kowarsky, 2012). Within the city of Gaza, leaders of the terrorist group Hamas assembled in a two-story building. Analysts calculated that a two-ton bomb could destroy these leaders, thus, decimating the terrorist group’s command and control. However, the Israeli army opposed the utilization of a one-ton bomb. This munition would cause extensive civilian casualties in the surrounding area. The Israeli Prime Minister compromised by authorizing a weaker bomb to only destroy persons on the second floor. Unfortunately, all the terrorist leaders were on the first floor during the strike and all managed to escape. Although significant strategic gains could have been won by utilizing a one-ton bomb, the act of knowingly killing civilians is immoral. The use of force to knowingly kill noncombatants is unjust because it violates principals of Just War Theory. Jus in Bello, just conduct during times of war, is comprised of three main principles: discrimination, proportionality, and responsibility (Moseley). Given similar scenarios, military …show more content…
The concept of “restriction of means” advocates against unnecessary suffering and restricts the amount of long-term damage that extends beyond the period of conflict (Green, 1993, p. 123). By killing innocent civilians, the engaging country creates emotional, fiscal, and physical problems to the enemy country for many years following the war. It is a leader’s responsibility to limit the long-lasting damage to their enemy to create better political success in the future. A bombing of an Israeli bus does not justify the massacre of innocent civilian lives in Gaza. Terrorist groups must be treated as separate entities and not representatives of national or ethnic
September 6, 2003, Avi Dichter, the head of Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, experienced his “toughest day” as a leader (Moreh, Fialon, & Kowarsky, 2012). Within the city of Gaza, leaders of the terrorist group Hamas assembled in a two-story building. Analysts calculated that a two-ton bomb could destroy these leaders, thus, decimating the terrorist group’s command and control. However, the Israeli army opposed the utilization of a one-ton bomb. This munition would cause extensive civilian casualties in the surrounding area. The Israeli Prime Minister compromised by authorizing a weaker bomb to only destroy persons on the second floor. Unfortunately, all the terrorist leaders were on the first floor during the strike and all managed to escape. Although significant strategic gains could have been won by utilizing a one-ton bomb, the act of knowingly killing civilians is immoral. The use of force to knowingly kill noncombatants is unjust because it violates principals of Just War Theory. Jus in Bello, just conduct during times of war, is comprised of three main principles: discrimination, proportionality, and responsibility (Moseley). Given similar scenarios, military …show more content…
The concept of “restriction of means” advocates against unnecessary suffering and restricts the amount of long-term damage that extends beyond the period of conflict (Green, 1993, p. 123). By killing innocent civilians, the engaging country creates emotional, fiscal, and physical problems to the enemy country for many years following the war. It is a leader’s responsibility to limit the long-lasting damage to their enemy to create better political success in the future. A bombing of an Israeli bus does not justify the massacre of innocent civilian lives in Gaza. Terrorist groups must be treated as separate entities and not representatives of national or ethnic