The night of September 4th, most of Olympic representatives of Israel when out for the night to attend a production of Fiddler on the Roof. Across town that same night, in a restaurant in Munich’s major railway station, Abu Daoud, a leader of the Fatah movement, briefed an eight member group of his organization’s military wing about what they were about to do (Burnton). This Palestinian group was called, Black September (Burnton). A little after four a.m. on the morning of September 5th, the eight men travelled to the Olympic village. The Olympic village was surrounded by a seven-foot wire fence, which according some it could be easily breached by even a “reasonably fit adult” …show more content…
She said, “If we should give in, then no Israeli anywhere in the world can feel that his life is safe.” Germany had no special unit dedicated specifically to anti-terrorism. However, one was created within the week following these events. Because of this the negotiations were handled by Bruno Merk, the Bavarian interior minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German federal interior minister, and Munich’s chief of police, Manfred Schreiber (Burnton). Manfred Schreiber had the assistance of a female police officer who, he hoped, would be a calming presence on all involved. No psychologists or specially trained hostage negotiators were consulted for their help in this crisis (Burnton).
At about six a.m., Avery Brundage, the president of the International Olympic Committee, was told of the hostage situation. He ordered that the Games should continue and carry on in peace (Burnton). At 8:15 a.m., with two Olympians lying dead on the grounds of the athletes’ village, the day’s first scheduled Olympic event began, on time (Burnton). Brundage spent his day pressuring the German officials to get the Israelis out of the village (Burton). “The Games,” he said, “must continue at all