David Hume's Theories Of Impressions

In Treatise, David Hume explains two categories of perceptions – impressions or ideas. Impressions originate from our sensory observation or feeling, which is also regarded as reflections by Hume. Ideas aren’t as vivid as impressions, nonetheless they originate from our impressions. Ideas aren’t as vivid as impressions because it involves thinking of something instead of (first hand) experiencing it. Hume proposes a principle that implies that all ideas, regardless of whether simple or complex, are resultants of their respective impressions. Complex ideas would originate from complex impressions and same would be applied to simple ideas and simple impressions. These terms lay the basis for Hume’s definitions of “cause” and his Copy Principle …show more content…
The first is spatial contiguity, in which objects must be in close distance to one another. The second is temporal contiguity where the objects must follow one another in a manner that the effect immediately follows the cause in a close succession of time. Besides these two relations, Hume also considered a third relation – constant conjunction. Constant conjunction is defined as “a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other” (T 1.1.1.8) and this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions is the convincing proof that impressions are the causes of ideas and our ideas of our …show more content…
Hume’s definitions all claim that causes are observational since all ideas are obtained through impressions. Under this idea, there are causes we are unable to see and discover and Hume doesn’t deny such a claim when he says, “I answer this objection, by pleading guilty…I am afraid, that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses…I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas” (T 1.2.5.26). Hume is satisfied with what he has established and doesn’t deny that these secret (or hidden) causes play an importance in explaining the precedency and contiguity of observations in our experience. The nature of Hume’s purpose in Treatise is to explicate the nature of impressions and ideas, but he fails to provide substantial evidence for why certain principles have this remoteness or minuteness factor (T 1.3.12.5). It’s puzzling that Hume can be so certain of his definitions of cause, but provide no explanation for why hidden causes play an importance in the