The principal of his argument is that since human beings differ greatly in their moral ideas, moral knowledge must not be innate. For example, what does it mean for all men to subscribe to the principle of justice so long as they have different notions about what is the just or right thing to do in particular instances? Clearly, it can mean nothing. Justice or any other virtue can mean nothing more than the particular instances that surround it. As far as these concrete particulars are concerned, there is no universal agreement and hence no reason for believing they are innate. Further evidence that moral principles are not innate can be seen from the fact that it is customary to give reasons to support or justify one's belief in any given moral principle. In this respect, the belief in moral principles is different from the belief in speculative principles. No one would think of giving reasons to justify the belief in the law of non-contradiction, which holds that a thing cannot be what it is and what it is not at the same time. That would be like trying to prove the principles of proof itself, which would be nonsensical. This is not the case with respect to moral beliefs: one can always give reasons for believing that people should keep their promises, pay their debts, or treat their fellow humans the way they would want to be treated themselves. Since the reasons are logically prior to the beliefs, we can only conclude that moral beliefs themselves are not
The principal of his argument is that since human beings differ greatly in their moral ideas, moral knowledge must not be innate. For example, what does it mean for all men to subscribe to the principle of justice so long as they have different notions about what is the just or right thing to do in particular instances? Clearly, it can mean nothing. Justice or any other virtue can mean nothing more than the particular instances that surround it. As far as these concrete particulars are concerned, there is no universal agreement and hence no reason for believing they are innate. Further evidence that moral principles are not innate can be seen from the fact that it is customary to give reasons to support or justify one's belief in any given moral principle. In this respect, the belief in moral principles is different from the belief in speculative principles. No one would think of giving reasons to justify the belief in the law of non-contradiction, which holds that a thing cannot be what it is and what it is not at the same time. That would be like trying to prove the principles of proof itself, which would be nonsensical. This is not the case with respect to moral beliefs: one can always give reasons for believing that people should keep their promises, pay their debts, or treat their fellow humans the way they would want to be treated themselves. Since the reasons are logically prior to the beliefs, we can only conclude that moral beliefs themselves are not