Ultimate responsibility would entail that there must be at least some moments in an agent’s life in which an agent has a truly free choice- an alternate possibility. However, alternate possibilities alone are not sufficient to prove free will. Philosopher J. L. Austin provides several examples in which there is an alternate possibility but no free will. In one example involves a golfer who, due to a twitch, misses his putt (Kane 125). In this example, an alternate possibility clearly exists: the golfer could have not missed the putt; however he could not have freely chose either action. His twitch prevented the golfer from choosing to make the putt. Because of this, onlookers would claim that the golfer is not responsible for missing the putt even though he had the possibility to make it. This action does meet the alternate possibility requirement; however it does not meet the ultimate responsibility requirement. Although alternate possibilities are necessary for free will, they are not sufficient on their own. Agents need both alternate possibilities and ultimate responsibility to have free
Ultimate responsibility would entail that there must be at least some moments in an agent’s life in which an agent has a truly free choice- an alternate possibility. However, alternate possibilities alone are not sufficient to prove free will. Philosopher J. L. Austin provides several examples in which there is an alternate possibility but no free will. In one example involves a golfer who, due to a twitch, misses his putt (Kane 125). In this example, an alternate possibility clearly exists: the golfer could have not missed the putt; however he could not have freely chose either action. His twitch prevented the golfer from choosing to make the putt. Because of this, onlookers would claim that the golfer is not responsible for missing the putt even though he had the possibility to make it. This action does meet the alternate possibility requirement; however it does not meet the ultimate responsibility requirement. Although alternate possibilities are necessary for free will, they are not sufficient on their own. Agents need both alternate possibilities and ultimate responsibility to have free